

Vol. 6 (1) 2019

ISSN 2311-3448

ARTICLES

ANDREY SHISHKOV. Discussing the Concept of Conservative Ecumenism

WILL COHEN. Whether and How Ecumenism, Anti-Ecumenism, and Conservative Ecumenism Are Politically or Theologically Motivated: A View from the United States

VLADIMIR MIKHEEV. Can Religious States and Representations Be Religious and Secular? A Critique of the Psychology of Religion

DIMITRI BRATKIN. D.A. Chwolson as an Expert Witness and Student of Abraham Geiger: Three Chapters from a Scholarly Biography

PAVEL KHONDZINSKII. Russian “New Theology” in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century: On the Question of the Genesis and Content of the Concept

BOOK REVIEWS

SOFYA RAGOZINA. Does It Mean You're Radical If You Have a Beard and Don't Eat Baguettes? Review of: E.I. Filippova and J. Radwani, ed. 2017. *Religii i radikalizm v postsekuliarnom mire* [Religions and Radicalism in the Postsecular World]. Moscow: IEA RAN (in Russian). — 330 p.

ALEXANDER AGADJANIAN. M.Iu. Smirnov, ed. 2017. *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar' sotsiologii religii* [Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Sociology of Religion]. Saint Petersburg: Platonovskoe Filosofskoe Obshchestvo (in Russian). — 508 p.



STATE,
RELIGION
and CHURCH

Vol. 6 (1) 2019

RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ACADEMY OF NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

STATE,
RELIGION
and
CHURCH

Vol. 6 (1) 2019

ISSN 2311–3448

STATE,
RELIGION
and
CHURCH

Vol. 6 (1) 2019

RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ACADEMY OF NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Moscow, 2019

EDITORS *Dmitry Uzlaner (editor-in-chief),
Marlyn Miller (editor), Alexander Agadjanian,
Alexander Kyrlezhev*

DESIGN *Sergei Zinoviev, Ekaterina Trushina*

LAYOUT *Anastasia Meyerson*

State, Religion and Church is an academic peer-reviewed journal devoted to the interdisciplinary scholarly study of religion.

Published twice yearly under the aegis of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Alexey Beglov (Russia), Mirko Blagojević (Serbia), Thomas Bremer (Germany), Grace Davie (UK), Vyacheslav Karpov (USA), Vladimir Malyavin (Republic of China), Brian Horowitz (USA), Vasilios Makrides (Germany), Bernice Martin (UK), Alexander Panchenko (Russia), Randall A. Poole (USA), Kathy Rousselet (France), Kristina Stoeckl (Austria), Marianna Shachnovich (Russia), Mikhail Smirnov (Russia), Roman Svetlov (Russia), Olga Vasileva (Russia), Alexander Verkhovsky (Russia), Paul Werth (USA), Alexey Yudin (Russia).

Address: *State, Religion and Church* Editorial Office. Institute of Public Administration and Management. Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
Prospekt Vernadskogo 84. Building 8, Room 2023. 119606 Moscow, Russia.

Website: www.srch.ranepa.ru

E-mail: religion@rane.ru

Copyright © 2019 Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the editor.

The opinions of the authors expressed in this journal are their own and do not necessarily coincide with those of the editorial staff.

Indexed in *Erih Plus* and *ATLA Religion Database*.

Table of Contents

Articles

<i>ANDREY SHISHKOV</i> . Discussing the Concept of Conservative Ecumenism	4
<i>WILL COHEN</i> . Whether and How Ecumenism, Anti-Ecumenism, and Conservative Ecumenism Are Politically or Theologically Motivated: A View from the United States.	20
<i>VLADIMIR MIKHEEV</i> . Can Religious States and Representations Be Religious and Secular? A Critique of the Psychology of Religion.	44
<i>DIMITRI BRATKIN</i> . D.A. Chwolson as an Expert Witness and Student of Abraham Geiger: Three Chapters from a Scholarly Biography	65
<i>PAVEL KHONDZINSKII</i> . Russian “New Theology” in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century: On the Question of the Genesis and Content of the Concept	86

Book Reviews

<i>SOFYA RAGOZINA</i> . Does It Mean You’re Radical If You Have a Beard and Don’t Eat Baguettes? Review of: E.I. Filippova and J. Radwani, eds. 2017. <i>Religii i radikalizm v postsekuliarnom mire</i> [Religions and Radicalism in the Postsecular World]. Moscow: IEA RAN (in Russian). — 330 p..	105
<i>ALEXANDER AGADJANIAN</i> . M.Iu. Smirnov, ed. 2017. <i>Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ sotsiologii religii</i> [Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Sociology of Religion]. Saint Petersburg: Platonovskoe Filosofskoe Obshchestvo (in Russian). — 508 p	113



ANDREY SHISHKOV

Discussing the Concept of Conservative Ecumenism

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.22394/2311-3448-2019-6-1-4-19>

Andrey Shishkov — Ss. Cyril and Methodius Institute for Post-Graduate Studies; Synodal Biblical and Theological Commission of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow). andrey.v.shishkov@gmail.com

This article continues the discussion of the concept of conservative ecumenism proposed by the author in 2017 to describe conservative Christian alliances in defense of traditional values. Debates have mainly revolved around the use of the term “ecumenism” in the case of such alliances. This article proposes what the author calls “ecumenical consciousness” as the minimal criteria for being “ecumenical.” It also considers the question of whether striving for Christian unity is a necessary criterion of ecumenism. Based on the work of George Lindbeck, the author shows that the normative image of ecumenism as a movement to achieve unity as a mandatory condition is incorrect, and that negotiating unity is not the only possible form of ecumenical interaction. The author also discusses the relationship between theology and ideology in connection with ecumenism.

Keywords: anti-ecumenism, Christian Right, conservatism, conservative Christian alliances, Ecumenical movement, ecumenism, interconfessional cooperation, Manhattan Declaration, Pan-Orthodox Council, postsecular conflicts, pro-life, traditional values, World Council of Churches, World Congress of Families.

TODAY, the theme of conservative Christian alliances that defend traditional values is increasingly attracting the attention of researchers — sociologists, political scientists, religious scholars. But this phenomenon can be studied through a theological lens as well as through the methods of social and political sciences. It is theology — or, more precisely, ecclesiology — the theological discipline of studying the Church — that allows us to consider conservative Christian alliances as a form of ecumenism.

The discussion of “conservative ecumenism” as a separate phenomenon, different from traditional forms of ecumenical interaction, began in 2017 with the publication of my article “Two Ecumenisms: Conservative Christian Alliances as a New Form of Ecumenical Cooperation” in the journal *State, Religion, and Church in Russia and Worldwide*. This theme was central to the international seminar “Ecumenism 2.0? Between Ecumenism and Anti-Ecumenism (Orthodox Cases).”¹ Discussions continued in a number of subsequent publications,² some of which were specially prepared for this issue of the journal. In this article, I would like to highlight this discussion and respond to criticism from colleagues.

Historical forms of ecumenism

The main debate has revolved around the correctness of using the term “ecumenism” for conservative Christian alliances in support of traditional values. A little history tour is necessary here.³ Ecumenism as a form of interaction between Christian churches and communities appeared more than a hundred years ago. The starting point of the ecumenical movement was the World Missionary Conference held in Edinburgh in 1910. At this conference, according to its chairman John Mott, Christians “realized that the biggest obstacle to the spread of Christianity is we ourselves” (Mott 2001, 13). One of the main topics discussed in Edinburgh was the missionary “struggle for

1. The seminar was held on March 21–24, 2018, in Vienna within the framework of the Postsecular Conflicts research project, with the participation of the Ss. Cyril and Methodius Institute for Post-Graduate Studies and the journal *State, Religion, and Church in Russia and Worldwide*.
2. See, for example, the section devoted to the discussion of the concept of conservative ecumenism in *Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West* 10 (2018).
3. For a more detailed overview of the history of the ecumenical movement, see Shishkov 2017, 272–81.

souls” between Christians in non-Christian countries. This struggle, according to many participants, had only discredited Christianity in the face of a world that was not very friendly to it. The need for a single Christian witness in rapidly secularizing societies raised the question of Christian unity, which over time became the main goal of the ecumenical movement. Ecumenism can be called the Christian answer to secularization.

Early ecumenism was not a monolithic phenomenon; it consisted of different movements, each with its own goals. The most notable of these were two: the Faith and Order movement, which sought to clarify the theological conditions of church unity, and the Life and Work movement, which dealt with issues of unifying Christian social action. In 1948, various movements united to form the World Council of Churches (WCC), which became the central platform for ecumenical dialogue. Over time, regional analogues of the WCC emerged — the European Conference of Churches, the Middle East Council of Churches, the All Africa Conference of Churches, and so on. Church structures responsible for ecumenical activities have also appeared within the churches themselves. For example, after the Roman Catholic Church officially joined the ecumenical movement, it established the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity. The Russian Orthodox Church also had appropriate structures in place.⁴ At the level of official declarations, ecumenical structures stated the goal of the visible achievement of Christian unity,⁵ and at the level of practice focused on interaction in the field of social work, human rights activities, organization of joint prayer actions and pilgrimages, and so on. The term “ecumenism” has become firmly associated with the activities of the WCC, its affiliated ecumenical organizations and foundations, as well as church structures engaged in bi- and multilateral theological dialogues between churches.⁶ I have suggested calling this organiza-

4. In 1960, on the eve of the accession of the Russian Orthodox Church to the World Council of Churches, the Commission on Inter-Christian Relations was established, and in 1979 the Holy Synod Commission on Christian Unity. The Synodal Theological Commission was the successor of the latter in 1993, and one of its first tasks was to evaluate the results of the theological dialogue between the Orthodox Church and non-Chalcedonian Oriental churches.
5. FitzGerald 2004, 1. Achieving the visible unity of churches is also mentioned in the document “The Church: Toward a Common Vision,” presented at the 10th WCC General Assembly in Busan, 2013.
6. We are talking, for example, about official dialogues between the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches, or between the Roman Catholic Church and the World Lutheran

tional type of ecumenism “classical” to distinguish it from the “conservative” type, which is not related to the WCC or the official church structures responsible for theological dialogues between individual denominations.

Conservative ecumenism is institutionalized in the form of movements whose activities revolve around the agenda of so-called “traditional values”: the traditional family (anti-LGBT), life (against abortion, euthanasia, artificial insemination), and religious freedom (religious symbols in public space) (Shishkov 2017, 224). A striking example of a conservative and ecumenical organization is the World Congress of Families (WCF), perfectly described by Kristina Stoeckl (Stoeckl 2018). Another example of the institutionalization of conservative ecumenism is the pro-life movement (Martin 2018). Within the framework of conservative ecumenism, there are also bilateral church contacts and initiatives, such as the interaction between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Billy Graham Evangelical Association (Shishkov 2017, 286–94).

“Ecumenical consciousness”

Returning to the discussion on the correctness of classifying conservative Christian alliances as a form of ecumenical interaction, one should ask the question: what is ecumenism and what are the criteria for belonging to it? The phenomenon of ecumenism is not only (and not primarily) the creation of various structures for dialogue and interaction between churches and Christian communities. Ecumenism is also a new Christian worldview based on a turn toward openness and the mutual recognition of Christians of different faiths as Christians. In my article, I called this worldview “ecumenical consciousness” and suggested the minimum criteria that define it. There are three: (1) recognition of the community of Christians regardless of their religious affiliation; (2) rejection of proselytizing, that is, a form of missionary activity that is associated with a deliberate effort to convert Christians of one confession to another; and (3) a fundamental rejection of the theological language that defines Christians of other confessions in the negative terms of “heresy” and “schism” (Shishkov 2017, 273). I argued that conservative ecumenicists are bearers of ec-

Federation. These dialogues are not related to WCC structures and represent direct ecumenical contacts between faiths.

umenical consciousness and share these ecumenical values (Shishkov 2017, 297).

Will Cohen calls my criteria ambiguous.⁷ In his view, following these criteria does not necessarily amount to ecumenism. For example, he speaks of a church publicist who “very much wants to include the non-Orthodox as ‘all who follow Christ’ but refuses to recognize the ecclesiastical nature of any non-Orthodox [Christian] community” (Cohen 2018, 26). Another example relates to Orthodox believers who say they are against proselytizing, but do not recognize the existence of other churches outside Orthodoxy (Cohen 2018, 26). In both cases, these Orthodox believers don’t recognize other Christian communities as churches from a theological point of view, as part of the Church as a metaphysical reality.

However, even in classical ecumenism there is no requirement to recognize other churches as churches. Moreover, one of the key documents of the World Council of Churches states that “membership [in the WCC] does not imply that each church must regard the other member churches as churches in the true and full sense of the word” (World Council of Churches, 1950). This means that those Christians who recognize the community of Christians over confessional boundaries, denounce proselytism, and do not use the language of “heresy” and “schisms,” but are not ready to recognize other Christian communities as churches in the ecclesiological sense of the word, can also be called ecumenists.

A necessary element of ecumenical consciousness, which I have missed, is the desire for the restoration of unity. Cohen writes, “An ecumenist is someone whose hope for the restoration of full unity . . . makes working toward it an imperative.”⁸ He adds: “Many classical ecumenists, especially Orthodox or Catholic, generally have seen *working for union* with another church, out of a hope rooted in the recognition in that church’s retention of at least certain key ecclesial elements in common, as the necessity.”⁹

Regina Elsner believes that I reduce the normative requirements of ecumenism exclusively to the goal of organizational unity (Elsner 2018, 19). But as you can see above, in defending the idea that conservative Christian alliances are a form of ecumenism, I hold the oppo-

7. Cohen 2018. See also the article by W. Cohen in this issue.

8. See Cohen’s article in this issue.

9. Ibid.

site view. For such alliances, organizational unity is not the goal. Rather, they proceed from the fact that unity has already been achieved, as, for example, one of the most significant documents of conservative ecumenism — the Manhattan Declaration of 2009 — declares: “We are Christians who have joined together across historic lines of ecclesial differences to affirm our right and, more importantly, to embrace our obligation to speak and act in defense of these truths” (“Manhattan Declaration” 2009).

Striving to restore unity as a criterion for ecumenism

Cohen’s comment on the need for ecumenism in the quest for the restoration of church unity raises the question of how to understand unity. The modern ecumenical theologian Dagmar Heller says that the term “unity” was understood by the ecumenical movement in different ways: (1) as a common cause, (2) as an intercommunion (that is, eucharistic communication while maintaining the autonomy of the churches), and (3) as an “organic union” (that is, a common organization) (“Khristianskii ekumenizm” 2017, 305). The first is also applicable to conservative Christian alliances. But the fact is that only the second and the third are perceived today as an ecumenical imperative.¹⁰

In 1989, George Lindbeck, an American Lutheran theologian and longtime ecumenical activist, wrote an article in which he distinguished between two kinds of ecumenism: *unitive* and *interdenominational*. And, observing the realities of the 1980s, he came to the conclusion that interfaith ecumenism is growing and unifying ecumenism is declining. Lindbeck writes: “Christians from separate churches are doing more and more together across confessional boundaries, and yet there seems to be less and less interest in and progress towards actually uniting the churches” (Lindbeck 1989, 647).

This discovery, however, reveals an aberration that occurred in the ecumenical movement in the 1960s and 1970s rather than actually revealing the emergence of a new type of ecumenism. Lindbeck writes that at the dawn of the ecumenical movement, interfaith ecumenism

10. For example, the introduction to the WCC document “The Church: Towards a Common Vision” (2013) refers to the achievement of “visible unity in one faith and one Eucharistic fellowship” as a goal (1–2). It can be argued that this official document expresses a normative vision of unity in the ecumenical movement today.

dominated the activities of the Student Christian Movement and the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA). Lindbeck also considers the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference and the Life and Work movement, whose first conference was held in Stockholm in 1921, to be interdenominational ecumenism (Lindbeck 1989, 649). At the same time, initiatives that can be attributed to unifying ecumenism have emerged. First of all, the movement Faith and Order, the first conference of which was held in Lausanne in 1927.

Thus, there were initially two directions in the ecumenical movement: the first one was based on the idea of inter-Christian cooperation on various practical issues, and the second one was based on the achievement of Christian unity. That is, in the early stages of the ecumenical movement, there was no common understanding of ecumenism.

Lindbeck writes that the unitive type of ecumenism "was immensely reinforced by the entrance of the Roman Catholic Church into the ecumenical arena at the Second Vatican Council" (Lindbeck 1989, 649). In the 1960s and 1970s the understanding of ecumenism as a movement toward Christian unity became normative. Thus, as Lindbeck says, "an ecumenical movement which was at first largely interdenominational has become at least officially unitive" (Lindbeck 1989, 649–50).

One of the most recent official documents of the WCC — "The Church: Towards a Common Vision" (2013) — talks about the goal of the ecumenical movement as achieving visible unity, which is expressed in the joint ministry of the Eucharist. However, this unity is described in eschatological categories, that is, without hope of achieving it in the historically foreseeable future. The pessimism about the real achievement of visible unity recorded in the 2013 document contributes to the decline of unitive ecumenism, which Lindbeck wrote about as early as 1989. The new paradigm of the ecumenical movement of "unity as communion" created in the early 1990s is more interdenominational than unitive (Shishkov 2017, 277–78).

Today, real ecumenical cooperation is based on the principles of practical interfaith rather than normative unifying ecumenism. Ecumenists no longer set themselves the goal of achieving Christian unity in the form of an intercommunity or a single organization. They view inter-Christian ecumenical interaction as a common cause. It can be a struggle for peace, care for the poor, resistance to discrimination, and so on. The members of conservative Christian alliances for the pro-

tection of traditional values also consider their (ecumenical) interaction as a common cause — the difference is only in the agenda. Belarusian researcher Natalia Vasilevich calls the alliance a new model of unity in the ecumenical field (Vasilevich 2013, 17). She uses the term “value-based ecumenism” for conservative alliances.

Will Cohen’s thesis about the desire to restore Christian unity as a necessary criterion of ecumenism is fully in the paradigm of unitive ecumenism and corresponds to the normative image that they set.¹¹ If this criterion is accepted, then not only conservative Christian alliances, but also a significant part of early ecumenical initiatives, as well as modern ecumenical practice, are beyond the scope of ecumenism. Restoring unity implies a process to achieve it, while understanding unity as a common cause implies that the necessary degree of community has already been achieved. The actual unity on the basis of which a common cause is possible arises from the recognition of the Christian community.

Militaristic rhetoric

Another common argument against the recognition of conservative Christian alliances as ecumenical is the critique of their militaristic rhetoric, which some scholars consider incompatible with “genuine” ecumenism.

Regina Elsner writes that “the ethos of ecumenism is community as openness, reconciliation, dialogue, forgiveness and understanding — the exact opposite of what most conservative alliances represent” (Elsner 2018, 19). In her view, the principles of some interdenominational alliances are contrary to the ecumenical ethos described above, as they use the rhetoric of war and aim to create a Christian front in the international culture wars (Elsner 2018, 20).

Indeed, conservative ecumenism in its rhetoric turns to images of war and the distinction between friend and enemy. Its militaristic rhetoric is based on the idea of a common front that opposes “militant secularism and liberalism.” Some conservative Christian alliances have called their interaction the “ecumenism of trenches” (Kushiner 2006). For example, Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev uses the front metaphor as follows:

11. The references to Lindbeck’s article, which Cohen makes by offering his criterion: Cohen 2018, 26.

The church should look for allies to protect traditional values. Attempting to build a common front against the onslaught of militant secularism is one of the main aspects of inter-Christian and interreligious dialogue. There are many things that Orthodox and Catholics and even, to a certain extent, Christians and Muslims can do together. Family, child-bearing, the right of all people to life, including those who have not yet been born, are quite close to the positions of traditional confessions on these issues. The joint efforts of different religions here are also possible because our polemic with secular humanism is not theological in nature. It's not like we're arguing about whether or not there's a God. We argue about the place of man in the world and the future of the human community. Because the answers to moral questions depend on it, and the very survival of entire peoples depends on the answers to these questions today. (Alfeyev 2009)

It should be noted here that the “openness, reconciliation, dialogue, forgiveness and understanding” that in Elsner’s words characterize the ecumenical ethos have been applied by the participants of the ecumenical movement primarily to each other, that is, within the ecumenical community. It has only been since the 1970s that the idea of inclusiveness and pluralism, as well as radical openness to the Other, has become part of the classic ecumenism of the WCC, together with the left-liberal turn. Previously, pluralism had been seen as a problem rather than a solution (Kinnemon and Koup 2001, 4).

As mentioned above, the emergence of ecumenism was a kind of response to secularization. The ecumenical movement, from its earliest stages, has seen the modern world as a space for active transformation that included not only free creativity and cooperation, but sometimes also struggle. One can find criticism of various manifestations of modernity in ecumenical texts. For example, the classic ecumenical document — the Encyclical of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of 1920 — criticizes “the spreading addiction to excess luxury under the pretext of improving the standard of living and enjoying it; the overwhelming and unconstrained promiscuity and obscenity in literature, painting, theater and music under the decent banner of nurturing good taste and encouraging fine arts; the deification of physical health and disregard for the highest ideals.” From the point of view of the author of the Encyclical, “all these and similar phenomena threaten the very essence of Christian society” (“Entsiklika Vselen-skogo patriarkhata” 2002, 15).

Militaristic rhetoric exists in the speeches of ecumenical figures up to the 1960s. For example, a speech by Eugene Carson Blake, who would become secretary general of the WCC a year later, reads:

Yet it is as easy as it is for all of us to turn our backs on this open door to Christian unity and engage in our religious games that have accelerated our past prejudices — at a time when units of the church’s all-around enemy army are calling on the united command of Jesus Christ to stand together against the forces of atheism, scepticism, hatred and disorder that are coming upon the church. (Blake 2002, 43)

Blake’s speech contains the same militaristic images that Metropolitan Hilarion’s words do. In both cases, the commonalities of Christians are opposed to the “enemy”: for Blake this is the power of atheism and skepticism, and for Metropolitan Hilarion it is secular humanism. Thus, the claim that militarism contradicts the “ethos of ecumenism” does not stand up to criticism. Otherwise, a significant part of ecumenism’s history preceding the left-liberal turn would have to be excluded.

However, as Dagmar Heller argues, “the term ‘ecumenical’ is by definition inclusive. It comes from the Greek word *oikumena*, which the ancient Greeks used to refer to ‘the entire inhabited land’ . . . This has two aspects: The ecumenical movement (1) invites all Christians to work together in the mission that God gave them, which is: (2) to spread the Gospel together to the whole world” (“Khristianskii ekuumenizm” 2017, 309–10). But as I wrote earlier, the concept of “Christian community” in different types of ecumenism may not coincide. For example, some conservative ecumenists may not recognize liberal Christians who approve of same-sex marriages as Christians (Shishkov 2017, 297). Conservative Christians declare the upholding of traditional morality as a true preaching of the gospel.

Theology versus ideology

Finally, one can often hear another critical argument: conservative Christian alliances are not ecclesiastical, but sociopolitical structures united by a common ideology rather than theology.

From Will Cohen’s point of view, the inclusion within ecumenism of forms of interdenominational cooperation that do not seek unity, such as conservative alliances, leads to “a shift in focus and meaning

from the theological to the sociopolitical plane.”¹² He defines forms of cooperation such as ecumenism as non-theological. Cohen says that this non-theological understanding of ecumenism can only be seen in ideological polarization. Cohen refers not only to conservative Christian alliances as non-theological definitions of ecumenism, but also to forms of classical ecumenism in which the element of striving for unity is lost and that are increasingly attached to the liberal trajectory set by the WCC.¹³

As we have seen above, an essential element of Cohen’s ecumenical consciousness is the quest for the restoration of Christian unity, which involves overcoming the theological differences between churches and Christian communities. The simple recognition of the community of Christians, upon which, for example, the interaction of conservative alliances is based, is from his point of view practically of no ecumenical importance without work to resolve theological differences.¹⁴

Theological differences are related to church doctrine, which in turn means that theology in such cases is primarily understood as dogmatic theology. The above statement by Metropolitan Hilarion — “our polemic with secular humanism is not theological in nature” — should also be understood as reducing theology only to dogmatics. The fact is that many researchers and church leaders often confine theology to the discussions that take place within the framework of bi- and multilateral theological dialogues, which really focus on the issue of overcoming doctrinal differences that hinder unification.

Despite the opposition between theology and ideology, conservative ecumenism, according to Cohen, “can also be a genuinely theological outgrowth of faith.”¹⁵

Archimandrite Cyril Hovorun also takes a stand against theology and ideology. It is worth noting that he uses the term “ideological ecumenism” in relation to the phenomenon of conservative Christian alliances under discussion (Hovorun 2017). This kind of inter-Christian interaction arises on the basis of the ideology uniting its participants. Hovorun writes:

12. See Cohen’s article in this issue.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

The divide between “liberal” and “conservative” approaches seems to be stronger than many other divides, including theological ones. Many churches experience internal divisions along this ideological line. Conservative wings in these churches feel closer to each other than to the liberal wings in their own churches. The same applies to the liberal wings. This creates a precondition for what can be called “ideological ecumenism” — a rapprochement between the churches not on a theological basis, but on an ideological one. In this ecumenism, theology is substituted by ideology. (Hovorun 2017)

Hovorun notes that ideological alliances are not only formed on the basis of conservatism. According to him, “Liberal ideology also sometimes tried to substitute for theology in the ecumenical movements.” For example, the WCC “from time to time fell into the trap of ideological bias, mostly of a leftward tilt” (Hovorun 2017).

However, from Hovorun’s point of view, the fact that alliances involve themselves in a political agenda does not mean that they automatically become ideological. For example, when the themes of justice and solidarity become the basis for church collaboration, such alliances are not ideological. Hovorun writes:

Unlike ideologies, which project political programs onto religion and thus reduce the theological scope of the church, causes of justice and solidarity project the principles of Christian faith onto the public domain. These causes do not reduce or constrain the nature and purpose of the church, but implement its theological vision through social action. Therefore, this sort of social activity of the church does not incur the same sort of reductions that ideologies do. (Hovorun 2017)

Hovorun does not explain why the discourse of justice and solidarity becomes theological and the discourse of traditional values becomes ideological. In one of his previous works, Hovorun wrote that “ideology in many ways imitates theology and uses the communicative tools of the Church” (Hovorun 2014, 232). But, unfortunately, his methodology of distinguishing between theology and ideology remains unclear. Hovorun writes that unlike theology, which connects the world with the divine, ideologies keep people within the limits of earthly priorities (Hovorun 2017).

However, Hovorun is clearly in a hurry to assert that conservative ecumenism does not have its own theological discourse. Indeed, the problem of doctrinal differences is of little importance for conservative

alliances, and therefore the role of dogmatic theology in them is not particularly pronounced. But the main line of separation of churches today, from the point of view of conservative Christians, is not on dogmatic issues, but on moral issues. In this regard, moral theology, as well as Christian anthropology, which is also a theological discipline, is beginning to play a key role. For members of conservative alliances, the issues of the beginning and end of life, gender, and family are resolved in theological discourse.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion on “conservative ecumenism” revealed several important points. First, it showed that those who criticize the definition of conservative Christian alliances as ecumenical interaction proceed from a certain understanding of ecumenism, which is at odds with historical forms of the ecumenical movement, as well as with the modern practice of interfaith cooperation. Much of early ecumenism thus falls outside of “normative ecumenism,” together with much of ecumenical practice, both conservatively and liberally oriented.

Secondly, this discussion demonstrated that the topic of conservative Christian alliances is highly politicized. For some classical ecumenists, the recognition of these alliances as ecumenism is a matter of ethical or even ideological choice. They believe that a movement that uses militaristic rhetoric, promotes violence, and sows hatred for certain groups of people cannot be considered ecumenical. And if this word is used to denote them, it is necessary to use a negative epithet — “ecumenism of hate” (Spadaro, 2017) or “bad ecumenism” (Stroop, 2016). At the same time, they often emphasize that conservative ecumenists do not have their own theology, but instead their own ideology. In other words, they are doing everything they can to strip these alliances of their ecclesiastical status.

And here I need to clarify my position on this issue. While not an apologist for conservative Christian alliances, I believe that denying their ecclesial status makes it impossible to adequately describe them as a phenomenon of church life. Reducing the activities of alliances in defense of traditional values to purely political or ideological factors does not allow us to understand their religious motivation and identify the specifics of their organization.

For example, the recognition of conservative alliances as a form of ecumenical interaction makes it clear that participation in them re-

quires adherence to at least the minimum ecumenical principles, the totality of which I have called “ecumenical consciousness.” Christians who deny the presence of Christians outside their church communities, are proselytizing, or consider Christians of other denominations to be heretics and dissenters, in other words, those who can be called anti-ecumenists, will not be members of conservative alliances, at least not without a fundamental review of their worldview. These anti-ecumenical Christians may be committed to traditional values, have similar political views, practice the same methods of fighting for their goals, but they will never unite with other similar Christians without a minimum commitment to ecumenism. This difference is not visible through sociological or political lenses, but only through an ecclesiological perspective. Accordingly, the presence of “ecumenical consciousness” (or its absence) becomes a distinctive feature by which one can distinguish adherents of different groups and determine their motivation in public space.

In conclusion, I would like to thank all the colleagues who took part in the discussion on the topic of “conservative ecumenism.” This discussion, in my view, is of great methodological importance, primarily because it allows us to rethink the established meaning of ecclesiological concepts such as Christian unity, community, ecumenical cooperation and dialogue, and so forth, in order to discover similarities and differences between different forms of ecumenical interaction, and to reactualize the experience of early ecumenism, which is still poorly understood. In addition, a theological view of conservative Christian alliances can complement the social and political science methods used to study this phenomenon.

References

- Alfeev, I. 2009. “Pozitivnaia programma tserkvi — eto spasenie liudei” [The positive program of the Church is the rescue of people]. *Foma* 6 (74) (June). Accessed November 3, 2018, <https://foma.ru/arxiiepiskop-ilarion-alfeev-pozitivnaya-programma-cerkvi-eto-spasenie-lyudej.html>.
- Blake, E.C. 2002. “Otkrytaia dver’: Propoved’-dialog s Martinom Nimëllerom, 1965” [An open door: Sermon-dialogue with Martin Niemöller]. In *Ekumenicheskoe dvizhenie: Antologiiia kliuchevykh tekstov*, 40–43. Moscow: Bibleisko-bogoslovskii institut sv. Andreia.
- Cohen, W. 2018. “Politische und theologische Motivationen der (Anti-)Ökumene.” *Religion & Gesellschaft in Ost und West* 10: 24–27.
- Elsner, R. 2018. “Wie ökumenisch sind ‘konservative christliche Allianzen?’” *Religion & Gesellschaft in Ost und West* 10: 18–20.

- “Entsiklika Vselenskogo patriarkhata 1920 goda” [Encyclical of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of 1920]. 2002. In *Ekumenicheskoe dvizhenie: Antologïia kliuchevykh tekstov*, 13–16. Moscow: Bibleisko-bogoslovskii institut sv. Andreia.
- FitzGerald, Thomas E. 2004. *The Ecumenical Movement: An Introductory History*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Hovorun, Cyril. 2014. “Tserkov’ i ideologïia: Razdeleniia i reduksitii” [Church and ideology: Divisions and reductions]. *Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov v Rossii i za rubezhom* 32 (3): 225–46.
- . 2017. “Ecumenism: Rapprochement through Co-working to Reconciliation.” *Religions* 8 (5): 70.
- “Khristianskii ekumenizm segodnia: Krizis ili transformatsiia?” [Christian ecumenism today: Crisis or transformation?]. 2017. *Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov v Rossii i za rubezhom* 35 (1): 302–12.
- Kinnemon, M., and B. Koup [Michael Kinnamon and Brian Cope]. 2001. “Obshchee vvedenie” [General introduction]. In *Ekumenicheskoe dvizhenie: Antologïia kliuchevykh tekstov*, 1–9. Moscow: Bibleisko-bogoslovskii institut sv. Andreia.
- Kushiner, J.M. 2006. “Christians All Together: *Touchstone’s* Twenty Years of Friendship & Proclamation.” *Touchstone: A Journal of Mere Christianity* (September/October). Accessed November 3, 2018. <https://www.touchstonemag.com/archives/article.php?id=19-08-003-e>.
- Lindbeck, G. 1989. “Two Kinds of Ecumenism: Unitive and Interdenominational.” *Gregorianum* 70 (4): 647–60.
- “Manhattan Declaration: A Call of Christian Conscience.” 2009. *First Things*. 20 November. Accessed December 9, 2018. <https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2009/11/manhattan-declaration-a-call-of-christian-conscience>.
- Martin, J. 2018. “The Ecumenism of the Pro-Life Movement.” *Public Orthodoxy*, February 1. Accessed November 3, 2018, <https://publicorthodoxy.org/2018/02/01/the-ecumenism-of-the-pro-life-movement/>.
- Mott, J.R. 2001. “Zakliuchitel’noe slovo na Vsemirnoi missionerskoi konferentsii, Edinburg, 1910” [Final speech on the World Missionary conference, Edinburgh, 1910]. In *Ekumenicheskoe dvizhenie: Antologïia kliuchevykh tekstov*, 12–13. Moscow: Bibleisko-bogoslovskii institut sv. apostola Andreia.
- Shishkov, Andrey. 2017. “Dva ekumenizma: Konservativnye khristianskie al’iansy kak novaia forma ekumenicheskogo vzaimodeistviia” [Two ecumenisms: Conservative Christian alliances as a new form of ecumenical cooperation]. *Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov’ v Rossii i za rubezhom* 35 (1): 268–99.
- Spadaro, Antonio. 2017 “Evangelical Fundamentalism and Catholic Integralism: A Surprising Ecumenism.” *La Civiltà Cattolica*, July 13. Accessed May 31, 2019, <https://www.laciviltacattolica.it/articolo/evangelical-fundamentalism-and-catholic-integralism-in-the-usa-a-surprising-ecumenism/>.
- Stoeckl, Kristina. 2018. “Aktivisti vne kofessional’nykh granits: ‘Konservativnyi ekumenizm’ Vsemirnogo kongressa semei” [Activists beyond confessional borders: The “conservative ecumenism” of the World Congress of Families]. *Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov’ v Rossii i za rubezhom* 36 (4): 58–86.
- Stroop, C. 2016. “Bad Ecumenism: The American Culture Wars and Russia’s Hard Right Turn.” *Wheel* 6: 21–24.
- Vasilevich, N. 2013. “Orthodox Perspective of the Faith and Order Ecumenical Ecclesiological Convergence Document ‘The Church — Towards a Common Vision’” (2012). Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn.

World Council of Churches. 1950. "Toronto Statement: The Church, the Churches and the World Council Of Churches" WCC. Accessed May 31, 2019, <https://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/central-committee/1950/toronto-statement>.

World Council of Churches. 2013. *The Church: Toward a Common Vision*. N.p.: WCC Publications.

WILL COHEN

Whether and How Ecumenism, Anti-Ecumenism, and Conservative Ecumenism Are Politically or Theologically Motivated: A View from the United States

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.22394/2311-3448-2019-6-1-20-43>

Will Cohen — University of Scranton; Orthodox Theological Society in America (USA). will.cohen@scranton.edu

This article discusses the phenomena of ecumenism, anti-ecumenism, and conservative ecumenism. The author sets two goals. The first is to identify the theological foundations of ecumenism and anti-ecumenism, and also to analyze conservative ecumenism in this research perspective. The second is to identify the political component of these phenomena. The author analyzes and criticizes the concept of “ecumenical consciousness” proposed by Andrey Shishkov. He gives his own definition of ecumenism, which includes the hope for the restoration of Christian unity as a fundamental component. From the point of view of the author, conservative ecumenism can be called ecumenism only if it contains an element associated with the quest for unity.

Keywords: anti-ecumenism, Christian unity, conservative Christian alliances, conservative ecumenism, ecumenism, theology.

I. Introduction

A PERENNIAL way to discredit a theological opponent’s perspective is to say it has been determined by extrinsic, political factors. Each of the three phenomena to be explored here — ecumenism, anti-ecumenism, and the more recently emergent “conservative ecumenism” — has been so described by its critics. Perhaps most familiar to those with knowledge of Orthodoxy is the accusation of political expediency leveled against Orthodox ecumenism, a charge with centuries-old antecedents. But in an interesting twist, the anti-ecumenists who level it have come to be accused, themselves, of being motivated by politics, albeit of a very different flavor. Unlike either ecumenism or anti-ecumenism, “conservative ecumenism” — in which long-separated Christian bodies, whatever their ongoing theo-

logical differences, cooperate to defend values they see as imperiled in secular society — never has purported *not* to make politics a priority.

Yet what I will claim about ecumenism and anti-ecumenism is also true of conservative ecumenism. This is that while none of the three movements has always been free of political determinants, neither can any of them be simply dismissed as mere politics dressed up in theological garb. Each has something to say for itself theologically. This does not mean, of course, that the content of what each expresses theologically is of the same value. In the analysis that follows, I will argue that there is a clear theological right and wrong in the long-standing dispute between Orthodox ecumenism and anti-ecumenism. (It is ecumenism that is right, anti-ecumenism wrong.) As for “conservative ecumenism,” it is theologically warranted to the extent that (1) it holds the “conservative” label loosely and (2) it is open to Orthodox ecumenism properly defined.

II. Orthodox ecumenism’s sometime intermingling with politics; its essential theological significance

For most of the 20th century, the countries where Western Christianity was dominant were more prosperous and powerful than those with majority-Orthodox populations. If leading Orthodox theologians wished to mingle with the well-educated and well-heeled of this world, they would not fare well identifying Catholics and others as heretics. Farther back in history, the need for financial or even military support from the West put pressure on Orthodox leaders to accept union on less than equal terms, as at Lyons (1274) and Florence (1449). As Fr. Alexander Schmemmann lamented: “The question of the unity of the churches was long confused by falsehood and calculations and poisoned by nonecclesiastical and base motives” (Schmemmann 1963, 254).

In the 18th century, a more affirming posture toward the non-Orthodox was associated in Orthodox consciousness with theological laxity or compromise. When Ecumenical Patriarch Cyril V vehemently denounced Latin baptism,¹ defenders of his decree were tasked with explaining why in earlier centuries Latin baptism had been accepted by the Orthodox, as when Latin converts to Orthodoxy had been chrismated rather than (re)baptized. According to a novel theory Cyril’s de-

1. The decree of Cyril V in 1755 was titled “A Definition of the Holy Church of Christ Defending the Holy Baptism Given from God, and Spitting upon the Baptisms of the Heretics Which Are Otherwise Administered.”

fenders put forward, that earlier more positive approach to Latin sacraments had been only a function of *economia*, that is, a relaxation of the theological norm. As Nikodemos the Hagiorite put it, the strict rule of (re)baptism had not been applied because “it was not good, given the utter weakness of our nation, to further excite the fury of the Papacy.”² The Orthodox had only given the appearance of accepting Latin baptism for political reasons.

At the dawn of the ecumenical movement the important but flawed encyclical issued by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, “Unto the Churches of Christ Everywhere” (1920) gave skeptics of ecumenism fresh grounds for thinking the movement too bound up with political concerns and categories. When the encyclical called for “a league (fellowship) between the churches” on the model of the newly formed League of Nations, its praise of the latter was unreserved (“Encyclinal” 1997, 12). When it sweepingly identified all divided denominations together as “the Christian body,” and “the whole body of the Church” (“Encyclical” 1997, 12, 13) the encyclical betrayed an imprecise and rather weak ecclesiology.

Yet neither these shortcomings of the 1920 encyclical, nor the political pressures under which earlier union attempts were undertaken, should be taken to mean that somehow ecumenism has always been nothing but politics. Orthodox tradition has also known situations of schism and doctrinal divergence where unity was restored successfully, with integrity. Examples include the Formula of Reunion of 433, or the ends of the Acacian (484–519) or Arsenite (1261–1310) schisms. An ongoing task of Orthodox ecumenism is to give such examples of principled restoration of unity greater prominence in popular accounts of Orthodox tradition.

Before turning to a consideration of the politics of anti-ecumenism, a brief definition of ecumenism may be ventured, to provide a baseline by which to distinguish between ecumenism and anti-ecumenism theologically, going forward. Ecumenism may be defined as activity — whether of prayer, reflection, interpretation, encounter, dialogue, or otherwise — undertaken in the hope (but not the presumption) of an eventual restoration of full, authentic unity between one’s own communion and another, not by the submission of the other tradition to one’s own but by reconciliation of the differences that have caused or now perpetuate the separation. In this definition, ecumenism does not presuppose an equivalency between or among divided churches; it

2. Nikodemos the Hagiorite, *Pedalion*, 57, quoted by Metallinos 1994, 90–91.

does hold that there is some meaningful reality of church, even if imperfect and incomplete, outside one's own communion.

III. Orthodox anti-ecumenism's political element; its essential theological significance

Being politically incorrect for truth's sake is often considered the hallmark of Orthodox anti-ecumenists. They are unafraid, for example, to call Protestants and Roman Catholics heretics, something they say the truth calls for. It might therefore seem counterintuitive to propose that their own positions could be shaped by political factors, but this is the thesis advanced by George Demacopoulos in his article "Traditional Orthodoxy' as a Postcolonial Movement," in which he speaks of "the ambivalence of Eastern Christianity's dependence on/resistance to the Western other" (Demacopoulos 2017, 477). Inasmuch as Orthodoxy has long been anxious to distance itself from Latin Christianity by drawing clear lines of demarcation and expurgating borrowed elements, this is best understood, Demacopoulos argues, in terms of an ongoing relationship of dependency he likens to the predicament of having been colonized. If ecumenism is prone to a politics of accommodation, anti-ecumenism is prone to a politics of separation — a kind of identity politics.

Demacopoulos traces the provenance of one of the most significant producers of anti-ecumenical literature in the United States, the Center for Traditionalist Orthodox Studies, to communities in Greece whose identities were forged in the 1930s when they separated from the canonical Church of Greece in an act of resistance to the adoption of the "new" calendar, which they considered a capitulation to Western dominance.

The phenomenon of *resistance* has a largely positive valence in Orthodoxy; it is typically associated with theological rigor, as in the case of Mark of Ephesus. Orthodox tradition has known many other moments, however, in which resistance would have to be viewed as negative, either cast in political terms, or, if in theological ones, as sheer recalcitrance — whether when groups at the margins of the Byzantine empire did not accept the imperially enforced theologies of Ephesus (431) or Chalcedon (451), or in the case of the Bogomils or Old Believers and other sectarian groups. In all these cases, from the canonical Orthodox point of view, resistance was a mistake. It was resistance to catholicity and only imagined itself to be resistance to heterodoxy.

Is Orthodox resistance to the West different? Mainstream and influential mid-20th-century Orthodox writers both in Greece (Pho-tios Kontoglou) and among Russian émigrés in Europe (Leonid Ous-pensky) were active in inveighing against Western styles in art and commending the importance of reviving traditional Orthodox forms (Demacopoulos 2017, 485–86). This obviously can be interpreted in positive or negative ways. Positively, one could see it as a return to au-thentic particularity, in line with the principle of enculturation in mod-ern ecclesiology; negatively, one could ask whether increasingly since the schism began Orthodox theological purity had not come to be sub-tly transmuted into a function of the categories of (Greek/Byzantine) East and (Latin) West, with purity now overidentified with the former. Georges Florovsky’s insistence that Eastern theology free itself from its “Babylonian captivity” to Latin scholasticism may be considered an example of the mode in question.³ According to Paul Gavrilyuk, “Flo-rovsky’s persistent conflation of the criterion of truth with the crite-ri- on of identity has bedeviled Orthodox theology ever since” (Gavrily-uk 2013, 269).

It may fairly be asked whether (theological) truth or (political) identity lay behind Cyril V’s renunciation of Latin baptism. A later de-fender of Cyril’s decree, Konstantinos Oikonomos (1780–1857), in-vo- ked an idea of “evangelical *economia*” to explain the Church’s earli-er practice of not requiring (re)baptism of Latin converts lest it deter them.⁴ Another writer, Neophytos, invoked the very opposite logic to say why — whatever was done before — (re)baptism was now strictly required: heretics’ incentive for entering the Orthodox Church would otherwise be undermined. He declares that baptism in heresy is “not capable of providing remission of sins,” but does not leave it at that. He then lingers, or doubles back, on his own assertion to make a de-duction of surprising logic. “For if it does provide [remission of sins], then they join the Church for no reason, and the heretics who do not join hear this.”⁵ Neophytos’s argument here appears to be one of evan-gelical *akribeia*: the strict rejection of all baptism except Orthodox baptism will serve the evangelical purpose of bringing people into the

3. In fact Florovsky’s critique is best understood as an effort to overcome one narrow form of Latin theology that many of his Catholic contemporaries were also seeking to transcend, insofar as it had closed itself off from vital contact with Eastern patristic sources.
4. *The Extant Ecclesiastical Writings of Constantine Presbyter and Oikonomos of the Oikonomoi*, published by Soph. C. of the Oikonomoi, vol. 1 (Athens, 1862), 475, quoted in Metallinos 1994, 92.
5. Neophytos, 147, as quoted by Metallinos 1994, 39n41.

one true (Orthodox) Church. Neophytos does not start from the idea, as a theological premise, that baptism is real only in Orthodoxy; instead he derives the conclusion that it must be real only there from the premise that converts will *enter* Orthodoxy only if that is the case.

But what if behind these crisscrossing lines of argument there lay something else that might better make sense of Cyril V's and his followers' insistence on a return to the allegedly normative practice of (re)baptizing converts? The conclusion drawn by Metropolitan Kallistos Ware is that when the patriarch issued the formal rejection of Latin baptism, it was not so much to bring Roman Catholics into Orthodoxy, as it was to keep Orthodox people from going over to Rome.

Cyril was . . . anxious at all costs to curtail Roman Catholic influence in his Patriarchate and to prevent further infiltration by the Latins. . . . Surely prospective converts would reflect more carefully before seceding to Rome, if it were forcibly emphasized that the Orthodox Catholic Church was the sole treasury of valid sacraments. (Ware 1964, 79–80)

We may call what Ware describes here, “political *akribeia*.” The hard-line position is taken as self-protection against Western imperialism and proselytism.

Ware is careful to note that Cyril V's stance on Latin baptism was supported by significant theological argumentation, most fully developed by Eustratios Argenti.⁶ Ware writes: “Certainly Cyril had practical motives for condemning Latin Baptism, but his action was not merely a piece of religious opportunism, for he could also defend it on serious theological grounds” (Ware 1964, 80).

This is an important point to highlight in regard to the proto-anti-ecumenical theology of the 18th and 19th centuries — and to the anti-ecumenical theology of today: whatever its non-theological influences or historical contexts, it can nevertheless be defended (and must be engaged) on “serious theological grounds.”

The pivotal theological claim of Orthodox anti-ecumenism is encapsulated in the following statement from the New Martyr Hilariion (Troitsky), a writer highly regarded by other anti-ecumenists: “If the grace-giving Baptism of the Holy Spirit is permitted outside the Church, then it is completely impossible to preserve the unity of the Church” (Troitsky 1975, 39).

6. E. Argenti, *Manual on Baptism*, 6–7, quoted by Ware 1964, 90.

For Orthodox anti-ecumenism, the Church's unity depends on an all-or-nothing divide between Church and non-Church. For Orthodox ecumenism, by contrast, a paradoxical *ecclesia extra ecclesiam* may account for the anomaly of schism as a temporary phenomenon. In my paper's concluding section I will further delineate the crucial difference between these two systems of thought.

IV. “Conservative Ecumenism” as political alliance; its possible theological basis

Unlike ecumenism or anti-ecumenism, “conservative ecumenism” does not purport to eschew politics; rather it is openly and unabashedly oriented toward political developments, which it seeks not only to evaluate but to shape and redirect. At the same time and without contradiction, this movement is perhaps more adamant than either of the other two (ecumenism and anti-ecumenism) in the claim that it is not beholden to the powerful of this world, but uncompromising in its witness to the gospel, however unpopular.

It would not be difficult in the dramatically new North American political climate that erupted in 2016 to show that the credibility of such a claim by the religious right — and thus also of Orthodox “conservative ecumenists” who identify with many of its aims — has received a severe blow, as though it had not been diminished enough already. But it would run counter to my purpose to single out conservative Christianity whether for censure in this regard, or praise in some other, since I consider it to be essentially cut of the same cloth as liberal Christianity — which we normally think of as its opposite — in how it understands itself in relation to politics. Both, in their public outspokenness, proceed as if a glaring and fundamental feature of today's geopolitical landscape were not there, namely the coexistence of *two*, competing, quasi-imperial ideologies, each of which can be reasonably identified with the inheritance of Christian tradition in some important respects, but perceived as betraying it (whether by outright abandonment or deceptive profanation) in other important respects.

When an Orthodox Christian rhetorically turns today toward the political powers and prophetically calls them out — implicitly or explicitly warning fellow Orthodox against ecclesial accommodation to such powers — there are two directions in which he or she might face. In one direction, he or she may turn and face the Babylon of the post-secular religious nationalism of traditionally Orthodox countries, in the Russian mold. We have come to expect to hear such prophetic de-

nunciation of this Babylon of authoritarian, state-sponsored religious nationalism (with its suspicion or denigration of human rights as an imperialist tool of Western individualism, and so on) from Orthodox academic theology, often in ecumenically open and regular contact with Catholic and other non-Orthodox Christians whether in the United States or other areas of the Orthodox “diaspora.”⁷

In another direction, the Orthodox Christian today who calls out the powers may turn to face the Babylon of liberal secularism — long identified more fully than elsewhere with post-Christian Europe, but understood increasingly in the Obama era as emanating from the federal government of the United States, as well as from the more enduring strongholds of Hollywood and academia. We have come to expect to hear the alarm sounded against *this* post-Christian secular Babylon from self-identified conservatives, ranging from such prominent religious leaders in traditionally Orthodox countries as Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk to American evangelical converts to Orthodoxy like Rod Dreher. Their demonstrated interest in cooperating with non-Orthodox Christian conservative individuals or ecclesial bodies to combat secularism in Europe and North America has led Andrey Shishkov to consider them as part of a global movement of “conservative ecumenism” (Shishkov 2017, 58–85) the concept and phenomenon to be explored here.

But I wanted first to offer this basic framework within which to see conservative and liberal Christianity’s *kinship* — in how their critical attentiveness and responsiveness to matters sociopolitical is, in each case, unidirectional. Liberal Orthodox academic theology today astutely perceives and publicly denounces threats to ecclesial and human freedom posed by post-secular religious nationalism. Orthodox conservative or “traditionalist” theology astutely perceives and publicly denounces threats to such freedom posed by post-Christian secularism. Each subgroup meanwhile sees in the Babylon it is *not* denounc-

7. If we were to name it so as to be paired with Shishkov’s “conservative ecumenism,” this contemporary movement, however comparatively small it may be and whatever impact its voice may or may not have within global Orthodoxy, might be called “liberal ecumenism,” although this would not be in reference to any actual program having to do with church division and unity but with, strictly speaking, sociopolitical concerns springing from certain shared Christian principles — shared between these Orthodox academic theologians and their fellow Christians of other traditions. Although this Orthodox “liberal ecumenist” movement — not of days gone by, as if it had been superseded by the rise in Orthodoxy of “conservative ecumenism,” but contemporary and of new vintage — will be mentioned very little in the remainder of this paper, it is important to note it here as something that exists in parallel to “conservative ecumenism” and that has much in common with it.

ing an ally — only minimally (if at all) problematic — in the noble effort to bring the world a little farther away from the brink of perdition and closer to the kingdom. It is in this respect that I see conservative and liberal Christianity as alike.

Their kinship as I have described it has coherent meaning only if we do indeed live in a world simultaneously characterized by post-Christian liberal secularism and post-secular religious nationalism. Only in that case does denunciation of just one raise the question of accommodation to the other. In other treatments of these two phenomena their relation to one another is generally presented not as synchronic but as chronological, with the post-secular world in which conservative ecumenism is waxing the successor to an earlier, post-Christian world in which the ecumenical movement, represented by the World Council of Churches, came to reflect an increasingly liberal and progressive political agenda in the latter years of the 20th century. Shishkov's presentation tends toward this diachronic or chronological approach,⁸ and while I do not wish to deny the rationale for it altogether, I would like to augment the synchronic element, which also appears at times in his presentation, but with considerably less emphasis.

In light of what has just been said the following analysis, while building on Shishkov's category of conservative ecumenism, proposes a modification in how the latter is to be understood. My proposed modification in our understanding of conservative ecumenism pertains to its relation to ecumenism (what Shishkov calls "classical ecumenism") as well as to anti-ecumenism. The relationship between or among ecumenism, anti-ecumenism, and conservative ecumenism looks different depending, above all, on how *ecumenism* is defined in the first place.

In Shishkov's own working definition of ecumenism, there is a certain fluidity with respect to one point, whose significance I will try to shed light on from a couple of different angles. Rather far along in his

8. Although he acknowledges the ongoing existence today of liberal ecumenism — and thus a certain simultaneity of the two — as is evident where he envisions a "competition of ecumenisms" (Shishkov 2017, 79) between the old-school WCC-oriented (what he calls here "classical") mode and the newer, conservative mode of Orthodox ecumenism, nevertheless liberal ecumenism is evidently gray and fading in the picture he presents of it. Indeed he says of it that at the rate things are going it stands at much risk of "suffering a defeat" at the hands of conservative ecumenism "in the competitive fight for Eastern Orthodoxy" (80).

article, in accounting for his view that the trans-confessional anti-secular strategic alliances he calls “conservative ecumenism” are rightly given the name of ecumenism, and not something else, Shishkov writes: “As with classical ecumenists, conservative ecumenists are also the bearers of an ecumenical consciousness. They share such ‘ecumenical values’ as the recognition of the commonality of Christians, a refusal to proselytize, and a refusal to use the language of ‘heresies and schisms’” (Shishkov 2017, 81). At an earlier point in his article, speaking in this case specifically of those Orthodox Christians involved in the (classical) ecumenical movement, Shishkov makes the same reference to “bearers of an ecumenical consciousness,” but with an important difference. In this rendering, they are said to be such in that they “acknowledge the commonality of Christians *and the necessity for union*, reject proselytism, and refuse to employ the language of ‘heresies and schisms’” (Shishkov 2017, 67).⁹

The discrepancy between the two descriptions of what it means to have an “ecumenical consciousness” is significant. In the one case, applied to classical ecumenism, concern for actual union among divided churches is constitutive. In the other, where it is said why both classical ecumenism and conservative ecumenism should be rightly identified as ecumenism, concern for union is not included as a constitutive element. Elsewhere Shishkov indeed addresses this discrepancy between the two ways of defining ecumenism, but he does so only indirectly, when he takes up the question of whether Orthodox anti-ecumenists are rightly so designated. He writes: “Some Orthodox anti-ecumenists specifically attack classical ecumenism for its unifying objective and its liberalism, while loyally responding to interconfessional cooperation [i.e., conservative ecumenism] in defense of ‘traditional values’” (Shishkov 2017, 82). Shishkov’s conclusion is that Orthodox anti-ecumenists of this type “only conditionally qualify as anti-ecumenists” (Shishkov 2017, 82).

However, Shishkov’s notion that so-called anti-ecumenists might actually be considered in the category of ecumenists in some sense, after all, is tenable only if one defines (I would say redefines) ecumenism as Shishkov does: by making the “unifying objective” non-constitutive of ecumenism. If the unifying objective — what George Lindbeck called “unitive ecumenism” (Lindbeck 1989, 70) — is centrally defin-

9. Emphasis added. Shishkov again will associate classical ecumenism with unitive ecumenism when he discusses an aspect of the Havana Agreed Statement jointly signed by Patriarch Kirill and Pope Francis; Shishkov 2017, 24.

ing of ecumenism (as it is according to the definition I proposed near the end of section 1 above) then no one who opposes it can be considered an ecumenist. An ecumenist is someone whose hope for the restoration of full unity (with another communion, seen as still ecclesial in some important sense) makes working toward it an imperative.¹⁰ An anti-ecumenist is someone who cannot hope for such restoration, because he sees no meaningful ecclesial reality outside his own communion. In that case unitive ecumenical efforts could only bring, if anything at all, concession and capitulation to falsehood.

Those, then, whom Shishkov says “only conditionally qualify as anti-ecumenists” — conditionally rather than fully insofar as “their recognition of conservative ecumenism makes them bearers of an ecumenical consciousness” (Shishkov 2017, 82), as he goes on to put it — would, on the contrary, be thoroughgoing anti-ecumenists according to the definition of ecumenism that entails an inherent openness to the possibility of union with one or more other communions. In that case, the differentiating line would run not where Shishkov draws it, with, on one side, all those who accept *either* “classical ecumenism” (with its unitive dimension) *or* conservative ecumenism (without a unitive dimension), and, on the other side, “only those who reject the possibility of any contact with those of other faith traditions,” these isolationists alone counting as “the genuine anti-ecumenists” (Shishkov 2017, 82).

Instead, the differentiating line would run through the middle of the group that Shishkov calls “conservative ecumenists.” Only those from within this group who continue to affirm “classical ecumenism” in principle¹¹ — specifically, with its “unitive” dimension — would properly fall on the “ecumenist” side of the differentiating line. Those from within this same group who in principle oppose “classical ecumenism” — again, specifically in terms of its unitive dimension — would properly fall on the “anti-ecumenist” side of the line. This redrawn

10. In this respect, the “unitive” character that I am saying is indispensable to the basic idea of ecumenism does not entail, precisely, the acknowledgment of the “necessity for union” as Shishkov phrases it; that is to presume too much about the achievability of union (and indeed its rightness vis-à-vis any particular ecumenical dialogue partner). Many classical ecumenists, especially Orthodox or Catholic, generally have seen *working for union* with another church, out of a hope rooted in the recognition in that church’s retention of at least certain key ecclesial elements in common, as the necessity. Whether union itself comes of the ecumenical effort or should come of it — depending on how the dialogue goes — is another question.

11. Strong criticism of certain, even many, concrete instances of the work of “unitive ecumenism” may still be possible in someone who does not oppose such work in principle.

map of the interrelations among ecumenists, anti-ecumenists, and so-called conservative ecumenists raises two interrelated questions.

First, is it even possible to find Orthodox who are proponents of old-school unitive ecumenism — to find them, for example, among the signatories to the socially conservative Manhattan Declaration (2009), or among those committed to European Catholic-Orthodox collaboration to combat secularism and moral relativism? Can conservative ecumenist and unitive ecumenist convictions coexist within one and the same person? The clear answer to this is yes.

Shishkov sees an early example of conservative ecumenism in the Hartford Appeal of 1975, which was initiated by the future founder and editor of *First Things*, John Richard Neuhaus (then a Lutheran pastor and later a Catholic priest), and to which Fr. Alexander Schmemmann was a signatory, among others. Schmemmann was also “a ‘classical ecumenist’ with nearly thirty years of service in events held by the WCC and its affiliated institutions (beginning in 1948)” (Shishkov 2017, 72). Schmemmann was a (proto-)conservative ecumenist with a keen interest in matters of church division and unity. Shishkov also discusses the joint declaration of Patriarch Kirill and Pope Francis in Havana, Cuba in February 2016, noting that while “the conservative agenda occupies a significant portion” of the text, the “‘classical’ ecumenical formula of church unity also exists within the declaration” (Shishkov 2017, 79).

Yet in order to maintain his categorizations, Shishkov is prone to see instances where (as he defines them) conservative and classical ecumenism coexist in the same person or document almost as anomalies — or as he puts it, “hybrid forms of ecumenism” (Shishkov 2017, 79). I instead want to suggest that there is nothing about classical and conservative ecumenism that needs be at odds with each other, and that when classical ecumenism is rejected by “conservative ecumenists” as Shishkov defines them — which is not always the case — it is because, *in that case*, the “conservative ecumenists” really are not ecumenists at all.

But this leads to the second and related question raised by my alternate mapping: what precisely is meant by “classical ecumenism”? Here Shishkov’s way of treating the subject ties classical ecumenism almost entirely to the historically evolving institution of the World Council of Churches. Another approach might instead tether classical ecumenism’s definition to certain principles that from the beginning of Orthodoxy’s participation in the movement have consistently informed its understanding of what ecumenical engagement proper-

ly is.¹² Drawing in part on the work of Peter Lodberg, Shishkov aptly traces a shift in WCC-based ecumenism away from its “initial universalistic ecumenical ideal” (Shishkov 2017, 84) whereby various traditions sought to overcome their particularism to a “pluralistic approach” whose emphasis on diversity, regional as well as racial and sexual, meant that “the initial and main objective established by the ecumenical movement — the union of Churches — has gradually begun to recede into the background or to disappear altogether” (Shishkov 2017, 69–70). But while the union of churches has indeed receded as a focus of the WCC, it has not receded from the world of ecumenical activity altogether. This (as I see it) essential component of classical ecumenism, the unitive component, migrated from the WCC to various bilateral dialogues in the latter decades of the 20th century and those of the early 21st. Shishkov notes the withdrawal of the local Orthodox churches of Bulgaria and Georgia from the WCC in the late 1990s (Shishkov 2017, 68), but these same churches have continued their participation in the international Catholic-Orthodox dialogue. This is not to say that pressure on them to also withdraw from that ongoing forum of classical ecumenism could not continue to build to a crisis point; it is only to suggest that the precise reasons for withdrawal in that case would be different. Opposition to WCC involvement over the past two or three decades has come from Orthodox social conservatives, some of whom retain a commitment to unitive ecumenism, as well as from anti-ecumenists, who by (my) definition do not. Orthodox opposition to bilateral Catholic-Orthodox dialogue has come only from anti-ecumenists.

If the nexus of questions concerning church division/unity, with which the ecumenical movement was itself robustly concerned from the 1927 World Conference on Faith and Order in Lausanne and for decades thereafter,¹³ has always been at the heart of classical ecumenism for the Orthodox, then Orthodoxy’s growing qualms about WCC participation over the past thirty years should be understood in light

12. One can discern a consistent thread running through not only the works of Florovsky and other important theologians (Schmemmann, Zizioulas and others), but also certain Orthodox statements clarifying or qualifying its participation in the WCC, such as the September 1991 statement issued by the inter-Orthodox Consultation in the wake of the Canberra Assembly. <https://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/wcc-programmes/ecumenical-movement-in-the-21st-century/member-churches/special-commission-on-participation-of-orthodox-churches/sub-committee-ii-style-ethos-of-our-life-together/inter-orthodox-consultation-after-the-canberra-assembly>.

13. See, for example, the Toronto Statement, “The Church, the Churches, and the World Council of Churches” 1950, and the document “Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry” 1982.

of the WCC's own movement away from classical ecumenism in this foundational sense, and not necessarily as a decline in Orthodox commitment to classical ecumenism per se. I believe the latter is best understood not in terms of evolving WCC institutional ecumenism but in the theologically meaningful way that Orthodoxy has always consistently cared about ecumenism. If we do understand classical ecumenism in this sense, then in important respects, and in spite of anti-ecumenists' influence (well shown by Shishkov 2017, 80) on the final form of the relevant conciliar document, Orthodoxy's commitment to classical ecumenism was in fact reaffirmed at the Council of Crete. This is a point of no small consequence.¹⁴

Having now clarified the question of what classical ecumenism was and still is for the Orthodox,¹⁵ I can return to the first question and see with more clarity why it made sense to answer it, as I did, by saying that not all so-called conservative ecumenists reject classical ecumenism. For a variety of reasons having to do with its liberal trajectory, conservative ecumenists have come to oppose the WCC almost uniformly, but not the bilateral dialogues, for example, with the Catholic Church, where classical ecumenism carries on. Many conservative ecumenists still espouse this classical ecumenism. Those who do

14. Has it really been definitely re-affirmed? The correct interpretation of the relevant document of the 2016 Council of Crete continues to be debated. Shishkov is correct to point out the significance of the change in the expressed purpose of Orthodox participation in the WCC. Whereas in the preconciliar draft it was said to be for the purpose of "contributing to the witness of truth and [the] promotion of unity," in the final version of the official conciliar document it is instead said to be for the purpose of "contributing . . . to the advancement of peaceful coexistence and cooperation in the major socio-political challenges" (Shishkov 2017, 80, with reference to the relevant texts issued before and after the Council). This shift from a unitive to a non-unitive focus would be far more concerning if it described Orthodox ecumenical engagement altogether. Insofar as it applies more specifically to Orthodox WCC participation, it seems to reflect the movement of the WCC itself away from unitive concerns and toward sociopolitical ones. However, there is little doubt that the conciliar text "Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World" leaves much about the precise nature of Orthodox ecumenism unspecified and undeveloped.
15. No claim is being made here, of course, of resolving this question at its most vexing ecclesiological point of inner tension — rather, only of resolving that classical ecumenism for the Orthodox must be, in some shape or other, "unitive ecumenism," and must not be hitched to the direction in which the institution of the WCC has gone over time. Where Shishkov, himself venturing into the ecclesiological core of the question, writes that from the Orthodox point of view, "the union of churches must be understood as reunion with the Orthodox Church" (Shishkov 2017, 66–67), this seems to me to reflect one and not the only way of interpreting Orthodoxy's ecclesial self-understanding in the condition of each and every Christian division.

not are not, as I would see it, actually conservative *ecumenists*, but anti-ecumenists.

Shishkov's three criteria for qualifying even these Orthodox "conservative ecumenists" who oppose unitive ecumenism as ecumenists are somewhat thin and ambiguous theologically. What are Shishkov's three criteria? One is a refusal to proselytize. But while this sometimes bears real ecclesiological significance, by no means does it always. In the Balamand Statement (1993) of the Joint International Commission mentioned earlier, refusal to proselytize is indeed connected with recognition of the other confession's sacramental reality. But in a great many instances, Orthodox objection to proselytism has had a self-protective character, on the one hand arising from concerns over Roman Catholic (and Eastern Catholic) encroachment on traditionally Orthodox territory (as was the case with the Balamand Statement itself), but on the other hand never actually committing itself (as Balamand did) to that *mutual* ecclesial recognition that ought logically to be entailed or implied in a principled rejection of proselytism. The message of the authors of the letter from Mount Athos quoted above is a case in point. It clearly and directly condemned Uniate/Eastern Catholic proselytizing of "suffering Orthodox," but it insisted that Orthodoxy's negative stance on Latin baptism had been "not for purposes of proselytism but in order to protect the flock." Although perhaps at first glance this could appear to imply a reciprocal renunciation of proselytism, it actually does not. Nowhere in the letter is there an assertion or even an implication that Catholic ecclesial life has spiritual and possibly salvific value, which is the only basis on which a refusal to proselytize makes any Christian sense. In the overall context of their letter, it is evident that what is renounced is not proselytism as evangelism (of those lacking the true faith, that is, Catholics, by those possessing it, that is the Orthodox) but proselytism as imperialism (by which the weak and "suffering," in other words the Orthodox, are preyed upon by the temporally powerful, the Catholics). By contrast, a rejection of proselytism that has unambiguous ecumenical meaning and not just self-protective political meaning would have to manifest itself in an affirmation of the other tradition's ecclesial significance.

Acknowledgment of the commonality of Christians and avoidance of the terms heretic and schismatic are Shishkov's two other criteria. It is true that each of the two was part and parcel of the advent of 20th-century classical ecumenism, in contrast to the denunciations and hostilities of the past. But over the years it has become possible for these respectful modes of interaction among separated Christians to be de-

tached from an underlying commitment to unitive ecumenism. The willingness to acknowledge commonality across confessional lines certainly can and normally should have ecumenical significance but it can also be subtly circumscribed in such a way that it excludes all hope of ever bridging certain theological differences, in which case its properly ecumenical significance is negligible. So too when the name of Christian rather than heretic is used of non-Orthodox, this can mean quite different things. When a non-Orthodox individual is called a Christian it could (and again arguably should, on the basis of the ancient adage “one Christian, no Christian”) also entail some kind of recognition of the Christian character of the individual’s faith community, but that logic is often absent where Orthodox admit the existence of Christians of other traditions. Writing for a North American archdiocesan magazine, Fr. John Oliver is typical of many anti-ecumenical Orthodox in his willingness to include non-Orthodox among “all who follow Christ” — and indeed even to name their charitable institutions “Christian” — while committing himself not at all to an ecclesial recognition of any non-Orthodox community that would give rise to a positive appraisal of ecumenism (classically understood, that is, in Lindbeck’s “unitive” sense) (Oliver 2018, 18).¹⁶

In the end, to include conservative Orthodox involvement in non-unitive forms of inter-confessional cooperation under the umbrella of ecumenism, even if some or many of the Orthodox participants concerned are directly opposed to unitive ecumenism, effects a shift in focus and meaning from the theological to the sociopolitical plane. The prospects are then radically diminished for ecumenism’s being seen in terms other than what Shishkov calls “the global ‘culture wars’” and for its being able to serve to bolster spaces of authentic Christian freedom that can constructively cut across the entrenched positions from which

16. Drawing a distinction between being “ecumenical” (which he affirms) and espousing “ecumenism” (which he does not), Fr. John Oliver says, “One is being ecumenical . . . by bumping elbows with anyone else — wherever he resides in the numberless religious and non-religious neighborhoods outside the visible boundaries of the Church — to feed the hungry, nurse the sick, clothe the bereft, serve the poor, visit the imprisoned, which are part of the basic mission of the Church. *St. Thomas* in Nashville, *Baptist* in Knoxville, *Methodist* in Memphis, *St. John’s and Mary* in Chattanooga — all these Christian hospitals in Tennessee from theologically-conflicting confessions are yet joined ecumenically in the singular task of caring for the sick. Such ministry, yes. Conjoined in charity, please. Dialogue and dinner with our various neighbors, certainly. Raising a mug of beer or cup of tea to cheerfully toast a mutual agreement not to condemn or kill each other or bust up each other’s property, absolutely. Beyond that, though? Ecumenism is different. . . . To be *ecumenical* stands as the high calling of all who follow Christ; *ecumenism* may be the most dangerous of all heresies.”

the culture wars are waged. When Shishkov writes of “the ideological polarization of the two ecumenisms along liberal and conservative lines” (Shishkov 2017, 82) it may be observed that his non-theological definitions of (1) classical ecumenism (loosed from unitive ecumenism and instead tied strictly to the WCC’s increasingly liberal trajectory) and (2) conservative ecumenism (also unmoored from unitive ecumenism) make this binary perspective all but inescapable. Ideological polarization then becomes all there is to see. We know, of course, how entrenched this polarization appears to be within and among the churches. But it is not everything, not even empirically. Where the theological leaven at ecumenism’s core has not been removed, more surprising coalitions and combinations of reconciling views remain possible, and prove far more resistant to being co-opted by either of the two great Babylons of our time, the beast of post-Christian secular liberalism or that of post-secular religious nationalism.

Finally, however, a word about conservative ecumenism should be added that may appear to upend everything that has just been said. It may appear that I have presented conservative ecumenism as always necessarily non-theological in its non-unitive dimension, that is, in its concern specifically with things sociopolitical. But it would be a mistake to see it that way. That is, here again there is a question. Where conservative ecumenism takes up issues at the forefront of the culture wars, whether having to do with abortion, same-sex marriage, or religious liberty, it *could* be doing this in only an ideological way. Often the emphasis on “values” rather than doctrine and on Christian “civilization” rather than actual Christianity signals that a set of ideological concerns have been split off from the root of Christian faith and have indeed supplanted it. However, activity of the Church or her members that aims at influencing public opinion or policy, including by means of cooperation with other Christian groups that may share the Church’s perspective on a given policy or legislative proposal, can also be a genuinely theological outgrowth of faith. What Shishkov calls conservative ecumenism is indeed not, then, inherently or always “bad ecumenism” as Chris Stroop contends (Stroop 2016); I would concur here with Shishkov that such an opinion is “too judgmental and does not adequately assess this phenomenon.”¹⁷ It *can* be bad ecumenism — bad if it understands the *conservative basis* of its ecumenical

17. Shishkov 2017, 73n28. Conservative ecumenism, as a manifestation of a basic Christian concern for the temporal sphere, may be seen as being in continuity with the Life and Work movement, even though the latter is more often associated with progressive forms of ecumenism.

coalition-building in a reified way as having to be always and everywhere at odds with progressive forms of ecumenical coalition-building, rather than open at least sometimes to the latter's concerns, based on a shared foundation of Christian principles.¹⁸ It can also be, for all intents and purposes, "no ecumenism" — if it is decoupled from unitive ecumenism.¹⁹

But it can also be good ecumenism; and let me conclude this section by suggesting by way of brief summary how Orthodox conservative ecumenism at its best may be understood, roughly on the model of Fr. Alexander Schmemmann, whom Shishkov has presented as a sort of proto-"conservative ecumenist." In its right balance and orientation it remains, in the first place, deeply interested in the question of church division and unity that has always been at the center of classical ecumenism. It does not arise as if from the ashes of such unitive ecumenism, but out of a legitimate perception of a growing one-sidedness (from the late 1960s onward) in the WCC-based and liberal-Protestant-dominated ecumenism that came to be less and less alert to a variety of dangers having to do with secularism and relativism. In this regard, what it rejects is not the WCC's engagement with the struggles of humanity in the contemporary world; on the contrary, conservative ecumenism at its best is profoundly interested in church-society relations and not at all sectarian. It intends rather to supplement what it sees as a growing lacuna in progressive Christianity's important, but overly narrow, focus on social justice and human rights, a lacuna having to do above all with a vision of the transcendent, of what Schmemmann called the "upper story," without which democratic liber-

18. Similarly, "liberal ecumenism" would be bad ecumenism if always opposed to any and all of the concerns of conservative ecumenism. Shishkov is correct in this regard when he writes (2017, 82), "If classical ecumenism [which for Shishkov means liberal-progressive, WCC-based ecumenism] still aspires to be inclusive and universal, its proponents will be forced to seek ways to incorporate the issue of 'traditional values' into its agenda. This, however, will require that both sides be prepared to conduct a responsible dialogue and to hear each other's arguments. Today, it is difficult to say whether the World Council of Churches will become a 'parliament' of sorts, wherein the entire ideological spectrum would be represented, or whether it will continue to occupy a liberal niche."

19. For in that case, the character of its interest in other Christian groups is finally the same as its interest in *any* groups with which it finds common cause on sociopolitical matters. About the World Russian People's Council (WRPC), which he describes as "an example of a Russian conservative ecumenical initiative," Shishkov writes (2017, 78) that it "proposes not merely an ecumenical project, but rather a super-ecumenical conservative project that goes beyond cooperation between Christians toward interreligious cooperation." My point is that cooperation and ecumenism properly speaking must be distinguished.

alism continually runs the risk of mistaking negative for positive freedom, subjective for objective truth — in short, the risk of imposing an illiberal liberalism as the *de facto* civic religion.

But Schmemmann was no promoter of conservatism *per se* and no stranger to the dangers of “soil and blood” nationalism, which he discerned to be an animating element in the thought of Solzhenitsyn, for example. One can infer from Schmemmann’s profound appreciation for the personal and religious liberties afforded by American democracy that he would be at the forefront of those Christians — including many self-identified conservative ones — sounding the alarm today over the threats to these liberties posed by the strong circulating currents of authoritarian nationalism unleashed in the United States. The “conservative ecumenism” of his participation in the Hartford Appeal was conducted in a catholic spirit attuned to the signs of the times rather than a sectarian, ideological spirit wedded to conservative ecumenism for its own sake. Perhaps it is even more necessary now than it was in his time to be careful not to imagine conservative ecumenism as something more deeply stable than it is — careful lest we reinforce already strong tendencies either to idolize or demonize it by “ontologizing” it in this way (together with a similarly ontologized liberal ecumenism, only inversely).

Effective critique of “conservative ecumenism” cannot be on the grounds that it happens to be what we are today calling “conservative” — unless, of course, it itself has internalized this identity so deeply that it imagines itself obligated to oppose everything we happen today to call “liberal.” Effective critique must rather be on the grounds that it has given up on unitive ecumenism, in which case, it is rightly to be named anti-ecumenical.

V. A key theological difference between Orthodox ecumenists and anti-ecumenists

Orthodox anti-ecumenists work hard to specify those things they believe are found only in the Orthodox Church. Few today deny the possibility of salvation elsewhere; nor do they contest that God’s spirit is somehow everywhere. But according to Fr. Peter Heers, we must distinguish between the “creative, sustaining, and providential energies of God,” in which all humanity participates, including schismatics and heretics, and “the purifying, illuminating, and deifying energies of God,” in which only those in the one and undivided Church participate (Heers 2015, 171–72). Heers elsewhere speaks of grace operating

on a person externally versus internally (Heers 2015, 178). After baptism, the Holy Spirit “works to form Christ within,” but before baptism “the activity of the Holy Spirit is restricted to drawing the soul towards Christ” (Heers 2015, 177). Against the idea that Christ may be formed within a baptized non-Orthodox Christian, Heers writes that the “‘one Spirit’ that dwells in and constantly builds up the ‘one Body’ (Eph. 4:4) cannot be at work creating ‘incomplete communion’” (Heers 2015, 179). Heers admits that “God, of course, can save whomever He pleases” (Heers 2015, 173n363), but for Heers the one way God cannot do this is by *forming* non-Orthodox people (including baptized Roman Catholics) into Christ, because according to Heers’s ecclesiological system, “the Holy Spirit is restricted.”²⁰

But Heers makes a further point: “Without these distinctions regarding the divine energies of the Holy Spirit, participation in the life of the Church in order to receive the grace that heals and saves would be pointless” (Heers 2015, 172). Here we have an echo of the logic of Neophytos when he spoke of Latin baptism in the 18th century: “For if [Latin baptism] does provide [remission of sins], then they [who] join the [Orthodox] Church [do so] for no reason.”²¹ For Heers as well, it is as if the Church holds so little intrinsic appeal that only if “the grace that heals and saves” is available nowhere else would one ever join it. He writes disapprovingly (though accurately): “If the Holy Spirit is accepted to be active — purifying and illuminating those outside the [Orthodox] Church through various ‘ecclesiastical elements,’ the first among which is Baptism — it follows that ‘ecclesiality,’ the possession of the character or nature of the Church, must also be conceded” (Heers 2015, 158). And this cannot be done because for Orthodox anti-ecumenical theology, it would necessitate a contradiction in the doctrine of the oneness of the Church.

This is the central point on which Orthodox ecumenical theology differs from the anti-ecumenical theology represented in the writings of Heers. The disagreement is not just about *whether* the Holy Spirit can work outside the Orthodox Church — and can do so not just universally and providentially, but ecclesially, to “form Christ” in those baptized elsewhere. It is true that Orthodox ecumenical theology gives an affirmative answer to this question and Orthodox anti-ecumenical theology gives a negative answer. But more important than just how they differently answer the question is the reason why. Orthodox anti-

20. See the longer quotation from which this is extracted, just above (Heers 2015, 177).

21. See above, note 5.

ecumenical theology states that the answer must be no because otherwise — if the Holy Spirit can “form Christ” in those baptized outside the Orthodox Church — it must be “completely impossible to preserve” the oneness of the Church in that case. By contrast, Orthodox ecumenical theology believes that both as a doctrine and as an existential reality, the oneness of the Church still can be preserved even if one affirms that Christ may be formed through the Holy Spirit in those baptized in a communion such as Roman Catholicism that has been separated from the Orthodox Church.

In fact, anti-ecumenists themselves unwittingly undercut their own position on this point. Acknowledging that the Greek Church did not always use the term heretics to describe Latin Christians even after the separation, Patrick Barnes writes:

Whatever reticence the Church may have had regarding the Latins in the first two centuries following the Great Schism can also be viewed as patient hope for their full return. . . . Nor can one responsibly state that the Roman church ceased overnight to be a repository of ecclesial Grace. Rather, it became spiritually ill, the disease of heresy spread, and the great branch of the West was finally detached from the rest of the Body, a reality which the Saints and various Synods since that time attest. This process may have lasted for decades — or even centuries — after the Great Schism. (Barnes 1999, 19)

Here Barnes himself effectively grants that the baptism that yields “a real, metaphysical, ontological change”²² did — at least for some period of years — continue to be performed in the separated Roman Catholic Church.

Anti-ecumenism’s distinct theological commitment, then, is to something else, namely to the belief that over time, *grace must inevitably and only decline, further and further*, in the communion separated from the Orthodox Church. Orthodox ecumenical theology disagrees. If grace can be diminished in separation, with one deviation giving rise to another, Orthodox ecumenism also leaves open the possibility that grace might also be increased and renewed — not least, by fresh contact with and receptivity to the Eastern Christian tradition. With respect to the Great Schism in particular, the Orthodox anti-ecumenist sees the church of Rome as “finally detached” — this finality be-

22. The phrase is from Saint Diadochus quoted by Telepneff, 77–78 (quoted in turn by Barnes 1999, 36).

ing, so they insist, a “reality which the Saints and various Synods since that time attest” (Barnes 1999, 19). But the ecumenist does not see any of this attestation as adding up to an authoritative resolution of the Orthodox Church as a whole that would rise to the level of dogma.

VI. Conclusion

In this paper I have argued that neither Orthodox ecumenism, nor Orthodox anti-ecumenism, nor even Orthodox conservative ecumenism can be dismissed by reducing them to strictly political movements. Whatever elements of politics have been and may continue to be intertwined with each — and it is certainly important to consider their political dimensions and motivations both historically and today — nevertheless each makes claims that must also be engaged theologically. This is not to say that the claims of each are equal to one another in theological cogency. The claims of Orthodox anti-ecumenism, I have tried to show, finally are not internally consistent and do not stand up against the contrary claims of Orthodox ecumenism. The latter rightly leaves open a possibility prematurely closed off by anti-ecumenists, namely the possibility that one or another Christian communion separated from Orthodoxy might, even in its ongoing formal separation, be in a process of recovering whatever it may have lost due to the separation, rather than only and inevitably losing more and more of the gifts of God with which it once had been graced.

The case of what Andrey Shishkov calls “conservative ecumenism” was treated at considerably more length than the other two movements within Orthodoxy, in part because conservative ecumenism is a more recent phenomenon on the Orthodox scene and therefore calls for an especially close and careful analysis in order to relate it properly to the others. The lengthy treatment was also due to the need I felt to respond to Shishkov’s particular way of framing this movement. Here I wished to develop three points in some tension with Shishkov’s perspective. First, I sought to retain within any overall definition of ecumenism, as *an essentially theological enterprise* — which, I argue, is how the Orthodox have always chiefly engaged in the ecumenical movement — the element of unitive ecumenism, which Shishkov is too ready in my view to decouple from ecumenism’s core meaning. Second, I looked to clarify that the “classical ecumenism” that itself prioritized unitive ecumenism and that characterized the World Council of Churches (WCC) at its inception has continued to live on elsewhere — in particular, in bilateral ecumenical dialogues, such as that between Catholics and Orthodox —

even as it has been increasingly marginalized within the WCC. I further argued that the withdrawal of some local Orthodox Churches from the WCC in the late 1990s — but not from the international Catholic-Orthodox dialogue — is to be understood as a reaction against a certain narrowly liberal sociopolitical trajectory of the WCC rather than as a rejection of “classical ecumenism” with its specifically unitive element, as Shishkov’s presentation seems to suggest. Finally, I offered the suggestion that far from being a mere matter of hair-splitting semantics, the adjustments I have recommended in how we define ecumenism, always with its theological significance at the core, such that there can be neither a genuine “conservative ecumenism” nor a true “classical ecumenism” without the unitive element still at the center, can be helpful in resisting the impulse to feed already strong tendencies toward sociopolitical polarization within the Church.

Perhaps, then, prophetic denunciation of religious nationalism will not only come from the safe haven of secular liberalism, nor denunciation of secular liberalism only from the safe haven of religious nationalism, but both may be criticized by a Church at home in neither the one nor the other, and therefore free to speak according to criteria uniquely given to her.

References

- “Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry.” 1982. Faith and Order paper no. 111. World Council of Churches, <https://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/commissions/faith-and-order/i-unity-the-church-and-its-mission/baptism-eucharist-and-ministry-faith-and-order-paper-no-111-the-lima-text>.
- Barnes, Patrick. 1999. *The Non-Orthodox: The Orthodox Teaching on Christians outside of the Church*. Salisbury, MA: Regina Orthodox Press.
- “The Church, the Churches, and the World Council of Churches.” 1950. Toronto Statement of the World Council of Churches, <http://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/central-committee/1950/toronto-statement>.
- Demacopoulos, George. 2017. “‘Traditional Orthodoxy’ as a Postcolonial Movement.” *The Journal of Religion* 97(4) (October): 475–99.
- “Encyclical of the Ecumenical Patriarchate (1920).” 1997. In *The Ecumenical Movement: An Anthology of Key Texts and Voices*, edited by Michael Kinnamon and Brian Cope, 12. Geneva: WCC Publications.
- Gavrilyuk, Paul. 2013. *Georges Florovsky and the Russian Religious Renaissance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heers, Peter. 2015. *The Ecclesiological Renovation of Vatican II: An Orthodox Examination of Rome’s Ecumenical Theology regarding Baptism and the Church*. Simpsonville, SC: Uncut Mountain Press, 2015.
- Lindbeck, George. 1989. “Two Kinds of Ecumenism: Unitive and Interdenominational.” *Gregorianum* 70(4): 647–60.

- Metallinos, George. 1994. *I Confess One Baptism . . . Interpretation and Application of Canon VII of the Second Ecumenical Council by the Kollyvades and Constantine Oikonomos (A Contribution to the Historico-Canonical Evaluation of the Problem of the Validity of Western Baptism)*. Translated by Priestmonk Seraphim. Mount Athos: St. Paul's Monastery.
- Oliver, John. 2018. "Ecumenism: The Autoimmune Disease in 'The Body of Christ.'" *The Word* (January): 17–21.
- Schmemmann, Alexander. 1963. *The Historical Road of Eastern Orthodoxy*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.
- Shishkov, Andrey. 2017. "Two Ecumenisms: Conservative Christian Alliances as a New Form of Ecumenical Cooperation." *State, Religion and Church* 4(2): 58–85.
- Stroop, Christopher. 2016. "Bad Ecumenism: The American Culture Wars and Russia's Hard Right Turn." *The Wheel* 6: 20–24.
- Troitsky, Ilarion. 1975. *The Unity of the Church and the World Conference of Christian Communities*. Translated by Margaret Jerenic. Montreal: Monastery Press.
- "Uniatism, Method of Union of the Past, and the Present Search for Full Communion." 1993. Joint International Commission for the Theological Dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church. Balamand, Lebanon, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/ch_orthodox_docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_19930624_lebanon_en.html.
- Ware, Timothy [Metropolitan Kallistos]. 1964. *Eustratios Argenti: A Study of the Greek Church under Turkish Rule*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Can Religious States and Representations Be Religious and Secular? A Critique of the Psychology of Religion

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.22394/2311-3448-2019-6-1-44-64>

Vladimir Mikheev — Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia). Dezem@bk.ru

Since the 1990s, there has been an ongoing discussion in religious studies about the uses of the terms “secular” and “religious.” This article applies the methodology of the critical study of religion within the psychology of religion. There are two main strategies to construct a research program in this field: (1) studying how religious senses occur (neurotheology, transpersonal psychology) and (2) studying how religious representations emerge (cognitive religious studies). This paper provides an overview of these two paradigms through the lens of the religious/secular dichotomy. Scholars who are trying to understand the nature of religious phenomena ignore a significant amount of data labeled as “secular.” The author then suggests studying such representations or senses beyond the religious/secular dichotomy.

Keywords: cognitive religious studies, ideological critique of religious studies, intuitive representations, neurotheology, protected values, religious representation, religious experience.

THE word “religion” is quite common in law, in the media, and in academic and everyday speech. However, this term is interpreted in ways that are contradictory and vague. This leads to discriminatory policy, negative or affirmative, toward certain groups based on their *religiousness*.¹ The appropriateness of this term was questioned in the 1990s by a group of scholars who developed what

1. Kenny provides the examples of jurisprudential cases from the European court. See Kenny 2014.

became known as “the ideological critique of religious studies.”² In November 2012 this way of thought became institutionalized: scholars from University of Stirling (Scotland) organized the international “Critical Religion Association.” Ivan Stransky, William Cavanaugh, Talal Asad, and Timothy Fitzgerald are leading authors of this field. Anthropologists and religious scholars, including Russians, actively discuss issues raised by this group (Forum 2017).

Their idea was to encounter Religious Studies as a research project that had its own history and ambitions. How did religious scholars create their field of investigation, how did ideologies³ use the term “religion,” and what kind of biases does the field of Religious Studies create? These critics were inspired by critical sociology (Michel Foucault, Edward Said, Lawrence Newman) and Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm shift theory (Strenski 2004). They claim that scientific knowledge is useful not merely for scientific discoveries, but also to legitimize power constellations in society (Asad 2003).

Each author came to his own conclusions in a different way. Church historian Cavanaugh traced the transformation of the term *religio* from Ancient Rome to the present and how it became common in Western culture. Asad, a historian of Muslim culture, studied the rise of the term “secular” and the exploitation of this term by the colonial authorities to create an Orientalized image of the Eastern world. During his anthropological research in Japan and India, Fitzgerald realized the impossibility of distinguishing “religious” from “non-religious” practices and institutions (Asad 2003; Cavanaugh 2009; Fitzgerald 2003). Each of these authors concluded that the terms “secular” and “religious”: (a) are ideologically biased and contradictory, although they are familiar to Western culture; and (b) that all attempts to set clear boundaries for these terms are logically inconsistent.

These critics have different views on the future of religious studies. Fitzgerald believes that religious studies should be replaced by cultural studies, since “the best work being produced in religious studies departments is not essentially any different from the work being done in departments of cultural studies or departments of cultural anthro-

2. See the website of The Critical Religion Association, accessed September 8, 2018, <https://criticalreligion.org>.
3. By *ideology* I mean the neutral conception of ideologies as “‘systems of thought,’ or ‘systems of belief’ or ‘symbolic practices’ which pertain to social action or political projects.” See Thompson 1984.

pology” (Fitzgerald 2003). This position is radical, but it must be recognized that some areas of religious studies do face serious methodological problems. The most problematic field of religious studies is the psychology of religion.

In contrast to the sociology of religion, which remains close to its parent discipline of sociology, this discipline operates distant from the mainstream of psychological research (Paloutzian and Park 2005). There is one possible explanation for such a state of affairs: perhaps the methodology of this field is not good enough? Are the terms “religious feelings,” “religious consciousness,” and “religious psychotechniques” objective and measurable? To answer this question, I analyzed the leading research programs of modern psychology of religion using the “secular-religious” opposition: cognitive religious studies, neurotheology, and transpersonal psychology.

These intellectual projects define their objects of research in their own way. Neurotheology (Andrew Newberg, Moshe Idel) and transpersonal psychology (Abraham Maslow, Stanislav Grof, Evgeny Torchinov) study *religious states/senses* (See Arzy and Idel 2015; Maslow 1964; Atran 2004; Boyer 2007; Newberg and Waldman 2009; Torchinov 1998). They are interested in how people perceive space and their bodies, especially unusual cases. Cognitive religious studies (Pascal Boyer, Scott Atran) focus on *religious beliefs/representations*. This approach tries to understand why people believe in gods or paranormal phenomena. All three projects compete against and criticize each other (Pyysiäinen 2012, 123–25). I am interested in the research objectives of these paradigms and their application of the terms “religion” and “secularity.”

1. The study of religious states

1.1 Object of research

The terms “religious states,” “religious experience,” “religious feelings,” “mystical experience,” and “transcendent experience” have plenty of meanings and contexts of use. I will focus on the interpretations that have been used to create objects of research in the psychology of religion.

Religious states are (a) any feelings experienced by a religious person; (b) senses constituting religiousness. The object of the study has a unique meaning only in the second case.

Two opposite methodologies of “religious experience” compete in the psychology of religion: constructivism and essentialism. Essentialists believe that there are one or more types of mystical experience. They have a common nature, observable and reproducible, but described in different cultures differently. Constructivists believe that a universal mystical experience is impossible because such experience depends on cultural context and personal expectations. Each culture has its own special forms of experience, such as Hasidic *Devekut* or Buddhist *Moksha*, but they are completely different phenomena. There has been no consensus between the two sides since the 1970s (Malevich 2013, 26–61). I will consider only essentialist scholars because no study of universal phenomena is possible within constructivism.

The American researcher Randall Studstill distinguishes five types of essentialism. Most of them have theological assumptions, therefore I am interested only in *psychological essentialism*, according to which mystical teachings and practices cause the same psychological transformations (Studstill 2005).

The model of *psychological essentialism* was proposed by Friedrich Schleiermacher in his *Speeches on Religion*. In his opinion, (1) religion is impossible without special psychological experience — the feeling of unity with God; (2) dogmas and rituals are secondary derivatives of that feeling; (3) the ability to engage with religious experience is a natural ability of human psychology, which can be studied using the scientific method. Schleiermacher explained the details of this process in terms of the Kantian theory of knowledge (Schleiermacher 1994).

Next, I will consider six research projects on religious phenomena using the model of psychological essentialism. I will list the methods used to investigate “religious states” and then analyze their theoretical assumptions.

1.2 Historical review of the methods of cognitive essentialism

The first scientific attempts to connect religious experience with natural causes took place in the 1870s–1890s. Early psychologists William James in the USA and Jean-Martin Charcot in France were simultaneously interested in magnetism and spiritism and tried to explain their physiological nature. The psychologists Abraham Maslow and Stanislav Grof, and Buddhistologist Yevgeny Torchinov, inspired by the intellectual tradition of psychoanalysis (Carl Jung) and the phenom-

enology of religion (Mircea Eliade) were interested in the psychedelic movement of the 1960s. Andrew Newberg, an American neurotherapist, and Israeli scientists Moshe Idel and Shahar Arzy, used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG) to describe brain processes during meditative or ecstatic practices in the 1990s and 2000s.

1. Jean-Martin Charcot, one of the pioneers of neurology, spent thirty years studying neurological diseases at the Salpêtrière clinic in Paris. In the 1880s he conducted public experiments with hypnosis on patients with hysteria. Charcot suggested that the hysteria and ecstasy experienced by Christian saints are the same phenomenon as that experienced by his patients (Evans 2015). In 1893, in the article “Cure by Faith,” he wrote:

Through all the ages, the most diverse civilizations, in the midst of religions apparently most dissimilar, the conditions of the miracle of healing have remained the same, its laws of evolution immutable.

I believe that the faith cure demands special subjects and special complaints — those, namely which are amenable to the influence of the mind over the body, if it is to find ground to work upon. Hysterical subjects offer a mental condition favorable to the operation of the faith cure (Charcot 1893).

2. William James collected dozens of testimonies from “religious geniuses” in his book *The Varieties of Religious Experience* and offered medical explanations of their conditions. According to his pragmatic philosophy, any human judgment (atheistic or religious) is “neurally conditioned,” roughly speaking, it “depends on the liver” of the individual (James 1896).⁴ However, this fact does not diminish the value of these experiences for the individual and his or her moral life (James 1905). James tried to explain conversion or mystical insights by means of the rapid transition of preliminary thoughts into the focus of consciousness.

James not only documented the testimonies of “religious geniuses,” but also experimented with nitrous oxide and recorded his impressions (James 1882). He also established the American branch of the Society for Psychical Research to study psychics and psychic phenomena. For fifteen years, he personally studied the psychic Leonora

4. “Is life worth living? It all depends on the liver.”

Piper, organized her public appearances, and claimed that she had extrasensory abilities (Fuller 2009).

3. In the 1960s, Stanislav Grof and Abraham Maslow founded the field of “transpersonal psychology.” Maslow studied the phenomenon of self-development and tried to understand why happy people feel a selfless love for the world. He developed the concept of “peak experiences,” that is, moments of the highest happiness and self-expression, feelings of love for being (*B-love experience*) like love, inspiration, aesthetic experience, and “mystical experience” (Maslow 1959).

Maslow suggested that peak experience is the core of all religions. This can be experienced by everyone, both atheists and priests. Previously, it had been “explained only in terms of the supernatural,” but today such phenomena could be observed and evoked in experimental conditions by means of psychedelics such as LSD. Maslow noted that “it looks as if these drugs often produce peak-experiences in the right people under the right circumstances, so that perhaps we needn’t wait for them to occur by good fortune” (Maslow 1964).

This idea prompted Stanislav Grof to carry out experiments with psychedelics, and he summarized his results in *The Adventure of Self-Discovery* based on the testimony of his patients. He discerned three subconscious levels of the psyche: (1) biographical — psychological complexes or suppressed thoughts, (2) perinatal — the birth experience, and (3) transpersonal — going beyond consciousness, time, and space. Psychedelics and techniques like holotropic breathing make it possible to study the last two layers and lead to “the beginning of spiritual awakening.” These “forms of spirituality” are similar to religions and the “worldview of great mystical traditions” (Grof 1994).

It is hard to call Grof’s experiments scientific: introspective reports ceased to be a relevant psychological tool in the middle of the nineteenth century after Franz Brentano’s criticism (Velichkovskii 1982, 46). The status of transpersonal psychology fluctuates between science and pseudoscience, and no one has conducted experiments with psychedelics except Grof and his followers.

However, Grof and Maslow’s ideas became popular among religious scholars. In Russia, they were promoted by Buddhistologist Evgeny Torchinov in his book *The World Religions: Transcendental Experience*. According to him, “the root of religious faith and religious life is transpersonal experience” (Torchinov 1998, 29). The experience itself is fundamentally indescribable, and therefore the catego-

ries “God” and “supernatural” are only descriptive constructs. He argues that this experience is poorly examined in religious studies and scholars need to shift their focus from a sociological paradigm to a psychological one.

5. The next attempt in the experimental study of religious experience emerged with the advent of neuroimaging technologies. In 1984, the first scientific work appeared in which the author explained the emergence of religion in terms of neuroscience; the term “neurotheology” was invented by Aldous Huxley in the 1962 novel *The Island* (Malevich 2013, 26–61).

Neurotheologists use MRI and EEG to track changes that occur in the brain during mystical states, and to understand how these states are induced. One of the most famous authors in this field is Andrew Newberg, professor of radiology and religious studies at the University of Pennsylvania.

Newberg carried out two kinds of research. In the first case, he searched for religious practitioners and asked them to perform their meditative (Franciscan sisters) or ecstatic (Pentecostals) practices. Then he studied changes in the subjects’ brain activity during these rituals (N’iuberg and Uoldman 2013, 18–19).

In the second case, he asked random subjects who did not belong to any denomination to apply specific meditative practices for several weeks and measured brain activity before and after the practice. Newberg found that different types of meditation correlate with activation in different brain areas, but all of them positively affect attention, memory, and empathy. Patients had similar health improvements, regardless of whether they were atheists or belonged to any religion.

1. The strong model

Torchinov defines religion as (1) psychotechnics that introduce a person into (2) transpersonal and archetypal states, (3) triggering some subconscious mental mechanisms. In his model, the “religious” is connected only with the experience of transpersonal states; the rest is related to the “secular.” For example, Confucianism is “civil rather than religious” and its rituals are similar to “the honors given to the national flag” (Torchinov 1998, 18).

Criticism. The strong model is based on the statement that transpersonal experience is possible only in religion, and in his book Torchinov considers only the practices of “world religions.” But doesn’t an

atheist using “secular meditation” experience a transpersonal state? Torchinov unreasonably restricts transcendental experience within the framework of “religious” institutions, although it can be imagined outside of this circle.

2. *The moderate model*

This model is based on two assumptions. First, there are several extraordinary phenomena in the human psyche in which the world, body, and mind are perceived in an unusual way. They often occur in people with brain disorders, but any healthy person may experience them if they learn special practices or take drugs. In this case the success of the practice is independent of any beliefs.

1. Charcot: “Between religions and lay faith cures no distinction can be made; the same cause the same effect” (Charcot 1893).
2. Maslow: “Perhaps we can actually produce a private personal peak-experience under observation and whenever we wish under religious or nonreligious circumstances” (Maslow 1964, 17).
3. Newberg: “This was our first real evidence that a meditation practice, even when removed from its spiritual and religious framework, can substantially improve memory in people suffering from cognitive problems . . . meditation can be separated from its spiritual roots” (Newberg and Waldman 2009, 31).

Second, the terms “God,” “soul,” “nirvana,” and so on, are merely labels taken from ordinary language or the cultural environment for the expression of unusual experiences.

1. James: “The theories which Religion generates, being thus variable, are secondary”; “The faith state may hold a very minimum amount of intellectual content” (James 1905, 505).
2. Maslow: “Practically everything that happens in the peak-experiences, naturalistic though they are, could be listed under the headings of religious happenings, or indeed have been in the past considered to be only religious experiences” (Maslow 1964, 34).
3. Newberg: “If a survey only gives the respondent the choice of a few options, the result will come out black and white. Thus, we chose to give our survey participants free rein in describing their religious beliefs and spiritual experiences. Instead of coming up with a simple set of categories, we uncovered a rain-

bow of colorful descriptions and beliefs” (Newberg and Waldman 2009, 10).


Criticism. According to the moderate model, meditative practices and drugs can change perception and consciousness, regardless of any interpretation of the nature of such phenomena. In this case, should such phenomena be called “religious” and do we need a special school of psychology to study them? The only justification for such a division is theological. It could be said that some meditative practices stimulate the brain, while others interact with the “divine.” However, such assumptions are inappropriate for a scientific discipline with reproducible experiments.

3. *The weak model*

Idel and Arzy propose a model in which the terms “religious” and “secular” do not matter to the researcher at all. The only things that are important are techniques to achieve experience and the underlying mechanisms of consciousness. The interpretation of practitioners or different ideologies cannot reveal the nature of the phenomenon. The authors denote traditional approaches as *top-down* because they assess the content of the experience based on the cultural context. They call their own approach *bottom-up* and they aim to describe physiological correlates of mystical techniques with no axiological interpretation.

According to Arzy and Idel, the top-down approach simply exploits mystical experiences as material for studying other cultural phenomena. Such an approach is not suitable for studying mystical experience: the cultural and linguistic context distort the reports of mystics, because such experience is unusual and difficult to express. The leading ideologies usurp the right to interpret the experiences of mystics and usually avoid interpretations in which the “mystical object may not be the ultimate divinity but the mystic’s self or body nonetheless” (Arzy and Idel 2013, 9). Finally, this approach overcomes cultural differences in the description of mystical practices. It assumes that mystical techniques evoke similar physiological processes in everyone (Arzy and Idel 2013, 10).

Criticism. The strong model is contradictory, and the moderate is absurd without theological assumptions. The weak model avoids the opposition of “religious” and “secular”: it tends to understand general cognitive mechanisms in each mystical tradition. However, Idel and Arzy unwittingly continue to use these terms.

Fig. 1. *Three models of cognitive essentialism*

1.4. Discussion

Almost all the authors reviewed here who use the words “religious” and “non-religious” admit that this division is deceptive or biased. This is the case because these terms are common in academic literature. According to Idel, “it is hard to avoid the pertinence of those approaches, formulated by intellectual prodigies, especially since they turned into conceptual tools that are part of the quotidian language” (Arzy and Idel 2013, 116).

The division of “religious/mystical experience” into three different phenomena could change this situation: (1) the perception of one’s consciousness and body as distorted by mean of the techniques of meditation (Arzy and Idel 2013, 33); (2) strong positive feelings; and (3) intuitive theories about the causes of the first and the second. Those who have experienced such states often combine these phenomena, but they could and should be studied separately.

Alternative terminology for the first and second phenomena already exists in the academic literature. Neuroscience investigates various transpersonal states, such as autoscopy or dissociation, and positive psychology studies positive experience as “autotelic experience” or “flow” (Csikszentmihalyi 2011).

The third phenomenon causes more difficulty. It could be called “religion” or “spirituality,” but such a designation links it to the theologies of the major confessions, although alternative interpretations are

also possible. Therefore, a neutral terminology should be developed that will allow a clear description of people's experiences.

The paradigm of "intuitive theories" or "folk theories" could be the theoretical basis for such terminology (Gerstenberg and Tenenbaum 2017, 517–20). According to this theory, a person uses *heuristics*, simple rules that give quick but imperfect results, to solve complex everyday problems. These heuristics create intuitive theories about the causes of the surrounding phenomena and processes (Gelman and Legare 2011). They are often adequate to reality but lead to systematic errors where subtle calculations are required (Kahneman 2011, 84). At the same time, folk theories are very influential and serious efforts are required to change them.

I believe that the term "intuitive psychology" is appropriate for studying how a person interprets her transpersonal and autotelic experiences. In a narrow sense, it refers to the daily perception of other people as capable of thinking (Arico 2010, 372). In a broad sense, it describes "commonsense psychology that explains human behavior in terms of beliefs, desires, intentions, expectations, preferences, hopes, fears, and so on" (Baker 2001, 318), that is, intuitive assumptions about the nature of people's experiences, intentions, and estimations. Intuitive psychology applies to both individuals and groups. Theologies can be considered unique types of systematized folk psychology, created in historical circumstances by "theological guilds," or organized groups of intellectuals (Boyer 2007, 272).

2. The study of religious beliefs

The study of "religious representations" investigates the genesis of ideas about gods, higher powers, and other counterintuitive representations. The most popular and fruitful current research program for the study of such phenomena is Cognitive Religious Studies (CRS).

CRS studies the mechanisms of cognition and memory to explain the belief in the supernatural that occurs in all human cultures. The aim of the discipline is to solve a long-standing problem in religious studies: how to overcome the specific features of individual religions and prove that their positions are based on universal features of human cognition (Tremelin 2012).

Let us consider the most famous representatives of this approach, whose works have been published in the respected journals *Science* and *Nature*: French-American anthropologists Pascal Boyer and Scott

Atran. The first conducted field research in Cameroon and Nepal, the second studied ISIS followers and the Druze (Atran 2010). I. Pyysiäinen calls them the creators of the “standard model” in CRS, and the books *Religion Explained* and *In Gods We Trust* are considered CRS “textbooks” (Pyysiäinen 2012, 123–25).

2.1 Cognitive religious studies

Cognitive religious studies is based on three theories: modularity of mind, slow and fast modes of thinking, and cultural evolutionism. The first theory encounters mind as a system of independent and specialized programs (Fordor 1985, 1–5). The second distinguishes between two modes of thinking: automatic thinking, which is quick and unconscious, and slow thinking, requiring cognitive load (Kahneman 2011). The third applies the laws of evolution to cultural selection, trying to explain the spread of beliefs and practices in human societies. It claims that the peculiarities of mind can explain why certain ideas are better remembered and more quickly disseminated than others (Boyd and Richerson 1988; Dawkins 1976; Sperber 1985).

In the 1980s, Atran applied these concepts in his study of folk biology, or the representation of the organic world by lay people (Atran 1998). Boyer investigated tale transmission in African tribes and the use of theological concepts in everyday speech (Barrett 1999). At the end of the 90s, both scientists began to study “religious concepts.”

The standard model of CRS consists of the following premises:

1. The specificity of “religion”

Atran and Boyer argue that the term “religion” is problematic, but it can be used in scientific research:

1. Atran: “Religion is a fuzzy category with no transparent distinction between beliefs or actions as religious or not. Nevertheless, readily identifiable clusters of empirically and logically inscrutable beliefs reoccur cross-culturally as a by-product of nonreligious cognitive functions evolved for mundane purposes” (Atran and Ginges 2012, 855–57).
2. Boyer: “Religion” is “a common prescientific category that may need to be replaced with other, causally grounded, scientific categories,” which help us to understand human cognition (Boyer and Bergstrom 2008).

Therefore, in CRS religious beliefs and secular ideology are clearly divided. Religious or supernatural concepts are those notions that: (1) are invisible and have intentions; and (2) evoke emotions and action.

1. Atran: “Faith in religious beliefs rests not on logical coherence and empirical evidence but is sustained by costly rituals whose elements may have no active or useful relationships in everyday life” (Atran and Ginges 2012).
2. Boyer: “Religious concepts are those supernatural concepts that matter. . . [they] can induce strong feelings of fear, guilt, anger but also reassurance or comfort” (Boyer 2007, 137).

In order to avoid Abrahamic notions of God and include such phenomena as the belief in aliens, spirits, ghosts, and so on, the authors defined “religion” as broadly as possible.

2. The naturalness of religion

There is no special religious organ/department of the brain or religious specialists, those who perceive religious agents better than others. Religious notions arise as a by-product of the most common cognitive mechanisms, such as memory, attention, abstract thinking, and emotional intelligence. Boyer stresses that these abilities are the same for all people, otherwise religious geniuses would not be understood (Boyer 2007, 309).

3. Why religious beliefs are easily remembered and affect people

Human thinking constantly produces spontaneous guesses about the world, but only a small number of them are culturally successful, that is, they remain in memory and are transferred to other people. Religious notions arise in all cultures, are passed down from generation to generation, and influence human behavior. Their cultural survival is caused by two factors.

(1) Memory advantage. Some stimuli are more conspicuous and better consolidate in long-term memory than others. Experiments demonstrate that “minimally counterintuitive concepts” evoke such an effect. They violate “assumptions about the basic categories of existence” and cause fascination. An optimal number of counterintuitive elements (2.5) within a tale makes it interesting to narrate and guarantee its stability during transmission (Norenzayan et al. 2006).

(2) Relevance. Representations that provoke action matter more than those that do not. For example, an intelligent but bodyless being causes fascination, however, it becomes relevant only if it knows something about our past and future and could be harmful or protective. According to Atran, “costly and seemingly arbitrary ritual commitment to apparently absurd beliefs deepens trust, galvanizing group solidarity for common defense and blinding members to exit strategies.” He demonstrates in numerous examples that religious groups are very cooperative, but prone to conflict in defending their “sacred values” (Atran and Ginges 2012).

2.2 The cognitive religious studies research program

For CRS, both criteria of religious beliefs are essential: (1) counterintuitiveness; and (2) the ability to evoke emotions and provoke behavior. If we consider only the first criteria, then “the Mickey Mouse problem” arises: what is the difference between religious doctrine and fairy tale? If only the second, then the “the Marx problem” occurs: how do religions differ from ideologies?

Atran: Cognitive theories of religion are motiveless. They cannot, in principle, distinguish Mickey Mouse and the Magic Mountain from Jesus and the burning bush, fantasy from religious belief. . . Commitment theories are mindblind. For the most part, they ignore or misrepresent the cognitive structure of the mind and its causal role. They cannot in principle distinguish Marxism from monotheism, ideology from religious belief. (Atran 2004, 14)

To solve the first problem, cognitive religious scholars have developed criteria for distinguishing fairy tales from religion. Justin Barrett highlights five attributes of “god concepts”: they are counterintuitive, violate intuitive assumptions about some ontological categories, they are intentional agents, they possess strategic information (about life, death, love, and honesty), and their acts are detectable in the human world and motivate human behaviors. These criteria explain why we do not consider Mickey Mouse (who does not affect the world) and George W. Bush (who is not counterintuitive) to be gods (Barrett 2008).

2. “The Marx problem” is harder to solve. Marxism, Confucianism, the secular cult of the French Revolution, “market fundamentalism,” and so on have the same properties mentioned by Barrett. For example, the laws of history in Marxism are paradoxical (it is not clear how

the laws of history exist), relate to strategic phenomena (the distribution of wealth), are detectable, evoke powerful feelings, and inspire actions. In public rituals, “an abstraction like ‘our tradition’ or ‘society’ can play much the same role as gods or ancestors” (Boyer 2007, 262).

Atran admits that “supernatural entities” occur both in religions and “in political and economic ideologies.” However, ideological entities are non-intentional, have no consciousness and goals, and no personal emotional connections can be established with them (Atran 2004, 15). Therefore, religious beliefs and rituals are more successful in strengthening group cohesiveness than secular ones. Atran believes that someday “neuroimaging may elucidate how religion and sacred values differ from secular beliefs and values” (Atran and Ginges 2012).

3. In solving these problems, Atran involuntarily creates new ones:

(1) The case of Buddhism. There are many non-theological religions in which deities or supreme principles are unintentional.

(2) The case of Wahhabism. There are many religious teachings prohibiting any anthropomorphic description of gods, especially any suggestion about their direct interference in human affairs.

CRS could answer that concepts elaborated by theological experts are not the same as intuitive representations of gods. However, the same argument could be applied to secular ideologies, and then we face . . .

(3) The case of nationalism. Atran claims that after the Westphalian peace secular national states were instituted and wars on religions ended. The ideology of these states lacks concepts of anthropomorphic and intentional supernatural beings and they do not consider their values as absolute. Perhaps humanism, nationalism, Marxism, and so on, in their doctrinal forms, are indeed prone to compromise and do not ensoul such concepts as “nation,” “history,” “human rights,” and so on. However, it is easy to prove that these abstract entities often became animated, sacralized, and evoke conflicts.

First, in social isolation or grave danger humans are prone to anthropomorphize nonhuman agents (puppets or computer gadgets) (Epley et al. 2008). Nation, traditions, and culture also could be easily personalized. A large body of research exists about the representation of the nation as a woman or a man (see Riabov 2008; Weaver 2002; McClintock 1995), a sovereign body (Kantorowitz 1957), an animal, et cetera.⁵


5. It is not clear why totemism is usually described in research literature as religion, but not as national symbol.

Second, it is arguable that religious communities are more cohesive than secular ones. Atran forgets about secular armies demonstrating excellent discipline and organization. During their history people have fought for their nation, tradition, ancestors, and other abstract, invisible entities, doing so altruistically, out of love for their sacred symbols. As Benedict Anderson writes, “for most ordinary people of whatever class the whole point of the nation is that it is interestless” (Anderson 2006, 144).

Finally, Atran acknowledges that any values can be made sacred and that any ideology can use rituals and absurd beliefs to strengthen group solidarity:

1. “Sacred values are not exclusive to religion; mundane values may be sacralized through rituals linking them to nonreligious sacred values, like the nation.”
2. “Thus, even ostensibly secular nations and transnational movements usually contain important quasi-religious rituals and beliefs: from sacred songs and ceremonies, to postulations that providence or nature bestow equal rights” (Atran and Ginges 2012).

Fig. 2. Atran and Boyer’s model of cognitive religious studies



2.3. Discussion

CRS’s attempt to separate secular and religious concepts is problematic. First, Atran and Boyer admit that (1) religious notions have no specific content or origin; (2) only their intentionality distinguishes them from secular concepts. However, psychological experiments and historical examples demonstrating the rapid humanization of objects and representations disprove this statement. Then the authors try to prove that religious ideas strengthen group solidarity more than secular ones. However, national symbols also evoke strong feelings and increase group solidarity, while national satisfaction improves subjective well-being (Morrison et al. 2011). If we draw an arrow from “secular culture” to “solidarity” in the above model (see fig. 2), then the dichotomy of secular and religious becomes useless.

This confusion is caused by two factors. First, European culture is biased in its contrast of secular ideologies and religions. The latter are perceived as more violent, less negotiable, and less rational (Cavanaugh 2009, 7). Second, Atran and Boyer decided that sacralization and counterintuitiveness are particular only to religions. However, plenty of research undermines this statement.

A research subject such as “religious beliefs” should be divided into two components: sacralization and counterintuitiveness. Prerequisites for the study of sacralization already exist in social psychology, like the theory of *protected values* developed by Jonathan Baron: these are values “that resist trade-offs with other values, particularly economic values” (Baron and Spranca 1997). The focus here shifts from the religious/secular opposition to the economic/moral dichotomy. Baron’s students investigate mundane phenomena such as resistance to biotechnology (Scott et al. 2016). Cognitivists and cultural evolutionists investigate counterintuitive representations (supernaturalism) and their role in the transmission of ideas in societies.

Perhaps protected values and counterintuitive representations have an interactive effect. But we should not assign them only to those cultural spheres that we call “religious,” ignoring the spheres that we call “secular.” Neuroimaging may never elucidate the difference between sacred and secular because this distinction remains merely because of centuries-old habit.

Conclusion

I examined two paradigms of the psychology of religion and the objects of their research. Neurotheology and transpersonal psychology construct their objects by referring to altered states of consciousness, CRS by referring to religious beliefs. In both cases, the disciplines blended physiological processes and their interpretation, ignored secular phenomena, and provided no advantage for scientific research. The only field properly using this dichotomy is theology, but this subject is very far from psychology, which is experimental and reproducible.

A research program in the psychology of religion has resources to elaborate a new “protective belt of hypothesis” (Lakatos 1976). Various theories can disguise or partly solve problems that undermine the core explicit assumption of religious essentialism, that is an existence of unique and scientifically explorable realm of religion. An

alternative approach should be developed to make it possible to completely avoid the “religious-secular” dichotomy. I proposed two features of such an alternative program: (a) altered states of consciousness and their intuitive interpretations, as well as sacred values, and counterintuitive representations ought to be studied separately; and (b) they should not be distinguished as “secular” and “religious.” I propose another paradigm: there is no essential “religious” domain, either as an observable psychological state, or as a unique system of beliefs.

Regardless of the acceptance of this proposal by the scientific community, attention needs to be paid to this problem. Moreover, the methodology of other research projects, such as the sociology of religion, should be questioned.

References

- Anderson, Benedict. 2006. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. New York: Verso.
- Arico, Adam. 2010. “Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects.” *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 1(3): 371–93.
- Arinin, E. 2013. *Chto takoe religia: 500 opredelenii termina s kommentariami* [What religion is: 500 definitions with commentaries]. Vladimir: VSU.
- Arzy, Shahar, and Moshe Idel. 2015. *Kabbalah: A Neurocognitive Approach to Mystical Experiences*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Asad, Talal. 2003. “Islam, Secularism and the Modern State: Talal Asad Discusses His Work on Secularism in the Modern World.” *Asiasociety.org*. Accessed December 3, 2017, <http://asiasociety.org/islam-secularism-and-modern-state>.
- Atran, Scott. 1998. “Folk Biology and the Anthropology of Science: Cognitive Universals and Cultural Particulars.” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 21(4): 547–69.
- . 2004. *In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2010. *Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists*. N.p.: Harper Collins.
- Atran, Scott, and Jeremy Ginges. 2012. “Religious and Sacred Imperatives in Human Conflict.” *Science* 336(6083): 855–57.
- Baker, L. 2001. “Folk Psychology.” In *The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Baron, Jonathan, and Mark Spranca. 1997. “Protected Values.” *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 70(1): 1–16.
- Barrett, Justin. 1999. “Theological Correctness: Cognitive Constraint and the Study of Religion.” *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 11(4): 325–39.
- . 2008. “Why Santa Claus Is Not A God.” *Journal of Cognition and Culture* 8(1–2): 149–61.
- Boyd, Robert, and Peter J. Richerson. 1988. *Culture and the Evolutionary Process*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Boyer, Pascal. 2007. *Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought*. New York: Basic Books.
- . 2008. “Being Human: Religion: Bound to Believe?” *Nature* 455(7216): 1038–39.
- Boyer, Pascal, and Brian Bergstrom. 2008. “Evolutionary Perspectives on Religion.” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 37: 111–30.
- Cahill, Lisa. 2012. Review of *Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict*. *Modern Theology* 28(3): 561–63.
- Cavanaugh, William. 2009. *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2011a. “The Invention of Fanaticism.” *Modern Theology* 27(2): 226–37.
- . 2011b. “Religious Violence as Folklore.” *Religion and Society* 2: 122–27.
- . 2013. “The Root of Evil: Does Religion Promote Violence?” *America* 209(3): 11(4).
- Charcot, J.M. 1893. “The Faith Cure.” *The New Review* 8(44): 18–31.
- Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly. 2011. *Potok: Psikhologiiia optimal'nogo perezhivaniia* [Flow: A psychology of optimal experience]. Moscow: Alpina.
- Dawkins, Richard. 1976. *The Selfish Gene*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Epley, N., S. Akalis, A. Waytz, and J. Cacioppo. 2008. “Creating Social Connection through Inferential Reproduction: Loneliness and Perceived Agency in Gadgets, Gods, and Greyhounds.” *Psychological Science* 19(2): 114–20.
- Evans, Jules. 2015. “Jean-Martin Charcot and the Pathologization of Ecstasy.” The History of Emotions Blog. Accessed May 31, 2018, <https://emotionsblog.history.qmul.ac.uk/2015/03/jean-martin-charcot-and-the-pathologization-of-ecstasy/>.
- Fitzgerald, Timothy. 2003. *The Ideology of Religious Studies*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fodor, Jerry. 1985. “Precis of the Modularity of Mind.” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 8(1) (March): 1–5.
- “Forum: Antropologiiia Religii” [Forum: The anthropology of religion]. 2017. *Antropologicheskii Forum* 34.
- Fuller, Robert. 2009. *Wonder: From Emotion to Spirituality*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Gelman, Susan, and Cristine Legare. 2011. “Concepts and Folk Theories.” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40: 379–98.
- Gerstenberg, Tobias, and Joshua Tenenbaum. 2017. “Intuitive Theories.” In *Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning*, edited by Michael Waldmann, 515–48. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Grof, Stanislav. 1994. *Puteshestvie v poiskakh sebia* [The adventure of self-discovery]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Transpersonal'nogo Instituta.
- James, William. 1882. “Subjective Effects of Nitrous Oxide.” *Mind* 7.
- . 1896. *Is Life Worth Living?* Philadelphia: S. Burns Weston.
- . 1905. *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature*. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.
- Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. London: Penguin.
- Kantorowicz, Ernst H. 1957. *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Keen, Sam. 1986. *Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination*. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

- Kenny, Celia. 2014. "Law and the Art of Defining Religion." *Ecclesiastical Law Journal* 16(1): 18–31.
- Lakatos, Imre. 1976. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." In *Can Theories Be Refuted?: Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis*, edited by Sandra G. Harding, 205–59. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Malevich, T.V. 2012. "Neiroteologiya: Teorii religii i nauka o mozge" [Neurotheology: Theories of religion and brain studies]. In *Religiovedcheskie issledovaniia* (1–2): 62–83.
- . 2013. "Filosofia religii o misticheskom opyte: Dilemma essentsializma i konstruktivizma." In *Filosofia religii: Al'manakh* [Philosophy of religion about mystical experience: The dilemma of essentialism and constructivism.] In *Philosophy of Religion: Almanac*, 26–61. Moscow: Nauka.
- Maslow, Abraham. 1959. "Cognition of Being in the Peak Experiences." *The Journal of Genetic Psychology* 94(1): 43–66.
- . 1964. *Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- McClintock, Anne. 1995. *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Conquest*. New York: Routledge.
- Morrison, Mike, Louis Tay, Ed Diener. 2011. "Subjective Well-Being and National Satisfaction: Findings from a Worldwide Survey." *Psychological Science* 22(2): 166–71.
- Newberg, Andrew. 2010. *Principles of Neurotheology*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
- Newberg, Andrew, and Mark Waldman. 2009. *How God Changes Your Brain: Breakthrough Findings from a Leading Neuroscientist*. New York: Ballantine.
- Newman, L. 1998. "Znachenie metodologii: Tri osnovnykh podkhoda" [The meaning of methodology: Three basic approaches]. *Sociologicheskie issledovaniia* 3: 122–34.
- Norenzayan, Ara, Scott Atran, Jason Faulkner, and Mark Schaller. 2006. "Memory and Mystery: The Cultural Selection of Minimally Counterintuitive Narratives." *Cognitive Science* 30(3): 531–53.
- Paloutzian, Raymond F., and Crystal L. Park. 2005. "Integrative Themes in the Current Science of the Psychology of Religion." In *Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality*, 3–20. 2nd edition. New York: Guilford Press.
- Pyysiäinen, I. 2012. "Kognitivnoe religiovedenie kak issledovatel'skaia programma" [Cognitive religious studies as research project]. *Religiovedcheskie issledovaniia* 1–2: 123–25.
- Riabov, O. 2017. "Rossiia-Matushka": *Natsionalizm, gender, voina v Rossii XX veka* ["Mother Russia": Nationalism, gender, war in 20th-century Russia]. Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag.
- Shleiermakher, F. [Friedrich Schleiermacher]. 1994. *Rechi o religii* [Speeches on religion]. Moscow: Aleteia.
- Sperber, Dan. 1985. "Anthropology and Psychology: Towards an Epidemiology of Representations." *Man* 20(1): 73–89.
- Strenski, Ivan. 2004. "Ideological Critique in the Study of Religion: Real Thinkers, Real Contexts, and a Little Humility." In *New Approaches to the Study of Religion*, edited by P. Antes, A.W. Geertz, and R.R. Warne, 271–94. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Studstill, Randall. 2005. *The Unity of Mystical Traditions: The Transformation of Consciousness in Tibetan and German Mysticism*. Leiden: Brill.
- Thompson, John B. 1984. *Studies in the Theory of Ideology*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Torchinov, E. 1998. *Religii mira: Opyt zapredel'nogo; Psihotekhnika i transpersonal'nye sostoiianiia* [The world religions: Transcendental experience; Psychotechnique and transpersonal states]. St. Petersburg: Tsentr "Peterburgskoe Vostokovedenie."
- Tremlin, T. 2012. "Kognitivnyi i sravnitel'nyi podhody: Kak novoe kognitivnoe religiovedenie mozhet pomoch' sravnitel'nomu religiovedeniiu?" [Cognitive and comparative approaches: How the first may help to the second]. *Researches in Religious Studies* 7–8.
- Uzlaner, D.A. 2008. "Raskoldovyvanie diskursa: 'Religioznoe' i 'svetskoe' v iazyke novogo vremeni" [Disenchantment of discourse: "Religious" and "secular" in the language of modernity]. *Logos* 4: 140–61.
- Velichkovskii, B.M. 1982. *Sovremennaia kognitivnaia psikhologiiia* [Contemporary cognitive psychology]. Moscow: MSU.
- Weaver, E. 2002. "Madonna Crucified: A Semiotics of Motherland Imagery in Hungary." *Slovo* 14: 54–76.
- Zinnbauer, Brian, and Kenneth Pargament. 2005. "Religiousness and Spirituality." In *Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality*, edited by Raymond F. Paloutzian and Crystal F. Park, 21–42. 2nd edition. New York: Guilford Press.

DIMITRI BRATKIN

D.A. Chwolson as an Expert Witness and Student of Abraham Geiger: Three Chapters from a Scholarly Biography

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.22394/2311-3448-2019-6-1-65-85>

Dimitri Bratkin – Department of the Philosophy of Religion and Religious Studies, St. Petersburg State University (Russian Federation). bratkin@yandex.ru

This article is based on unpublished sources from St. Petersburg archives (the Manuscript Department of the Russian National Library, the St. Petersburg Branch of the Archive of the Russian Academy, and the Russian State Historical Archive). It explores the forms and methods of Daniel Chwolson's (1819–1911) work on academic protection for the Jewish minority. Apart from his well-known effort to refute blood libel accusations that spanned five decades (1861–1911), Chwolson's activities on behalf of Jews included less obvious projects and approaches. For instance, he attempted (unsuccessfully) to establish an "associate professorship for Judaic Studies" at St. Petersburg University in 1896–97, which in due course would give birth to the "Academy of Baron Günzburg." Less apparent but equally important is his work in refuting anti-Jewish theological presuppositions; in this he followed in the footsteps of his admired teacher, Abraham Geiger, and the methodologies of Wissenschaft des Judentums. In so doing, Chwolson argued against Christian confessional distortions of Judaism. His firm insistence that early Jewish sources be used in the

This research has been completed with the support of grant RNF No. 16-18-10083, "Izuchenie religii v sotsiokul'turnom kontekste epokhi: Istoriia religiovedeniia i intellektual'naia istoriia Rossii XIX–pervoi poloviny XX vv." [The study of religion in the socio-cultural context of the era: The history of religious studies and the intellectual history of Russia in the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries].

study of the New Testament and early Christianity anticipated a turn that would become mainstream in the latter half of the 20th century.

Keywords: Daniel Chwolson, Khvolson, Khvol'son, minority, Judaism, Early Christianity, Pharisees, history of scholarship, Jewish Studies, *Wissenschaft des Judentums*.

DANIEL A. Chwolson¹ (Daniil Avraamovich Khvol'son) (1819–1911) is known in the history of humanities in Russia as a Jewish child prodigy, a former yeshiva student who studied languages (other than Hebrew and Aramaic) and other secular subjects through self-education, who managed to become a student of Abraham Geiger and a personal protégé of Avraam S. Norov; following his conversion to the state church, he held the chair of Hebrew and Syriac philology at St. Petersburg University. Chwolson was in effect the founder of the St. Petersburg Semitological school, of Hebrew paleography and Semitic epigraphy as a field of systematic research in Russia and, therefore, an active participant in the discussions over the authenticity of certain manuscripts and inscriptions collected by Avraam S. Firkovich. Chwolson himself was also one of the first to collect and comment on Eastern sources on the history of medieval Eastern Europe and Ancient Rus, and to acquire a vast collection of Hebrew books and early printed books that in due course became part of the Academic collection. Daniel Chwolson was part of the social and political history of Russia in the 19th century as the most assiduous combatant against the blood libel. It is hardly possible to refer to this scholar as “little-known,” much less as “forgotten,” but beyond this discrete, albeit broad, set of contexts, Daniel Chwolson certainly remains an understudied figure. Suffice it to say that a detailed foundational biography of the scholar, written from the standpoint of modern knowledge of him and his era, has still not been published, which is striking against the background of Russia's flourishing Judaic studies and especially of the study of the history of Russian-Jewish intellectual life of the 19th and 20th centuries. Such a biography

1. Despite the present tendency, I am systematically using the German-style transliteration “Chwolson” (instead of the English “Khvol'son”) since it was the Latinization favored and authorized by the bearer himself and the members of the same family in their lifetime. The variant “Khvol'son” is used in the bibliography only, to indicate the Cyrillic original.

is sorely needed, and the main research task would consist not only of assessing Daniel Chwolson's contribution to those fields of scholarship in which he was engaged as a Russian academic professional working among his peers, but also to the wider social and cultural context, including the European and world contexts. As preparatory material toward this biography, I offer to the readers three inter-related chapters; here Daniel Chwolson appears in three roles, which complemented his position as a professor (*ordinarnyi professor*) of the capital's university — in other words: (1) as a public expert who addressed the wider lay public, (2) as a founding figure of his scholarship, who formulated a new agenda for the discipline of which he was the doyen, and finally, (3) a professional in the particular field of his scholarly expertise.

The public expert struggling against blood libel

Chwolson's most famous work on this topic was a small booklet titled "On Certain Medieval Accusations against the Jews," published in 1861 (Khvol'son 1861). The author himself in the second edition of the same book explained the circumstances that demanded its publication at the behest of the faculty of Oriental languages of St. Petersburg University:

[In 1852–53 — D.B.] many Jews, mostly soldiers, were accused of killing two Christian children in Saratov, with the intention of using their blood for religious purposes. In relation to this, a special commission was established under the Ministry of Internal Affairs by the tsar's order and was charged with a dual mandate. First, it was to examine the Jewish books, manuscripts, and letters seized from the accused in large numbers, whether information would be found in them that could serve as proof of the correctness of the accusation. The second assignment of the commission was to investigate the question: do Jews in general, or does some sect among them, use Christian blood for any religious or other purposes of any kind? [. . .] The members of the commission were Archpriest Gerasim Petrovich Pavsky and Fedor Fedorovich Sidonsky; in addition, a professor of the biblical Hebrew language at the local [St. Petersburg — D.B.] theological academy, Vasily Andreevich Levison, and I myself. The first two members of the commission stated that they understood only the biblical language and were not familiar with the post-biblical literature of the Jews and that therefore they were not in a position to read the abovementioned books. For this reason, exam-

ination of the confiscated books, manuscripts, and letters was entrusted to Levison and me. [. . .] My response, in terms favorable to the Jews, filled about 100 pages: [I] placed a detailed analysis of the Saratov case at the end of it. [. . .] Later I reworked my response, supplemented it significantly, and published it first in *Biblioteka dlia chteniia*² and then as a separate edition. (Khvol'son 1880a, vii–ix)

Later an abridged version of this report was published, with censorial permission for printing dated October 8, 1879 (Khvol'son 1879). This date suggests a story behind it. In March 1879 a number of Jews were indicted on charges of murdering a Georgian Christian girl. The defendants were acquitted by the local court of Kutaisi. The prosecution appealed to the supreme court of Tiflis court chamber with the date of proceedings being set for April 1880. In between, certain periodicals in St. Petersburg became involved in the matter and republished the older anti-Jewish texts in support of the blood libel. That caused a considerable revival of blood libel literary publications. For instance, the topical accusation of child torture by a Jew was referred to, rather sympathetically, by Fyodor Dostoyevsky in his novel *The Brothers Karamazov*, which was published serially at the time. Chwolson's involvement included a number of literary publications. First, the abridgement of his 1861 monograph was published in October 1879. The second, expanded and improved edition of "Certain Medieval Accusations" was completed by Chwolson in January 1880 and formally approved by the Oriental Faculty of St. Petersburg University on February 4 of that year (Khvol'son 1880) to be followed by yet another little book. The brochure "On the Supposed Insularity" of the Jews (the censor's permission was dated February 21, 1880) was also probably published for the same purpose (Khvol'son 1880).

It should be noted that by the turn of the 20th century this story had become one of the key points of Chwolson's biographical narrative. In 1900, David G. Günzburg (Gintsburg) mentioned this episode in his jubilee articles dedicated to Chwolson's eightieth birthday:

The Kutaisi trial prompted the dissemination of 10,000 copies of his booklet "Do the Jews Use Christian Blood?," profound in its brevity, and then also the appearance of the landmark work "On Certain Medieval

2. *Biblioteka dlia chteniia* — a Russian journal, the title of which means "Library for reading" — Trans.

Accusations against the Jews” (1880) in a revised form and twice the original length. Not content [to use only] his pen, Dan[iil] Abr[amovich], i.e., Chwolson — D.B.), in a long audience with the then august governor of the Caucasus, Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, managed to dispel all possible suspicions concerning ritual murder. (Gintsburg [Günzburg] 1900, column 13)

Further, Günzburg quotes in his own Russian phrasing what I believe to be the record of an *oral history* from Chwolson himself (OR RNB, f. 183, Gintsburg D.G., ed. khr. 51):³

The rabbis blessed the name of Dan[iil] Abr[amovich]; and when he proceeded to Kutaisi from Tiflis, to which the most interesting of all archaeological congresses had drawn him in 1881, he learned from the judges that they derived their own belief in the innocence of the accused from his ardent defense of the Jewish tribe. The marshal of the nobility brought him to the synagogue past Jews standing all along the road; the synagogue was illuminated, the holy ark was opened, and a solemn *Mi Sheberach*⁴ was proclaimed to Daniil Abramovich. A venerable rabbi, of splendid appearance and truly biblical bearing, gave a heartfelt speech in the Hebrew language, another rabbi spoke in Georgian, during which the marshal served as interpreter, and then the address was presented. (Gintsburg [Günzburg] 1900)

In 1901, an authorized German translation of “[On] Certain Medieval Accusations” was published (Chwolson 1901),⁵ and, finally, the brochure “Do the Jews Use Christian Blood?” was reissued after Chwolson’s death in 1912 (Khvol’son 1912).

It is less known that throughout his service at the St. Petersburg Catholic Theological Academy, Daniel Chwolson spoke annually to the students, the future Catholic priests of the Russian part of Poland and

3. An undated note in German. The text of the following quotation below reproduces the text on list 4 ob. [sheet or page 4, obverse] of the document with several changes. On the oral history behind the published jubilee eulogy in *Voskhod*, see my forthcoming “Manuscripts, Images, and Biographies of Daniel Chwolson: New Details from the Archives of St. Petersburg” (2019).
4. The beginning of a Jewish prayer of blessing, used to bless those who are getting married, do work for the community, become a bar/bat mitzvah, who are ill, or on other occasions. The prayer begins *Mi sheberach avoteinu . . .*, “May the one who blessed our ancestors bless . . .” Thanks to Rabbi Bob Freedman for this translation. — Ed.
5. As far as I know, this text has not been translated into English.

Lithuania, giving lectures against the blood libel (Gitsburg [Günzburg] 1900, column 13).

Plan for the establishment of a new university instructorship in Judaic Studies

The last third of the 19th century in Germany brought dramatic changes, inter alia, the dismantling of conservative Protestant hegemony in the training of academic scholars of Judaism. Such a fundamental change was hardly an end in itself. Rather, it grew out of the new educational institutions that emerged precisely during this period, created through the program *Wissenschaft des Judentums* and intended for the education of would-be rabbis. These institutions modeled themselves on the external forms of the classical liberal arts university of the 19th century and cultivated the study of the history of Judaism and of Jewish literature that aptly employed the historical critical approach and, more important, was liberated from a Christian projective interpretation of Judaism. For the purposes of my study, two such institutions are important, both established with the support and participation of Abraham Geiger (1810–74), to whom Chwolson was bound by ties of personal gratitude and discipleship.

1. The Jewish Theological Seminary (*Jüdisch-Theologisches Seminar Fraenckel'sche Stiftung*) in Breslau was opened on August 10, 1854, with funds left by the will of the Breslau financier Jonas Fränkel. The philologist and classicist Jacob Bernays (1824–81) and the historian Heinrich Graetz (1817–91) occupied the central place among the professorial body of this seminary, which enjoyed the support of the Prussian government.
2. The establishment of the Higher School for the History and Study of Judaism (*Hochschule für die Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*) in Berlin was preceded by an initiative of several prominent Jewish scholars and officials who had founded an association ten years earlier to promote the establishment of a Jewish university. After benefactors had donated the necessary funds, the Higher School was opened on May 6, 1872, and Geiger himself held one of its most important chairs (see the literature indicated by Wiese 2005, 83–90).

Daniel A. Chwolson's archival collection has preserved interesting evidence that he planned to realize an educational project that in certain key respects clearly took as its guide the educational model estab-

lished by Abraham Geiger. The St. Petersburg Branch of the Archive of the Russian Academy holds a lithographed letter, dated December 14, 1896 (f. 959, op. 1, ed. khr. 11, ll. 1–2), the text of which reads:

On the day of the fiftieth anniversary of my literary activity, I received from every part of our great Rus numerous telegrams and letters, in which, to my greatest joy, [the writers] expressed respect and love for me as a scholar and as a person, and which also repeatedly referred to the gratitude, which, in their opinion, they owe me. Whether I deserve all of this is not for me to judge, and I can only say that I have done what a sense of duty and justice required of me. If the fellow members of my tribe consider themselves genuinely obligated toward me and want to give me true joy, may they honor the following selfless request.

In the Eastern department of the local university there is a “Hebrew-Arabic division” — the only place in the entire Empire where Jewish studies are taught on strictly scholarly principles. Here I and my former student, now colleague K. [sic] Kokovtsov teach and read [omission in the text] biblical studies [omission in the text] Mishnah, Midrash, and various places from the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds. All with strictly grammatical, philological explanations. Further: [omission in the text]. The last three works are in Arabic and Hebrew translations. In addition, works written by Jews in Arabic are read, such as the works: [omission in the text]. Also taught: the history of the Hebrew language and Hebrew literature, Hebrew paleography, as well as the Syriac language.

In sum, everything that a truly educated and learned rabbi should know is studied here.

Students in this “division” are for the most part Jews, who usually enter university with some prior knowledge of Hebrew literature. Most of these Jewish students are entirely without means, and my request is to establish a fund for one or, if possible, two scholarships for Jewish students in this division who are distinguished for their knowledge and diligence.

Currently, there are two professors in the Hebrew-Arabic division, but according to the university charter, one is designated for this division, for whom it will be impossible to teach all the above subjects should I ever have to leave the university. Although those with master’s degrees in Hebrew-Arabic literature also have the right to give lectures on the aforementioned subjects, they would not be able to claim any remuneration. Therefore, it would also be highly desirable to provide for an associate professorship [*dotsentura*] in Jewish subjects in the He-

brew-Arabic division through annual contributions and voluntary donations. In this way [the donors] will give intelligent Jewish communities the opportunity to be led by rabbis who are truly learned and thoroughly proficient in Jewish scholarship.

Our government, which allows the Jews to maintain Jewish religious teachers at their own expense in various educational institutions, will undoubtedly also permit the support of a Jewish instructor with the right to lecture on associate professor's level [*dotsirovat'*] [*sic*], who will also teach those Jewish subjects that are already offered. I think it not superfluous to note that most of the foreign higher educational institutions for rabbinic education are supported mainly by voluntary contributions from private individuals and communities.

Yet another story is apparent behind this document. The jubilee itself marked the fiftieth anniversary of Chwolson's literary activity, reckoned from the publication of Chwolson's first German article. It was celebrated on November 21, 1896, and was, as is evident from the preparatory materials for it from the Günzburg (Gintsburg) archive, a last-minute impromptu (RGIA, f. 1009, op. 2, d. 34; d. 38, l. 1–ob.; d. 50, l. 3–ob.; d. 51, l. 2–ob., and others). However, more than three weeks passed between the celebration and the date on the appeal. The text was composed, rewritten, and lithographically reproduced for distribution to a large (yet unknown) number of recipients. Everything suggests the deliberate seriousness of Chwolson's intentions; he combined two tasks in this appeal: first, to raise capital for one or two scholarships for poor Jewish students in the Hebrew-Arabic division of the Faculty of Oriental Languages, and second, more importantly, to raise capital for the establishment of an associate professorship and the corresponding strengthening of the teaching of Jewish subjects in the same division. In both cases, the stated goal was to provide educated rabbis for the communities. Although Chwolson had been expressing similar ideas at least since the 1870s (see RGIA, f. 846, op. 1, d. 129), in this instance I believe he was trying to reproduce here the scheme behind the establishment of the Berlin "Higher School."

On December 21, 1899, the appeal was published in *Voskhod* [Dawn] (Khol'son 1896), whereupon one line was added, which named the trading house "I.E. Günzburg [Gintsburg]" as the recipient and custodian of the donations. This clearly indicates the help, support, and personal involvement of Baron David Günzburg in this project. While the collection of funds to support students drew upon

a practice widespread by that time, the establishment of an associate professorship in Jewish subjects, which would be taught by educated Jewish instructors supported by funds collected by the Jews themselves, had no precedents in the practice of imperial Russian universities. The matter, however, did not even reach the stage of submission of the project to the Ministry of Public Education.

The appeal came at the height of an intense newspaper campaign led by the editors of *Voskhod* in favor of creating a certain “rabbinic theological institute.” The editorial on May 12, 1896 (no. 19), raised the topic: beginning with an emphatically loyal salute to the coronation of Nicholas II and Alexandra Feodorovna, the editors lamented the lack of truly educated rabbis who could “represent the Jewish subjects of Russia before Their Majesties” and concluded with a call to raise capital for the establishment of a Jewish theological institute similar to those already existing in the cultured countries of the West (“Redaktsionnaia stat’ia” 1896a). Adjoining the article was an unsigned “Letter to the editor,” which vigorously repeated the same idea, and not only rich Jews but also the editors of Jewish newspapers were called to give their “mite” (“Pis’mo v redaktsiiu” 1896). Beginning right from the next issue (no. 20, dated May 19), *Voskhod* enthusiastically promoted the idea of such an institution as highly desirable and thereby stressed the need to collect capital for it. The topic was recurrent throughout the year 1896 in the form of editorials and surveys of “letters to the editor” (See “Redaktsionnaia stat’ia” 1896b, 1896c, 1896d, 1896e, 1896f, 1896g, 1896h, 1896i). This discussion showed that within *Voskhod*’s readership, that is, among educated Russian-speaking Jewry, there were two parties. One supported the creation of such an institution, the other inclined to an Orthodox-conservative position and rejected the very idea of such an educational institution.

Wittingly or unwittingly, Daniel Chwolson had intervened in an issue that was controversial in the Jewish community itself. It seems quite plausible that David Günzburg, a supporter of the establishment of an institute, who had initiated the very commemoration of the Chwolson anniversary not only as a St. Petersburg academic event but also as a Jewish community celebration, proposed to Chwolson the idea to make an appeal. In this case, the naming of the trading house “I.E. Günzburg [Gintsburg]” as the custodian of donations also becomes understandable, as well as the entirely natural desire to benefit from the name and authority of the iconic Russian Jewish academic. The editorial stance of *Voskhod* was probably

at odds with Günzburg's intentions, but unable to oppose him and Chwolson directly, the editors provided the pages (and evident sympathy!) for an author who wrote under the pseudonym of "the Hermit of St. Petersburg" (Peterburgskii pustynnik 1897, 1897a, 1897b, 1897c). This "Hermit" sarcastically argued against Chwolson and brought him down to the position of defending and even to a certain extent justifying his views (see his replies: Khvol'son 1897, 1897a, 1897b). Chwolson's argument was probably quite sincere. It maintained that Chwolson did not consider the associate professorship he proposed to be a replacement for a theological institute but sought only to promote the development of scholarship and the very emergence of educated rabbis. Chwolson's proposals clearly suggested the extraordinary and, for 1897, even shocking idea of the possibility of turning over the training of future rabbis to a state university — that is, under the conditions of that time, to a manifestly Christian educational body. Yet there was an elephant in the room that was clearly visible by contemporaries, which for censorship reasons required Aesopian language. Certainly it was Chwolson's baptism in 1855 that had made his career possible, and at the same time called his right to advise the Jewish community on internal matters of Jewish religion into question.

The "Hermit" wrote in his ultimate article:

An "appeal" or "letter of request" by the venerable Professor D.A. Khvolson of his writing in the following [*sic!* — D.B.] explanation of this document reminded me of an old, really sad truth, which, however, one should never forget. [. . .] One can compare wholehearted love and devotion to religion with devotion and love for a beloved woman. If for any reason you gave a beloved woman a formal divorce, if from the time of the formal break with her several decades have passed, during which you have not been immersed in her joys and sorrows every day and every hour, you have not shared with her the common concerns of raising children and so on, then despite your continued respect for this woman, after such a long interruption you cannot again begin to be immersed in her life, to perceive the content and meaning of all the innermost layers of her soul, to agonize over her doubts, to be imbued with her aspirations, and to illuminate her life path. (Peterburgskii pustynnik 1897c, column 209)

The Hermit of St. Petersburg's attacks against Chwolson prompted a lengthy discussion. It resulted in readers' letters in defense of the

professor,⁶ and the editors apparently considered it best to curtail both the debate between Chwolson and the Hermit, and the discussion of the institute itself (“Redaktsionnaia stat’ia” 1897a). Having given space to both polemicists in adjacent columns (“Redaktsionnaia stat’ia” 1897b), and having responded enthusiastically to the “Higher School” Geiger had created (“Redaktsionnaia stat’ia” 1897c), the editors put an end to the topic a little more than a year after the publication of the first article on the rabbinical institute (“Redaktsionnaia stat’ia” 1897d).

In this dispute both parties appealed to Geiger as the ultimate model for teaching Jewish studies according to the pattern of the European university. Chwolson’s authority as *the* professor of Semitic languages and renowned advocate of the Jews was undeniably high, but his baptism and his proposal for teaching “Jewish disciplines” in a state Christian university clearly undermined his position. Moreover, in the context of the conservative policy pursued by the Ministry of Public Education under ministers Ivan D. Delianov⁷ and Nikolai P. Bogolepov,⁸ Chwolson’s plan was completely utopian. Nevertheless, the idea itself of establishing an institution of higher education, intended primarily for Jewish studentship and offering academic knowledge in the field of Semitic and Hebrew studies, did not die. The next attempt at its realization came in 1900–1901, undertaken by a disciple of Chwolson and a recent summa cum laude graduate of the Oriental faculty of St. Petersburg University, Naum Pereferkovich,⁹ in the form of a plan for individual “courses on the teaching of Semitic languages to individuals of non-Christian confessions,” which, however, were not permitted to take place (RGIA, f. 733, op. 191, d. 1959; compare OR RNB, f. 183, ed. khr. 15). One should consider Baron David Günzburg’s “Jewish Academy” — the first secular educational institution devoted to Judaic studies in Russia, which began its work in 1906 — the direct continuation of the idea proposed by Daniel Chwolson. Archi-

6. Chwolson’s archival collection (*fond*) contains a copy of a letter in his defense dated April 15, 1897, sent to the editorial office of *Voskhod*, and signed by nine Jewish doctors and lawyers from Vitebsk (PFA RAN, f. 959, op. 1, ed. khr. 56).

7. Ivan Davydovich Delianov (1818–1897, N.S. 1898), minister of public education from 1882 till 1897/1898.

8. Nikolai Pavlovich Bogolepov (1846–1901), minister of public education from 1898 till 1901.

9. Naum (Nehemiah) Abramovich Pereferkovich (1871–1940), Semitologist, translator of the Talmud into Russian, philologist and lexicographer.

val documents reflect the history of the organization of this academy quite well, which dates directly back to Chwolson's "Appeal" published in 1896 and merits a separate, independent study.

Chwolson on Jesus and the Pharisees: The influence of the school of Abraham Geiger

Daniel Chwolson's *Nachlass*, limited though it is, still preserves much that would anticipate the development of the main scholarly directions of the second half of the twentieth century. An example of this is his plan in 1900 to publish the corpus of Hellenistic Jewish literature, in the context of which Chwolson made a strong case for publishing the entire corpus of all Second Temple Hellenistic Jewish literature, a project that Leopold Cohn of Breslau, a philologist and specialist on Philo of Alexandria, would ultimately realize. The presently existing collection of German translations of Philo (Philo 1964) was the direct heir of Chwolson's unrealized project (PFA RAN, f. 959, op. 1, ed. khr. 4; ed. khr. 5).

But in order to understand the specifics of Daniel Chwolson's work as a researcher of early Christianity, one must realize the immediate context of his scholarship. The dominance of Christian theological concepts in the emerging, primarily German historical criticism was virtually unchallenged until the appearance of the so-called *Wissenschaft des Judentums*. This new academic discipline, modeled on the pattern of historical-critical Protestant theology, was born out of the impulse and action of several influential Jewish intellectuals, one of whom was the aforementioned Abraham Geiger. In *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, the Jewish minority, previously a voiceless subaltern, obtained its own voice and the possibility of reasoned argument with the help of standard means of critical scholarship, and Susannah Heschel has quite rightly called the appearance of *Wissenschaft des Judentums* "an uprising of the colonized." What exactly was this new discipline?

Wissenschaft des Judentums accomplished de facto the dismantling of the basic constructions of Christian anti-Judaism as a theological concept, which was fully accepted in the historical critical scholarship undertaken by Protestant scholars. Its origins are already discernible in the earliest layers of New Testament literature, but the turning point occurred at the beginning of the third century. It was in this period that the traditional Christian view and indeed the very idea of "Judaism" matured. The concept of Ἰουδαϊσμός (Iu-

daisuism), which had previously had an ethnographic meaning, “the way of life adopted by the *Judeans*, that is, by the present-day or former inhabitants of Judea,” or a social meaning — “following the customs of the *Judeans*” — acquired a new Christianized meaning, formalized for the first time in its entirety by Tertullian. In the works of later Church fathers (Origen, Eusebius, Epiphanius, John Chrysostom, and others), this concept was transferred to a certain set of religious beliefs and to an order of life dictated by those beliefs (see especially Mason 2007, 471). This resulted in the concept of Judaism as essentially a religious, rather than ethnographic, phenomenon. A Christian pejorative meaning was attached to the concept of “Judaism,” so radically reconceived by Christian authors: Judaism appears as a set of theological concepts, as something intellectually inferior, overshadowed and limited to the “old Covenant,” whereas New Israel superseded the former one due to its superiority in theology, ethics, and universalism. During the golden age of patristics, the appropriated heritage of Judaism became the subject of intense theological reflection by authors who were for the most part unable to read the Hebrew Old Testament in the original (see the classic article, Elliott 1880), let alone to discuss contemporary Jewish texts and opinions. Examples of Christian Hebrew studies, rare in the Middle Ages and more frequent in the Reformation era, generally reflected the specific interests of individual Christian scholars, mostly the attraction of Kabbalah and esotericism, and did not engender the dismantling of the traditional Christian view of Judaism (Visscher 2014; Burnett 2012; Coudert and Shoulson 2004). Finally, even with the advent of Protestant critical scholarship in the 18th century, Judaism remained a sphere of theological manipulation: the image of Judaism was constructed as the antithesis to the Pauline — that is, “correct,” “original,” “undistorted” — form of Christianity as a religion that was essentially supreme in general. “Judaism” (and especially the doctrine and practice of the Pharisees who were perceived entirely through the prism of the Synoptic polemic) was constructed as *the* direct opposition to universalistic and non-legalistic Pauline Christianity (Gerdmar 2009). Christian theology thus constructed its imaginative “Judaism” as the quintessence of narrowness, legalism, dryness, emasculation, religious insincerity, literalism, and the loss of the spiritual understanding of the texts that had once existed and was preserved as the unique possession of the Christians; Jewish morality and Jewish mysticism were perceived a priori to be insincere, inauthentic, and flawed — and then this image, sanctioned by the authority of academic theolo-

gy, was transmitted beyond the boundaries of scholarship. Supported by the authority of *Wissenschaft* and the image of profound proof-based learning, in the outer context of public life this image of Judaism and fundamental Jewish concepts was in full accord with the emerging political anti-Semitism of the late 19th century and served as its “scientific” basis.

A specific feature of this theological construction was that the Christian interpreters of Judaism, with very rare exceptions, did not know and did not seek to understand the Jewish religious phenomena of the post-biblical period, and when such an interest nevertheless appeared in the second half of the 19th century, it was imbued with missionary overtones and was aimed at demonstrating the self-sufficiency of Christianity and its distinctiveness when compared to the Judaism of Jesus’s contemporaries; as part of this approach the Mishnah and Gemara were studied through a specific lens, in which they were to serve as sources on Jesus and the New Testament, but the meaning and interpretation of these sources were predetermined. It should be noted that, for all the reservations about Edward Said’s “Orientalism,” the concept of “orientalization” works well if applied to the “inner East” of the European Jewish ethnoconfessional minority, rather than the “outer East” of the Arab and Muslim Mediterranean minority.

Two novel points should be noted in Geiger’s approach. First, while taking his bearings specifically from Protestant theological scholarship as his expected audience (compare particularly the polemical afterwords to his lectures [Geiger 1865, 180–87]), Geiger deliberately rejected the unspoken assertion that Jesus was alien to the Jewish world of his day. Within this silent dogma the Synoptic consensus that the Pharisees were Jesus’s topmost opponent and collective enemy was unquestioned even though the value of the Gospels as a historical source was questioned as a result of keen critical scrutiny. Nor was the accuracy of the Synoptic picture of the Pharisees questioned. Geiger presented a portrait that was directly opposite: the Pharisees in his telling became genuine reformers of Judaism, fighters for the people’s cause, and opponents of the aristocratic Sadducees, who had usurped the priesthood.

Second, as Susannah Heschel rightly points out, Geiger “touched the sensitive nerve of Christian theology” (Heschel 1999, 80) when he intervened in the *Leben-Jesu-Forschung*, or “the quest for the historical Jesus.” This academic genre, at least after David F. Strauss, became a legitimate field for the application of critical theories. Yet all

Protestant participants of the discussion unanimously held common presumptions of Jesus as a unique figure standing above his Jewish environment and opposing it, in particular — by means of sharp polemic against the Pharisees. Geiger discussed the issue without allowances for the confessional sensitivity of his Christian opponents and portrayed Jesus as a Jew par excellence; moreover, “he was a Jew, a Pharisean Jew with a Galilean colouring — a man who joined in the hopes of his time, and who believed that these hopes were fulfilled in him. . . . He did not repeal the smallest tittle of Judaism; he was a Pharisee who walked in the way of Hillel; though he did not set the most decided value upon every single external form, he yet proclaimed on the other hand, ‘that not the least tittle should be taken from the Law’” (Geiger 1866, 215–16). In the context of the modern “Third Quest” such a conclusion about the relationship between Jesus and the Pharisees’ version of Judaism merely recapitulates the consensus and a view widely shared at least since the publication of the classic monograph by Géza Vermes [Vermes 1973]. However, in the mid-19th century such an opinion and moreover its affirmative tenor was scandalous, and the majority of Protestant critics — once again, according to Heschel’s justified observation — were forced to resort to *ad hominem* argument since they were unable to beat Geiger in his field, that is, his expertise in Judaic religious heritage (for more detail, see Heschel 1998).

It is well known that Chwolson was attached to Geiger personally as a grateful and beloved student. Chwolson (at the time still an impoverished Jewish youngster, Joseph by name) tramped to Geiger in Breslau on foot from Riga in 1841, after he had obtained a letter of recommendation from Max Lilienthal. A year later Geiger would personally petition the Russian Ministry of Public Education to extend the period of Chwolson’s stay abroad (RGIA, f. 733, op. 97, d. 51). And indeed, in his ultimate years Daniel Chwolson would dedicate his last monograph “*To the Manes [sic! — D.B.] of my fatherly friend and benefactor, Rabbi Dr. Abraham Geiger, as a weak addition to and extension of his landmark studies on the Pharisees and Sadducees*” (Chwolson 1910, iii).¹⁰ Chwolson proved to be one of the most consistent support-

10. The German dedication “*Den Manen*” reproduces in translation the Roman formula *Dis manibus* (“the gods, the Manes”), that is, the deified souls of ancestor-patrons. Note that Chwolson, by his formal standing a Christian (albeit of Jewish background), purposefully chose to honor his Jewish (albeit Reformist) mentor and patron by reference to the Roman pagan deities (although by the time the formula had lost any

ers of Geiger in yet another field, in that he argued for the need to lay the foundations of New Testament interpretation on the study of Jewish sources (Chwolson 1908 [1892]).

Throughout his own academic career Chwolson championed the thesis of the affinity between Jesus and the Pharisees that Geiger had advocated (Heschel 1998, 220–21). This idea runs through all of Daniel Chwolson's works. As early as 1861 he wrote in the first version of the book on medieval accusations against the Jews:

Our Savior knew the rabbinical teachings and fought more with their arrogant representatives than with the teachings themselves. [. . .] Part of the moral teachings of the rabbis passed into Christianity, where in accordance with Christian principles the teachings became more universal. The Christian Church has even assimilated some of the rabbinic religious rites and preserved them to this day, which one must especially note of the Greek Church (Khvol'son 1861, 9–10).

The phrasing of this passage betrays the writer's care, obviously prompted by the official character of the work. Fifteen years later, in 1875, Daniel Chwolson wrote that “the teaching of Jesus, with the exception of the dogma of the Trinity, found almost nothing objectionable in the Pharisees” (Khvol'son 1875, 484), and this conclusion, among others, was the reason for the harsh criticism from Archimandrite Vitaly (Grechulevich) (A.V. [Vitalii (Grechulevich)]), 1876; see Chwolson's detailed response [Khvol'son 1877, 605–9]. In the second edition of the book on medieval accusations against the Jews, Chwolson provides a comprehensive argument for this, essentially Geigerian, thesis (Khvol'son [Chwolson] 1880a, 22–39; for more detail on the same topic, see Chwolson 1908 [1892], 85–127), and returning to it in one of his last published works, Chwolson sharpened the conclusion even more:

The reason that German theologians studying the New Testament depicted the Pharisees in a completely distorted caricature was a misinterpretation of the accusatory words of Christ, addressed to the “hypocritical” Pharisees in chapter twenty-three of the Gospel of Matthew; and still to this day in all European languages the words “Pharisee” and “hypocrite” are considered synonymous; as a result of this misunderstanding,

cultic connotation). This may reflect his desire to mark it as humanistic and devoid of any religious message.

the attitude of the Pharisees toward Jesus Christ is drawn in the wrong light. [. . .] The attitude of the Pharisees toward Christ was undoubtedly amicable, and . . . His teaching in no way contradicts the teaching of the best and most noble men of the Jewish people. German theologians, however, distorted and interpreted in the worst light everything found in the Synoptic Gospels in favor of this view; they even interpreted the Pharisees' friendly warning to Christ about the danger threatening him from His enemies as a hostile action against him. [. . .] *There never were fundamental points of contention between Christ and the Pharisees* [emphasis mine — D.B.]; there were only minor disagreements, like those that have occurred by the hundreds, even thousands, among rabbis of all time (Khvol'son 1911, 16–18).

In the 19th century this thesis sounded revolutionary, but in the perspective of the development of scholarship one can say that Chwolson anticipated the revolution that occurred from the 1950s to the 1970s, when the history of Second Temple Judaism, its literature, religious practices, and the social structures of the life of the Jews in Palestine and the Diaspora became the main context for the study of early Christianity.

* * *

The works of Daniel Chwolson aimed at the refutation of the blood libel are unquestionably scholarly studies, although undertaken with a polemical public purpose. Contemporaries noted similar potential in Chwolson's works on the Pharisees and Jesus (for example, Malis 1906), and although their content to a certain extent anticipates mainstream scholarly thought in the second half of the 20th century, in general one can say that in the context of the 19th century and for the contemporaries of Chwolson himself, the examples considered above fit into a framework of public activity aimed at protecting the Jewish minority of the Russian Empire that was by no means limited to refuting the blood libel. Such measures should include the unsuccessful attempt to establish an associate professorship in Jewish subjects at St. Petersburg University. No less important — inspired by the example of his teacher Abraham Geiger and following the academic path of *Wissenschaft des Judentums* — Daniel Chwolson worked fruitfully to overcome Christian theological projections in the academic study of Judaism.

References

- Otdel rukopisei Rossiiskoi natsional'noi biblioteki [Manuscript Department of the Russian National Library] (hereafter, OR RNB), f. 183 Gintsburg D.G., ed. khr. 15.
- OR RNB, f. 183 Gintsburg D.G., ed. khr. 51.
- Sankt-Peterburgskii filial arkhiva rossiiskoi akademii nauk [St. Petersburg Branch of the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences] (hereafter, PFA RAN), f. 959, op. 1, ed. khr. 4.
- PFA RAN, f. 959, op. 1, ed. khr. 5.
- PFA RAN, f. 959, op. 1, ed. khr. 56.
- Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv [Russian State Historical Archive] (hereafter, RGIA), f. 733, op. 97, d. 51.
- RGIA, f. 733, op. 191, d. 1959.
- RGIA, f. 846, op. 1, d. 129.
- RGIA, f. 1009, op. 2, d. 34.
- RGIA, f. 1009, op. 2, d. 38.
- RGIA, f. 1009, op. 2, d. 50.
- RGIA, f. 1009, op. 2, d. 51.
- A.V. [Vitalii (Grechulevich), arkhimandrit (archimandrite)]. 1876. "Posledniaia paskhal'naia vecheria Iisusa Khrista i den' Ego smerti" [The last paschal supper of Jesus Christ and the day of his death]. *Strannik* (November): 97–126; (December): 185–289.
- Burnett, Stephen G. 2012. *Christian Hebraism in the Reformation Era (1500–1660): Authors, Books, and the Transmission of Jewish Learning*. Leiden: Brill.
- Chwolson, D. 1901. *Die Blutanklage und sonstige mittelalterliche Beschuldigungen der Juden: Eine historische Untersuchung nach den Quellen*. Frankfurt: Kauffmann.
- . 1908 (1892). *Das letzte Passamahl Christi und der Tag seines Todes nach den in Übereinstimmung gebrachten Berichten der Synoptiker und des Evangelium Johannis nebst Schluss und Anhang...* Anastatischer Neudruck der Ausgabe von 1892, Mémoires de l'Académie impériale des sciences de St.-Pétersbourg, VIIe série, XLI, no. 1. St. Petersburg.
- . 1910. *Beiträge zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Judentums von ca. 400 v. Chr. bis ca. 1000 n. Chr.* Leipzig: Haessel.
- Coudert, Allison P., and Jeffrey S. Shoulson. 2004. *Hebraica Veritas? Christian Hebraists and the Study of Judaism in Early Modern Europe*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Elliott, C.J. 1880. "Hebrew Learning among the Fathers." In *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, edited by W. Smith and H. Wace, 2:851–72. London: John Murray.
- Geiger, Abraham. 1865. *Das Judentum und seine Geschichte*. Vol. 1, *Abteilung: Bis zum Zerstörung des zweiten Tempels*. Breslau: Schletter.
- . 1866. *Judaism and Its History*. Vol. 1, *Closing with the Destruction of the Second Temple*. Translated from the German by Maurice Mayer. New York: Thalmessinger & Cahn, 1866.
- Gerdmar, Anders. 2009. *Roots of Theological Anti-Semitism: German Biblical Interpretation and the Jews, from Herder and Semler to Kittel and Bultmann*. Leiden: Brill.

- Gintsburg [Günzburg], David G. 1900. "D.A. Khvol'son (Okonchanie)" [D.A. Khvol'son (Conclusion)]. *Voskhod* 3: col. 13–14.
- Heschel, Susannah. 1998. *Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 1999. "Revolt of the Colonized: Abraham Geiger's *Wissenschaft des Judentums* as a Challenge to Christian Hegemony in the Academy." *New German Critique* 77: 61–85.
- Khvol'son, Daniil A. 1861. *O nekotorykh srednevekovykh obvineniakh protiv evreev (Istoricheskoe issledovanie po istochnikam) Soch. professora evreiskago i siriiskago iazykov i slovesnosti pri Sankt-Peterburgskii universitete D.A. Khvol'sona* [On certain medieval accusations against the Jews (Historical investigation based upon sources) compiled by D.A. Khvol'son, professor of Hebrew and Syriac languages and literature at St. Petersburg University]. St. Petersburg: Tipografia Shtaba Otdel'nago korpusa vnutrennei strazhi.
- . 1875. "Posledniaia paskhal'naia vecheria Iisusa Khrista i den' Ego smerti" [The last paschal supper of Jesus Christ and the day of his death]. *Khristianskoe chtenie* 9–10: 430–88.
- . 1877. "Posledniaia paskhal'naia vecheria Iisusa Khrista i den' Ego smerti" [The last paschal supper of Jesus Christ and the day of his death]. *Khristianskoe chtenie* 11–12: 557–610.
- . 1879. *Upotrebliait li evrei khristianskuiu krov'? Rassuzhdenie D.A. Khvol'sona, ordinarnago professora evreiskago, khaldeiskago i siriiskago iazykov pri Sankt-Peterburgskom universitete, ordinarnago professora pri Sankt-Peterburgskoi dukhovnoi akademii* [Do Jews use Christian blood? A discussion by D.A. Khvol'son, professor of Hebrew, Chaldean, and Syriac languages at St. Petersburg University, professor at St. Petersburg Theological Academy]. 2nd edition, revised and supplemented by three appendices. St. Petersburg: Tipografia Tsederbauma i Gol'denbliuma.
- . 1880 [censorship date]. *O mnimoi zamknutosti evreev* [On the supposed insularity of the Jews]. St. Petersburg: Tipografia Tsederbauma i Gol'denbliuma.
- . 1880a. *O nekotorykh srednevekovykh obvineniakh protiv evreev: Istoricheskoe issledovanie po istochnikam D. Khvol'sona, ordinarnago professora evreiskago, khaldeiskago i siriiskago iazykov pri Sankt-Peterburgskom universitete chlen korpusa Akademii nauk i proch.* [On certain medieval accusations against the Jews: Historical investigation based upon sources by D. Khvol'son, professor of Hebrew, Chaldean, and Syriac languages at St. Petersburg University, member of the corps of the Academy of Sciences, and so on]. 2nd edition, sovershenno pererab [completely revised]. St. Petersburg: Tipografia Tsederbauma i Gol'denbliuma.
- . 1896. "Vozzvanie professora Daniila Abramovicha Khvol'sona" [An appeal by Professor Daniel Abramovich Khvol'son]. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 52: col. 1370–72.
- . 1897. "Pis'mo v redaktsiiu" [Letter to the editor]. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 3: col. 43.
- . 1897a. "O evreisko-arabskom razriade" [On the Hebrew-Arabic department]. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 5: col. 109–11.
- . 1897b. "O ravvinskom voprose" [On the rabbinic question]. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 6: col. 141–43.
- . 1911. "Vozrazheniia protiv lozhnogo mneniia, budto Iisus Khristos v deistvitel'nosti ne zhil" [Objections to the false opinion that Jesus Christ never actually lived]. *Khristianskoe chtenie* 1: 3–22.

- . 1912. *Upotrebliauit li evrei khristianskuiu krov'? Rassuzhdenie A.D. [sic! — D.B.] Khvol'sona, ordinarnago professora evreiskago, khaldeiskago i siriiskago iazykov pri Sankt-Peterburgskom universitete, ordinarnago professora pri Sankt-Peterburgskoi dukhovnoi akademii* [Do Jews use Christian blood? A discussion by D.A. Khvol'son, professor of Hebrew, Chaldean, and Syriac languages at St. Petersburg University, professor at St. Petersburg Theological Academy]. 3rd edition. Kyiv: Tipografia R.K. Lubkovskogo.
- Malis, I. 1906. *Kto vinoven v smerti Spasitelia? Po povodu raboty D.A. Khvol'son "Posledniaia paskhal'naia vecheria Iisusa Khrista i den' ego smerti"* [Who is guilty of the Savior's death? Concerning the work "The last paschal supper of Jesus Christ and the day of his death" by D.A. Khvol'son]. Odessa: Tipografia Izdatel'.
- Mason, Steve. 2007. "Jews, Judaeans, Judaizing, Judaism: Problems of Categorization in Ancient History." *Journal for the Study of Judaism* 38: 457–512.
- Peterburgskii pustynnik [St. Petersburg hermit]. 1897. "Pis'mo v redaktsiiu" [Letter to the editor]. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 1–2: col. 6–8.
- . 1897a. "Pis'mo v redaktsiiu" [Letter to the editor]. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 4: col. 78–80.
- . 1897b. "Pis'mo v redaktsiiu" [Letter to the editor]. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 7: col. 172–74.
- . 1897c. "Pis'mo v redaktsiiu" [Letter to the editor]. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 8 (February 23): col. 206–9.
- Philo of Alexandria. *Die Werke in deutscher Übersetzung*. Vol. 7. Edited by Leopold Cohn, Isaak Heinemann, Maximilian Adler, and Willy Theiler. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1964.
- "Pis'mo v redaktsiiu" [Letter to the editor]. 1896. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 19 (May 12): col. 508–9.
- "Redaktsionnaia stat'ia" [Editorial]. 1896a. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 19 (May 12): col. 506–8.
- "Redaktsionnaia stat'ia" [Editorial]. 1896b. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 20 (May 19): col. 530–31.
- "Redaktsionnaia stat'ia" [Editorial]. 1896c. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 21 (May 26): col. 555–58.
- "Redaktsionnaia stat'ia" [Editorial]. 1896d. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 22 (June 2): col. 580.
- "Redaktsionnaia stat'ia" [Editorial]. 1896e. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 26 (June 20): col. 677–79.
- "Redaktsionnaia stat'ia" [Editorial]. 1896f. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 27 (July 7): col. 698–702.
- "Redaktsionnaia stat'ia" [Editorial]. 1896g. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 33 (August 18): col. 850–850.
- "Redaktsionnaia stat'ia" [Editorial]. 1896h. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 36 (September 8): col. 932–33.
- "Redaktsionnaia stat'ia" [Editorial]. 1896i. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 37 (September 15): col. 954–56.
- "Redaktsionnaia stat'ia" [Editorial]. 1897. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 18: col. 498–501.
- "Redaktsionnaia stat'ia" [Editorial]. 1897a. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 18: col. 498–501.
- "Redaktsionnaia stat'ia" [Editorial]. 1897b. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 19: col. 541–42.
- "Redaktsionnaia stat'ia" [Editorial]. 1897c. *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda* 23: col. 665–67.

- “Redaktsionnaia stat’ia” [Editorial]. 1897d. *Nedel’naia khronika Voskhoda* 24: col. 678–80.
- Vermes, Géza. 1973. *Jesus the Jew*. London: SCM.
- Visscher, Eva De. 2014. *Reading the Rabbis: Christian Hebraism in the Works of Herbert of Bosham*. Leiden: Brill.
- Wiese, Christian. 2005. *Challenging Colonial Discourse: Jewish Studies and Protestant Theology in Wilhelmine Germany*. Translated from the German by Barbara Harshav and Christian Wiese. Leiden: Brill.

PAVEL KHONDZINSKII

Russian “New Theology” in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century: On the Question of the Genesis and Content of the Concept

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.22394/2311-3448-2019-6-1-86-104>

Archpriest Pavel Khondzinskii — St. Tikhon’s Orthodox University (Moscow, Russia). paulum@mail.ru

In this article I consider the genesis and the substantial characteristics of the concept of “New Theology,” which has become a commonplace in the Russian theological tradition since the end of the 19th century. Initially this term was applied to lay theologians — particularly, to Khomiakov — but afterward was applied to academic scholars as well, such as metropolitan Antony Khrapovitsky, V.I. Nesmelov, et al. Research shows that in the first decades of the 20th century these authors’ works met with a mixed reception: from very enthusiastic support (e.g., Archbishop Hilarion Troitsky) to strong critique and opposition (e.g., Bishop Viktor Ostrovidov). Later Archpriest Georges Florovsky attempted to give an objective characterization of this theological movement. He defined it as a theology coming not from Revelation but from human experience. The analysis undertaken in this article revealed another significant characteristic of “New Theology,” which is its continuity with the ideas and methodology of the lay theologians on the basis of the principle of confessionalization.

Keywords: confessionalization, new theology, Russian academic theology, the history of the Synodal period, Khomiakov, Metropolitan Antony Khrapovitsky, Nesmelov, Archpriest Georges Florovsky, ecclesiology, anthropology.

The theory of confessionalization and extra-academic theology

IN discussing the phenomenon of lay theology or extra-academic theology¹ in the Russian 19th century it is fair to say that the internal logic of the development of its ideas is that of confessionalization. The theory of confessionalization was developed and put into scientific circulation by German scientists E. Zeeden, W. Reinhard, and H. Schilling. Professor M.V. Dmitriev notes:

Confessionalization implies: first, the formation and the development of specifically confessional discourses, specifically confessional institutions, and specifically confessional consciousness in the Protestant and Catholic cultures of the modern period (these processes are described as the first and basic stage of confessionalization — *Konfessionsbildung*); secondly, a new symbiosis of ecclesiastical and state institutions, religious and secular policies; the processes, mechanisms, and institutions of joint influence of denomination and state-confessional institutions and factors based on the social, political, cultural, and economic life of Catholic and Protestant societies of Europe in the early modern period. In its cumulative effect, confessionalization opposes the processes of secularization; and nevertheless, it turns out to be the most important aspect of both the transition to modernity and the genesis of the new European civilization itself. (Dmitriev 2012, 142)

Below I will not touch upon the history of institutions. I am primarily interested in pointing out the fact that the process of confessionalization is an ever-increasing tendency that captures different spheres of religious mentality. This tendency, in its extreme, aspires to the polarization of the religious traditions included in this mentality. Finally, the theory of confessionalization can be supplemented by yet another

1. In prerevolutionary tradition, it was more common to speak about *secular theologians* (see, for example, Antonov 1912) when speaking of those who did not belong to the clergy. However, while the term *secular theologian* may be considered acceptable, the term *secular theology*, by default, already has a negative connotation. Therefore, the term *extra-academic theology*, which is more neutral, will be used below. It is predicated upon the fact that during most of the Synodal period, religious education was social class (or estate) based, and the nature of theological studies was determined not by the presence or absence of clerical rank, but by the presence or absence of systematic theological education (those professors of spiritual academies who did not become priests belonged to the spiritual estate or clergy as well).

provision: the very need for confessionalization arises mainly in the location of a *common cultural field*, such as Europe on the eve of the Reformation (see also Khondzinskii 2015, 9–17).

In Russia at the beginning of the 19th century a common cultural field already existed, a single horizon of mutual communication with the Western tradition, but, due to the stratification of the nation into “society” and “the people,” this horizon was fully realized only in educated society. At the same time, the representatives of educated society did not have the opportunity to receive a systematic theological education, which was available only to the representatives of the clergy through their respective academies. In fact, it was exactly this circumstance that caused the phenomenon of extra-academic theology mentioned above, which was spread by people from the educated stratum. It was also they who sharply criticized Western Christianity in all its manifestations.

The clergy, in turn, continued to live the old pre-Synodal type of life, and it is simple to find empirical evidence of the fact that they were barely involved in the process of confessionalization. There is no notable theological essay produced within the scope of any theological academy or school in Russia up to the last decades of the 19th century that contains an effort to criticize Western Christian civilization as a whole or even Western theology as such.

It should be added that although the university Statute of 1814 clearly patronized Platonism in the field of philosophical sciences, it could not prevent the learning of German Romantic Philosophy in spiritual and academic contexts (primarily, in the Kiev Academy).

In the middle of the 1820s, interest in this philosophy also manifested itself in secular circles. According to A. Koire, December 14, 1825 (the Decembrist Uprising), was a milestone that marked the end of French influence: “The next generation, to which the Slavophiles belonged, was imbued with a very different spirit: it grew up under the increasing influence of German Romantic Philosophy” (Koire 2003, 27).

This philosophy was studied in the secret circle of “Liubomudry” (“Lovers of Wisdom”) that appeared in 1822 and existed until December 1825, and where “Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Oken, Görres, et al. dominated” (Koliupanov 1889–92, 1:2:73). The circle became the forerunner of the Slavophile movement, and one of its members, I.V. Kireevsky, later expressed the idea that this philosophy could serve as the basis for a “new liubomudrye” (i.e., philosophy), the prototype for which would be the philosophy of the Church Fathers (Kireevskii

1911, 1:270), for whom in turn ancient metaphysics served as a basis. The intention was for “Liubomudrye” to become the foundation for a relevant and up-to-date exposition of the truths of Revelation and holy tradition (Kireevskii 1911, 1:271).²

As a result of these (and other) differently directed forces and tendencies, in the second half of the 1840s Khomiakov’s theology appeared, which gives us one of the first vivid examples not only of a “new liubomudrye,” but also of the practical implementation of the differentiation of traditions implied by the process of confessionalization.

For Khomiakov, the main issue is, of course, the question of the church. The answer to this question is related to two other questions: first, the internal structure of the church in terms of the relationship between the clergy and the laity; and second, the external structure (i.e., the boundaries of the church) in terms of the relationship between Orthodoxy and other denominations. Both of these issues, from Khomiakov’s point of view, should be resolved in an way different from that of Western tradition.

While traditional Catholic theology is characterized by the division of the church into teaching hierarchy (i.e., the clergy or hierarchy) and laity, and both Catholic and Orthodox dogmatists most often define Church as a Christian society (Plank 1960, 50), from Khomiakov’s point of view the Church is not a society (Khomiakov 1907c, 2:12). The earthly Church (or Church visible) is only a phenomenon of the Church in heaven (Church invisible) and correlates with the latter as a thing-in-itself (noumenon) in the Kantian sense (Khondzinskii 2014, 86–93). But, ultimately, the main principle that allows Khomiakov to solve the question about the internal structure of the church is “the principle of *sobornost’*,” understood as an organic unity in love. This unity is not only moral, but also, if you will, gnoseological, because cognition of the Truth can be achieved only in the love of the Church, or rather in the love of the community (Khomiakov 1907a, 2:239). Hence the absence of a “Teaching Church” (hierarchy) in the Orthodox tradition (Khomiakov 1907b, 2:83).

For the Catholic tradition (and others [Feofan 2004, 287–88; cf. 364–65]) the foundation of the Church is connected primarily with the earthly life of Christ. Khomiakov, by contrast, seeks to find a con-

2. The relevance of the language of the new philosophy (in this) to the language of Revelation and the Church Fathers was implied by default. This is evidenced by Khomiakov’s curious remark that today the apostle would have preferred the concept of the *object* (a concept from modern philosophy) to the biblical concept of the *Word (Logos)*, used in the language of the apostles (see Khomiakov 1907a, 2:247–48).

nection between ecclesiology and the events of New Testament history that are not identical with Catholic teaching, and finds this in the events of Pentecost, when the descent of the Holy Spirit on the Apostolic Community introduces the latter to the life of the Holy Trinity, because the intra-trinitarian action of the Holy Spirit — as the new cognition of love — is identical to its action in the Church. According to Khomiakov, on the one hand, intra-trinitarian relations can be characterized as the relationship of *the subject* (the Father), who considers himself an *object* (the Son), resulting in the *new cognition* (the Holy Spirit) (Khomiakov 1994b, 2:335); on the other hand, it is the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the Apostolic Community (who remains in the unity of love) that provides the latter *the cognition of the truth* (Khomiakov 1994a, 2:12), for it is the act of the eternal proceeding of the Spirit from the Father. Only a temporary sending of the Spirit to the creation through/from the Son remains available to outsiders/Westerners (unorthodox), who had broken the law of love (Khomiakov 1907c, 2:11–12). Thus, the intra-trinitarian characteristics of the Spirit reveal themselves on the day of Pentecost and introduce the Church into the mystery of intra-trinitarian life (O’Leary 1982, 16).

This resolution of the issue was indeed Khomiakov’s discovery, and it provided a solid theological foundation for the thesis of the primacy of the community over everything in the Church, as a successor to the “Trinity-Community”; at the same time, this answer made it possible to draw a sharp line between East and West, making the Orthodox doctrine of the Church completely independent of Western ecclesiology.

At the same time, it should be noted that Khomiakov’s fundamentally anti-Western concept had been shaped under the evident influence not only of Kant, but also of I.A. Möhler, a major German theologian of the first third of the 19th century, a representative of “Romantic Theology,” so called, whose ideas were closely connected with German Romantic philosophy. It is from Möhler that Khomiakov borrows the idea of the Church as an “organism of love,”³ as well as

3. “It’s not a trifle that Khomiakov has so fervently approved of Möhler; he loves this Church, where everything is about the whole, animated in love by the same spirit, and where the hierarchy, not being seen as an authority (teaching and government) with a special ‘power’ over the faithful as over the *subjects*, on the contrary, reveals itself as an organ of the whole body that gives the whole body an expression of its faith and its unity in love” (Congar 1935, 327). See also: Bolshakoff 1946. For the basic principles of Romantic theology, see Vermeil 1913, 11. Cf: Titova 2014, 49.

the corresponding hermeneutics of the word καθολικός (*katholikos*) (Möhler 1957, 254–55; Khomiakov 1886, 2:326–27).

Thus, Khomiakov’s conception fully met Kireevsky’s requirements for the new Liubomudrye; in accordance with the principles of confessionalization, it segregated the concepts of Western and Eastern theology completely, and moreover, it allowed criticism of the Russian theological school for its commitment to the Catholic doctrine of the “Teaching Church” (hierarchy) (Khomiakov 1900a, 8:189; Kireevskii 1911b, 2:258), opposing them to the laymen who were not infected by foreign influences.

The emergence of the term “New Theology” and various authors’ understanding of it

Khomiakov’s theological works did not reach the Russian reader at once. Some of his works were initially published in *Dushepoleznoe chtenie* (Edifying readings) but the Prague edition of his works, prepared by J.F. Samarin, who wrote a conceptual preface to it, is much more significant. This is where Khomiakov was first mentioned as a teacher of the Church (Samarin 1886, 2:xxxvi). Although this expression may seem rhetorical at first glance, it was, as a matter of fact, undoubtedly quite “dogmatic.” According to Samarin, it is not patristic works, but *catechism* that embodies the most complete statement of the Church’s teaching about itself (Samarin 1880b, 5:23n). Hence it becomes clear not only why Samarin added a subtitle — “An experience of catechetical teaching about the Church” — to Khomiakov’s treatise “The Church Is One,” but Khomiakov himself, quoting from his own text, calls it “a Russian catechism” (Khomiakov 1886a, 2:130).

However, at first both the words about Khomiakov as a teacher of the Church and his works themselves were met with suspicion in the professional theological environment. But the ice of distrust was melting rapidly: the scrapping of the walls between social classes launched by the Great Reforms had been increasingly successful, and the charm of new ideas and approaches was so great that in the 1880s it became almost impossible to criticize them. The first hints of a picture of “New Theology” were being formed at that time in the minds of those authors who belonged to the religious-academic environment, and it is characteristic that those hints arise in connection with the analysis of Khomiakov’s works.

The term that we are interested in seems to have first been used by a professor of the St. Petersburg Academy, N.I. Barsov; to be more

precise, he used the expression “a new method in theology.” One of his two articles devoted to the analysis of Khomiakov’s works was published under this exact title in the journal *Khristianskoe chtenie* (Christian reading). In these articles, Barsov opposed Khomiakov’s approaches to those of a scholastic nature inherent in the religious-academic system of theological education,⁴ and located the new method both in the historico-philosophical approach to the consideration of theological problems (Barsov 1869, 201), and in reliance on the patristic heritage (Barsov 1878, 310).

The term “New Theology” appeared somewhat later in another church magazine, *Vera i razum* (Faith and mind), which announced a series of articles on “our new philosophers and theologians” — representatives of extra-academic theology of the next generation, such as V.S. Soloviev or L.N. Tolstoy (See Stoianov 1885). It is interesting that although the authors of *Vera i razum*, and Barsov as well, paid attention to the use of philosophical methodology by the “new theologians,” they set themselves the opposite goal: “to prove, as far as possible for us, the illegality of the invasion of philosophy into the field of religious Christian truths; and to prove the philosophical method to be unsatisfactory in this area” (Stoianov 1885, 1:49).

The fact that the expression “new theologians” was becoming a commonplace was evidenced, among other things, by the fact that not only representatives of the academic community, but also Leo Tolstoy himself, called Khomiakov and his followers “new theologians” (Tolstoi 1957a, 222).

A closer examination of the publications in the church periodicals of those years could certainly provide additional evidence of the use of the term in question. In the meantime, it is enough for now to state the fact that around the beginning of the 20th century this term clearly changes its referent and points to authors from the professional academic environment (which does not exclude different assessments of their ideas).

Thus, Bishop Viktor (Ostrovidov) in his article “New Theologians” (1912) wrote about the new theological movement, which aimed to revive “dead” theological science, and which was headed by Antony (Khrapovitsky), archbishop of Volyn and Sergius (Stragorodsky), archbishop of Finland, “whose works pretend to be regarded as a reviv-

4. In religious-academic science of the 19th century, *scholasticism* implied: (a) dependence on Western models; (b) the desire for excessive systematization of the material. In this sense, Iu.F. Samarin remark that the theological system in Orthodoxy is impossible is quite characteristic (Samarin 1886, 2: xxiii).

al of true patristic teaching” (Viktor 1912, 381). In fact, according to Bishop Viktor, the new theologians based their teaching on the laws of human mental life, “where everything should be in a natural order” (ibid., 382–83).

Archbishop Hilarion (Troitsky) refers to the same movement and its same authors (although in the opposite way) in an article titled “Theology and the Freedom of the Church” (1915):

Thank God a new theological movement, which overthrows the deadly bonds of the preceding Scholasticism has appeared. . . . A wide dissemination and complete dominance of this new movement should be necessarily achieved. (Hilarion 2004, 2:262)

In this article, Sergius Stragorodsky represents this new theological movement, and although Antony Khrapovitsky is not mentioned in the text, judging by repeated references to him in the author’s other works and in a similar context, we can assume that his presence was implied here as well.

Finally, many years later the term in question was used by Archpriest Georges Florovsky in his work *Ways of Russian Theology*, which included, apart from Antony Khrapovitsky, V.I. Nesmelov as well. Florovsky tried to formulate a common feature, or main “marker” of New Theology: the desire for its constructions comes not from God, but from man, not from Revelation, but from experience (as Viktor Ostrovidov pointed out):

“Scholastic” theology had long since been unsatisfying, the “historical” method did not give the synthesis specifically, it did not create systems. The search for a new method had shifted to the explanation of the dogmas in a moral aspect. Dogmatics was reshaped in accordance with a moral standpoint. Antony was then one of the brightest representatives of this new theology. (Florovskii 2009, 550)

And below:

There are two possible ways in theology: from above or below, from God or from man, from Revelation or from experience. Patristics and Scholasticism choose the first way. “New Theology” prefers the way from below. One type of this anthropological bias is moralism in theology, but not the only one. (Florovskii 2009, 565)

Given such mixed assessments a question arises: what really forms the characteristic features of this doctrine and what connects new theologians from the laity with new theologians from academic circles?

The first representatives of “New Theology” from the religious-academic environment

As already noted, in Russian educated society the process of confessionalization began at the beginning of the 19th century, and a little later began the exploration of German Romantic philosophy. However, the religious school did not stand still either, and the theological intentions of Archbishop Innokentii of Kherson (Borisov) were largely determined by the need to respond to Kant and his purely humanistic Christology.

However, in noting the proximity of the philosophical background of academic and non-academic theologians, we also find important differences: the former have a concentration of interest primarily in the field of anthropology/psychology, the latter in the field of ecclesiology; and in the first case the absence, and in the second the presence of the vector of confessionalization. This probably explains the fact that Innokentii Borisov highly appreciated *Dogmatic Theology* by Metropolitan Macarius (Bulgakov) as a work in which Russian theology threw off the confines of scholasticism, while for Slavophiles Macarius became a symbol of slavery to the scholastic West.

At any rate, it is hardly a coincidence that it was in the 1880s and 1890s, a period of time when Khomiakov’s ideas were widely disseminated, that the “marker of confessionalization” became important for the formation of a new academic theology, allowing the latter to oppose the scholastic past and confidently assert itself as the path to a theological revival in the future.

This is confirmed by the fact that Antony Khrapovitsky, in his leading article “The Difference between the Orthodox Faith and the Western Confessions,” called Khomiakov his predecessor on the path toward the renewal of the Russian theological tradition, whose “great merit” consists of his pointing out the difference between the true Church and the Western confessions, “not in particular dogmatic peculiarities, but in the overall superiority of the inner ideal of the true Church over the non-Orthodox churches.”⁵ Antony saw

5. Antonii 2007a, 415. Characteristically, Khomiakov’s genealogy has been ascribed to the new academic theologians by Fr. Pavel Florensky. See Florenskii 1916, 527.

his task as “filling in” Khomiakov’s teachings and thus finally giving to Orthodox theology the content that “constitutes its exclusive belonging, which is equally alien to European confessions” (Antonii 2007a, 415). As for the Church, Khomiakov had already formulated this teaching of the exclusiveness of Orthodoxy, and what remained was to develop it in regard to the study of humanity, because Russian theological science was “so far from the real spiritual life of the Orthodox Christians, and so alien to it, that it is not only incapable of leading the latter, but even of approaching it [i.e., the spiritual life]” (Antonii 2007a, 417). Following the West, Russian theological science understands salvation as “an external reward for a certain number of good deeds (external ones),” whereas, in fact (Antonii 2007a, 420), “the purpose of Christianity, the purpose of Christ coming to earth is the moral perfection of the human personality” (Antonii 2007b, 420).

In developing his own doctrine, Antony’s method is similar to Khomiakov’s. If the latter, in order to avoid intersections with the West, moves the ecclesiological accents from Christology to Triadology, Antony moves the center of gravity of the dogma of redemption from Golgotha to the Garden of Gethsemane with the same purpose (Antonii 2007b, 58); he also looks for opportunities to rethink the consequences of original sin in categories that are far from its “legal” imputation to the descendants of Adam (Antonii 2007b, 71). To solve the first problem, he proposes a teaching of redemption as an act of compassionate love (Antonii 2007b, 58); to solve the second, he suggests the concept of “preconscious” universal human will, which is the common mental nature of humanity, according to its essence, but after the Fall turns out as fragmented individual wills (Antonii 2007d, 31–32; Florovskii 2009, 544). In both cases, it is easy to notice the features of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, which is not surprising: Antony’s close acquaintance with Schopenhauer’s works is evident in his master’s thesis. It is also indicated by the fact that, while analyzing Dostoevsky’s teaching on Christian love in his articles on pastoral theology, Antony denotes it through the concept of “compassionate love,” which (see Antonii 2007e, 264–78) was so important to Schopenhauer (Schopenhauer 2011, 296–97), but which cannot be found in Dostoevsky’s legacy, although the great Russian writer did have certain parallels with the German thinker (Khondzinskii 2013). It is not difficult to see Kant’s thought in Antony’s understanding of holiness as gradual moral self-improvement as well (Antonii 2007f, 722; Kant 1965, 4:1:446, cf. 455–56).

The name of his closest student, Sergius Stragorodsky, is often mentioned with Antony's. Stragorodsky's main theological work is the master's thesis titled "The Orthodox Doctrine of Salvation" — it is a work in which the author's personal position appears to be completely dissolved in the thoughts of the Holy Fathers, but in fact it is not. He proclaims the fundamental difference between Orthodox theology and Western theology, based not on different dogmatic postulates, but on a different "understanding of life," on the very first pages of this study; this exact postulate defines the author's interpretation of the Holy Fathers he cites. Antony attributes everything that contradicts his position to the fact that the Holy Fathers perforce had to reckon with the low level of education of the audience. In this sense, the "Orthodox Doctrine of Salvation" appears as one of the first attempts to *rethink* the Holy Fathers. In the end, Antony Khrapovitsky's favorite thesis of gradual moral self-improvement, that is, sanctity, understood as "the completion of moral self-education of a human being," remains predominant (Sergii 1898, 118).

V.I. Nesmelov, who was mentioned by Florovsky together with Antony, and earned at the time the latter's enthusiastic review, developed the anthropological line of New Theology in his own way. Formally (and perhaps fundamentally), Nesmelov had no criticism of the West. However, some of his statements are strikingly similar to those of Sergius: Sergius sees the difference between heterodoxy (unorthodoxy) and Orthodoxy as the dissimilarity between two irreconcilable worldviews, the legal and the moral; while the representatives of the first worldview seek happiness, those of the second seek the truth. Nesmelov likewise formulates the juxtaposition of the legal and moral ways to understand Christianity. Admittedly, the legal understanding is also characteristic of the Holy Fathers, who adapted their views to the customs of the Gentiles (see Sergius above). But if we take the legal understanding in its purest form, then it

directly and decisively destroys both the truths of religion and the possibility of morality, because by virtue of this relationship *religion becomes a mere deal with God and as an ordinary everyday deal it has necessarily to obey the principle of happiness in life*. So it was and is indeed, in the field of all natural religions without exception. (Nesmelov 2000, 1:277)

Hence, in particular, Roman "legalism" is not above the level of natural religions.

So, the study *Science of Man* by Nesmelov implicitly contains criticism of the Western religious tradition, which is no less harsh than that of Sergius's "Orthodox Doctrine of Salvation," and in a sense complements it. Indeed, whereas Sergius only described the progress of a person on the way to salvation without saying a word about why this salvation is necessary for him and where the possibility of it came from, Nesmelov, based on the data of experimental psychology, built not only an anthropological, but also a Christological concept, at the center of which is an idea of personality independent of its soul-body nature. This personality, from Nesmelov's point of view, is not affected by the fall of man, so that when Christ — through the Incarnation — heals human nature in Himself, "the communion . . . with the living body of Christ and the true revelation of the divine power of Christ in man" allows the followers of Christ to imitate Him in His moral feat and thus move forward on the path of moral perfection. Thus Nesmelov responded to the challenge of Kant, who had called traditional Christology into question on the basis that Christ, who did not know the human struggle against sin, could not be the moral ideal for us. But at the same time Nesmelov relies not only on experimental psychology, but also on the anthropology of Kant himself, who separated the personality (the carrier of autonomous morals) from the soul-body nature of man (the carrier of heterogeneous morals) (Kant 1980a, 96–98).

Having briefly considered the most important works of the first representatives of the New Theology from the religious-academic environment, we can see that they — following their predecessors from the laity — use the language of the Western humanities (German philosophy, psychology), mastered by the school by that time, first of all, in order to make a sharp distinction between Orthodox theology and the Western Christian tradition. And the need for such distinction arises for them under the influence of Khomiakov's ideas, which were widespread at the time. In addition, the extraordinary influence of the new movement should be noted. For example, Viktor Ostrovidov decided to publish his criticism of the New Theology only in an Old Believer magazine and then anonymously.

Refraction of the ideas of "New Theology" by academic theologians of the late 19th–early 20th century

There were other authors with similar intentions. These ideas were uniquely combined in the works of Archpriest E. Akvilonov, who paid

tribute to both the ecclesiological and anthropological direction. In his doctoral dissertation titled “On the Physical and Teleological Evidence of the Existence of God,” he started from the phenomenology of the soul, in this way following his predecessors — Antony Khrapovitsky and Bishop Mikhail (Gribanovsky). Yet he himself had been developing answers to ecclesiological problems for a long time, and presented Khomiakov-Möhler’s concept to the religious-academic environment. Akvilonov did not hide the fact that he borrowed from Khomiakov “the basic view . . . on the essence of Western confessions in general” (Akvilonov 1894, 57). As a result, he came to the definition of the Church as a God-man *organism*, making the following curious argument:

Since there is no other life in experience that is more perfect than organic life, then the Church, the treasury of true life, is nothing but the *organism*. (Akvilonov 1894, 239)

Characteristically, Akvilonov’s thesis, which dates back to Möhler’s Romantic Theology (Akvilonov’s familiarity not only with Khomiakov’s texts, but also with the corresponding German-language literature is proved by the bibliography given in his dissertation), does not correlate in any way with the *Eucharistic* aspect of the apostolic view on the Church as the Body of Christ (“For we being many are one bread, and one body; for we are all partakers of that one bread”; 1 Cor. 10:17 KJV). Obviously, what confused the reviewers of the dissertation, which was never approved by the Most Holy Synod, is the uncritical transfer of the concepts of Romantic philosophy to Orthodox theology. After the failure to defend his dissertation, Akvilonov substantially redesigned it, and as a result, the Eucharistic aspect received the necessary coverage (Akvilonov 1896, 60–99). At any rate, in his original text he demonstrated his desire to discard the influence of the Western tradition on the one hand, and tried to express the Orthodox doctrine of the Church in “Western language,” on the other.

The abovementioned Hilarion Troitsky not only gave an enthusiastic characterization of the New Theology, but he himself can be classified as a representative of the younger generation of its protagonists. Focusing his scientific and theological interest in the field of ecclesiology, he, by his own admission, sought first of all to give the ideas of this New Theology a patrological justification (Ilarion 2004b, 2:76) and underwent a rather noticeable evolution in his views. Whereas in his early works Hilarion recognized the importance of the ecclesiological texts of St. Augustine, considering his legacy in the same light as

that of the great Cappadocians (Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa), in due course, under the apparent influence of Antony Khrapovitsky, he came to a radical segregation of the Eastern and Western theological traditions (Ilarion 2004a, 3:512). In the face of the need to explain how the conversion of Catholics into the Orthodox Church is possible without rebaptism, he introduced a risky thesis: the very fact of reconciliation with the Church is so significant that “the external rite of baptism performed outside of the Church can turn into the gracious Sacrament” (Ilarion 2004a, 3:526). Characteristically, he justified this thesis with reference to the theological opinion of Khomiakov, who merely expressed, what was, in his opinion, “a constant thought of the Church” (Ilarion 2004a, 3:538). While he represents an apparent direction of confessionalization, he is no longer interested in the philosophical origins of Khomiakov and Antony’s concepts. He accepts the opinions of his teachers as indisputable truths, which require not a critical examination with a view to congruence with the Holy Tradition, but merely an illustration of it (the Sacred Tradition) with texts.

Of course, not all the authors of that time can be included in the theological movement we are considering. The path of the priest Pavel Florensky was quite different from the path of Hilarion Troitsky, for example. Father Pavel was, in the prerevolutionary years, quite critical of Khomiakov’s works; however, earlier, in his dissertation “On the Spiritual Truth: The Experience of Orthodox Theodicy” (an abridged version of his book *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth*), following his older contemporaries, he characterized “living religious experience as the only legal way of comprehending the dogmas” peculiar to Orthodoxy, a church-juridical concept of Church life peculiar to Catholics and a church-scientific concept peculiar to Protestants (Florenskii 1916, 12). Actually, his divergence with the theological trend we are considering began when he criticized Western philosophy more consistently than the leading representatives of New Theology, returning to the Platonism of the 19th century.

Conclusions

Although it is not possible within the scope of this article to give an exhaustive overview of the works that would fit more or less into the paradigm of the theological movement under consideration,⁶ let us sum

6. A study of works by I.V. Popov, A.D. Beliaev, A.I. Vvedensky, Archpriest P. Svetlov, and some others would undoubtedly be of interest. In addition, it should be emphasized

up the preliminary results and begin by *separating* the New Theology of the laity from the New Theology of the representatives of theological academies.

The first is a *new* theology, not within the framework of already existing tradition, but in the sense of the *beginning of* a new tradition — the tradition of extra-academic theology. The most important representative of the Russian extra-academic theology of the 19th century was A.S. Khomiakov, who implemented the idea of the new Liubomudrye (philosophy) put forward by Kireevsky: he not only used new philosophical ideas and concepts in order to express the church doctrine, but also set the path toward confessionalization.

The second theology was new in the sense of *transforming* the already existing academic tradition — the transformation that occurred as a result of a mixture of elements of the two traditions — academic and non-academic, which was, of course, in a sense, *a break* with preceding academic tradition. The leaders of this movement were Antony Khrapovitsky and Sergius Stragorodsky.

In this case, we were interested in this new academic (and at the same time anti-academic) theology, which appears in the late 19th to early 20th century. By this time, religious-academic theology had a long tradition of intellectual interaction with German philosophy, the beginning of which can already be distinguished in works of Innokentii of Kherson. This had led academic theology to the Christological and anthropological horizon rather than to the trinitarian-ecclesiological one. But at a certain point the anthropology of the academicians met with the extra-academic ecclesiology of lay theologians, and perceived in the latter not only the idea and pathos of *sobornost'*, but also a particular commitment to the formation of a special Orthodox theological position, an alternative to the Western one.

This leads to the conclusion that the identity of the new academic theology (as well as the theology of the laity) is determined, on the one hand, by the logic of confessionalization, that is, confrontation with the West, and, on the other hand, by the logic of Western philosophy of the modern period. At this point these ideas are being broad-

that a huge corpus of works and ideas of various authors who addressed the topic of Sophiology remains outside the scope of the study. It is true that Archbishop Seraphim (Sobolev), having criticized the works of Fr. Sergius Bulgakov, named his work *New Teaching about Sofia* (Sofia, 1935). However, Sophiology is not a new doctrine in the same sense as the teachings of the new theologians discussed in the article: the latter did not try to introduce new dogmatic concepts, but aimed primarily to purify the Orthodox tradition of Western ideas.

cast to theology, which has already accumulated a substantial amount of patrological knowledge, and they require the standard operations of scientific theological research: correlations with the texts of Scripture and the Holy Fathers. At the same time, the idea of returning to the Holy Fathers (which was also generated by anti-Westernism), in most cases did not lead to a critical understanding of the theses being defended, since the question of correlation between the philosophical ideas of the Holy Fathers and that of the modern period was not even raised. In other words, the new Liubomudrye proposed by Kireevsky, based on *the model of the Holy Fathers*, appears to have been an attempt to find in the legacy of the ancient Fathers those concepts that arose in the framework of new philosophical paradigms — in the process of confessionalization. And this attempt led to a conscious or unconscious need to correct — *rethink* — the Holy Fathers in cases when they did not correspond to the new ideas.

Thus, Georges Florovsky's statement on the moral and anthropological orientation of the New Theology should be supplemented by a reference not only to the ecclesiological aspect, which is attributable to Khomiakov, but also to a kind of *anti-Western categorical imperative*, which defined this new academic theology no less than the appeal to human experience highlighted by Florovsky. Undoubtedly, Florovsky identified the groundedness of the new theology correctly, but he did not notice the phenomenon of confessionalization within it. Perhaps it was this phenomenon that caused the rupture in the theological tradition, which Florovsky himself did not avoid and which led him to propose the idea of "neopatristic synthesis."

References

- Akvilonov, E. 1894. *Tserkov': Nauchnye opredeleniia Tserkvi i apostol'skoe uchenie o nei kak o Tele Khristovom* [The church: Scientific definitions of the church and the apostolic teaching of it as the body of Christ]. St. Petersburg: Tip. A. Katanskago.
- . 1896. *Novozavetnoe uchenie o Tserkvi: Opyt dogmaticheskogo issledovaniia* [Teaching of the New Testament on the Church: The experience of dogmatic research]. St. Petersburg: T-vo "Pechatnia S.P. Iakovleva."
- Antonii (Khrapovitskii). 2007a. "Chem otlichaetsia pravoslavnaia vera ot zapadnykh ispovedanii" [What is the difference between the Orthodox faith and Western confessions]. In Antonii 2007c.
- . 2007b. "Dogmat iskupleniia" [Dogma of atonement]. In Antonii 2007c.
- . 2007c. *Izbrannye Trudy, Pis'ma, Materialy* [Selected works, letters, materials]. Moscow: Pravoslavnyi Sviato-Tikhonovskii gumanitarnyi universitet.
- . 2007d. "Nravstvennaia ideia dogmata Tserkvi" [Moral idea of the dogma of the church]. In Antonii 2007c.

- . 2007e. “Pastyrskoe izuchenie liudei i zhizni po proizvedeniiam F.M. Dostoevskogo” [Pastoral study of people and life based on the works of Dostoevsky]. In Antonii 2007c.
- . 2007f. “Psikhologicheskie dannye v pol’zu svobody voli i npravstvennoi otvetstvennosti” [Psychological data in favor of freedom of will and moral responsibility]. In Antonii 2007c.
- Antonov, N.R. 1912. *Russkie svetskie bogoslovyy i ikh religiozno-obshchestvennoe mirovozzrenie* [Russian secular theologians and their religious and social outlook]. St. Petersburg: Tip. M.A. Aleksandrova.
- Barsov, N.I. 1869. “Novyi metod v bogoslovii” [New method in theology]. *Khristianskoe chtenie* 2:177–201.
- . 1878. “O znachenii Khomiakova v istorii otechestvennogo bogosloviia” [Khomiakov’s role in the history of Russian theology]. *Khristianskoe chtenie* 1/2: 303–20.
- Bolshakoff, S. 1946. *The Doctrine of the Unity of the Church in the Works of Khomyakov and Moehler*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.
- Congar, M.-J. 1935. “La pense de Möhler et l’eccléosiologie orthodoxe.” *Irenicon* 12(4) (July–August): 321–29.
- Dmitriev, M.V. 2012. “‘Pravoslavnaia konfessionalizatsiia’ v Vostochnoi Evrope vo vtoroi polovine XVI veka?” [“Orthodox confessionalization” in Eastern Europe in the second half of the 16th century?] *Dorogobits’kii kraeznauchii zbornik* 5(16): 133–52.
- Feofan Zatvornik, Saint. 2004. *Tolkovanie poslaniia apostola Pavla k Efesianam* [Interpretation of the Epistle of Paul to the Ephesians]. Moscow: Pravilo very.
- Florenskii, P. 1916. “Rec. na: Zavitnevich V.V. Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov” [Rev. on Zavitnevich V.V. Alexei Stepanovich Khomiakov]. *Bogoslovskii vestnik* 2(7–8): 516–81.
- . 2012. *Stolp i utverzhdenie istiny: Opyt pravoslavnoi teoditsiei v dvenadtsati pis’makh* [The pillar and ground of the truth: An essay in Orthodox theodicy in twelve letters]. Moscow: Gaudeamus Akademicheskii proekt.
- Florovskii, G. 2009. *Puti russkogo bogosloviia* [The ways of Russian theology]. Moscow: Institut Russkoi tsivilizatsii.
- Ilarion (Troitskii), Saint. 2004a. “Edinstvo Tserkvi i Vsemirnaia Konferentsiia Khristiansva” [Unity of the Church and the World Conference of Christianity]. In Ilarion 2004c. Vol. 3.
- . 2004b. “Triedinstvo Bozhestva i edinstvo chelovechestva” [The Trinity of God and the unity of humankind]. In Ilarion 2004c. Vol. 2.
- . 2004c. *Tvoreniia* [Works]. Vols. 1–3. Moscow: Sretenskii monastyr’.
- Kant, I. 1965. *Sochineniia* [Works]. Vols. 1–6. Moscow: Mysl’.
- . 1980a. “Religiia v predelakh tol’ko razuma” [Religion within the limits of reason]. In Kant 1980b.
- . 1980b. *Traktaty i pis’ma* [Treatises and letters]. Moscow: Nauka.
- Kireevskii, I.V. 1911a. “Pis’mo k A.I. Koshelevu ot 10.07.1851” [Letter to A.I. Koshelev from July 10, 1851]. In Kireevskii 1991b. Vol. 2.
- . 1911b. *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* [Complete works]. Vols. 1–2. St. Petersburg: Tip. Imperatorskogo Moskovskogo Universiteta.
- Khomiakov, A.S. 1886a. “Neskol’ko slov o zapadnykh veroispovedaniiakh po povodu odnogo poslaniia parizhskogo arkhiepiskopa” [A few more words of an Orthodox Christian on the Western confessions of faith about a letter by a bishop of Paris]. In *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* [Complete works], 2:130. Saint Petersburg: N.G. Martynov.

- . 1886b. “Pis'mo k redaktoru ‘L'Union Chretienne’ o znachenii slov: ‘Kafolicheskii’ i ‘Sobornyi’ po povodu rechi iezuita otsa Gagarina” [Letter to the editor of *L'Union Chrétienne* on the meaning of the words: “Catholic” and “Cathedral” about the speech of Jesuit Father Gagarin]. In Khomiakov 1900b. Vol. 2.
- . 1900a. “Pis'mo k A.N. Popovu ot 22.10.1848” [Letter to A.N. Popov from November 22, 1848]. In Khomiakov 1900b. Vol. 8.
- . 1900b. *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* [Complete works]. Vols. 1–8. Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia.
- . 1907a. “Eshche neskol'ko slov Pravoslavnogo Khristianina o zapadnykh veroispovedaniiah po povodu raznykh sochinenii Latinskikh i Protestantskikh o predmetakh very” [A few more words of an Orthodox Christian on the Western confessions of faith about the various Latin and Protestant works on the objects of faith]. In *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* [Complete works]. Vol. 2. Moscow: Tipo-lit. t-va I.N. Kushnerev i Ko.
- . 1907b. “Neskol'ko slov Pravoslavnogo Khristianina o zapadnykh veroispovedaniiah po povodu broshury g-na Loransi” [A few more words of an Orthodox Christian on the Western confessions of faith about the brochure by Mr. Loransi]. In *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* [Complete works]. Vol. 2. Moscow: Tipo-lit. t-va I.N. Kushnerev i Ko.
- . 1907c. Tserkov' odna: Opyt katekhizicheskogo izlozheniia ucheniia o Tserkvi [The Church is one: An experience of catechetical presentation of the Church's doctrine]. In *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* [Complete works]. Vol. 2. Moscow: Tipo-lit. t-va I.N. Kushnerev i Ko.
- . 1994a. “Neskol'ko slov o zapadnykh veroispovedaniiah po povodu odnogo poslaniia parizhskogo arhiiepiskopa” [A few more words of an Orthodox Christian on the Western confessions of faith about a letter by a bishop of Paris]. In Khomiakov 1994c. Vol. 2.
- . 1994b. “O Sv. Troitse” [On the Holy Trinity]. In Khomiakov 1994c. Vol. 2.
- . 1994c. *Sochineniia* [Works]. Vols. 1–2. Moscow: Medium.
- Khondzinskii, P. 2013. “Chistaia liubov” v poucheniiakh startsa Zosimy” [“Pure love” in the teachings of elder Zosima]. *Dostoevskii i mirovaia kul'tura*, *Al'manakh* 30: 423–40.
- . 2014. “Yuri F. Samarin as a Commentator on Alexei S. Khomiakov's Theological Works.” In *Religion and Culture in Russian Thought: Philosophical, Theological and Literary Perspectives*, 86–93. Cracow: The Pontifical University of John Paul II.
- . 2015. “Pole' kessionalizatsii: Opyt prilozheniia teorii k russkoi dukhovnoi traditsii” [The “field” of confessionalization: The experience of applying theory to the Russian spiritual tradition]. *Vestnik PSTGU* II (2): 9–17.
- Koire, A. 2003. *Filosofskaia i natsional'naia problema v Rossii nachala XIX veka* [The philosophical and national problem in Russia at the beginning of the 19th century]. Moscow: Modest Kolerov.
- Koliupanov, N. 1889–92. *Biografiia Aleksandra Ivanovicha Kosheleva* [Biography of Alexander Koshelev]. Vols. 1–2. Moscow: Izd. O.F. Koshelevoi.
- Möhler, J.A. 1957. *Die Einheit in der Kirche oder das Prinzip des Katholizismus dargestellt im Geiste der Kirchenvater der drei ersten Jahrhunderte*. Cologne: Hegner.
- Nesmelov, V. 2000. *Nauka o cheloveke* [The science of man]. Vols. 1–2. Saint Petersburg: Tsentr izucheniia, okhrany i restavratsii naseleiia sviasch. P. Florenskogo..
- O'Leary Paul Patrick. 1982. *The Triune Church: A Study in the Ecclesiology of A.S. Xomjakov*. Freiburg: Universitätsverlag.

- Plank, B. 1960. *Katholizität und Sobornost'*. Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag.
- Samarin, Iu.F. 1880a. *Sochineniia* [Works]. Vol. 5. Moscow: Tip. A.I. Mamontova.
- . 1880b. “Stefan Iavorskii i Feofan Prokopovich [Stefan Yavorsky and Feofan Prokopovich]. In Samarin 1880a.
- . 1886. “Predislovie (k pervomu izdaniuu bogoslovskikh sochinenii A.S. Khomiakova)” [Preface (to the theological works of A.S. Khomiakov)]. In *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* [Complete works], by A.S. Khomiakov, vol. 2. St. Petersburg: N.G. Martynov.
- Schopenhauer, A. 2011a. “Mir kak volia i predstavlenie” [The world as will and representation]. In Schopenhauer 2011b.
- . 2011b. *Sobranie sochinenii* [Collected works]. Moscow: Respublika.
- Sergii (Stragorodskii). 1898. *Pravoslavnoe uchenie o spasenii: Opyt raskrytiia nravstvenno-subiektivnoi storony spaseniia na osnovanii Sv. Pisaniia i tvoreniia sviatootcheskikh* [Orthodox doctrine of salvation: The experience of disclosing the moral and subjective side of salvation on the basis of Holy Scripture and patristic works]. Kazan: Tipografii Imperatorskago Universiteta.
- Stoianov, T. 1885. “Nashi novye filosofii i bogoslovy” [Our new philosophers and theologians]. *Vera i razum* 1: 46–64, 98–118, 171–91, 432–59, 688–725.
- Titova, A.O. 2014. “Myoler i Khomiakov” [Moehler and Khomiakov]. In *Russkoe bogoslovie: Issledovanie i materialy*, 48–79. Moscow: PSTGU.
- Tolstoi, L.N. 1957. “Issledovanie dogmاتического bogosloviia” [The study of dogmatic theology]. In *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* [Complete works]. Vol. 23. Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura.
- Vermeil, E. 1913. *Jean Adam Möhler et l'école catholique de Tubinge*. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Viktor (Ostrovidov). 1912. “Novye bogoslovy” [New theologians]. *Tserkov'* 16: 381–83.



Does It Mean You're Radical If You Have a Beard and Don't Eat Baguettes?

Review of: E.I. Filippova and J. Radwani, eds. 2017. *Religii i radikalizm v postsekuliarnom mire* [Religions and radicalism in the postsecular world]. Moscow: IEA RAN (in Russian). — 330 p.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.22394/2311-3448-2019-6-1-105-113>

This book was one of the results of the fruitful Russian-French dialogue on topical issues of social anthropology, launched in 2005 by the Institute of Ethnology and Ethnography of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures (*INALCO*, France). The publication was preceded by a seminar on interreligious interaction between France and Russia, which took place on October 28–29, 2016, the materials of which are presented at the end of the book.

This collection claims a comprehensive understanding of radicalism in the post-secular world. The authors managed to present the rich texture of interaction between the state and various religious communities in Russia and France. The editors — Elena Filippova and Jean Radva-

ni — have done a great deal of work on understanding such a wide thematic field and attracting the most appropriate materials. Despite the fact that most of the book is devoted to Islam (which has already become a traditional tendency when focusing on the problem of radicalism), it also shows the relevant manifestations in Christianity. The book is divided into four parts: a detailed editorial introduction, in which E. Filippova sets the conceptual framework for the entire publication and J. Radvani analyzes the limits of comparability of the French and Russian experience; a first part, which is devoted to the interaction between religion and the state; the second part on interconfessional contacts and general problems concerning the relationship between religion and society; and final-

ly, the third part, on religiousness and modern forms of radicalism. However, these parts do not equally contribute to the general idea of the book.

In the introduction, Elena Filippova examines the concepts of postsecularity and post-religiosity, which she believes are the most suitable to describe the current situation. Referring to D. Uzlaner she notes that “the clear boundaries between religious and secular, established within the framework of the secular paradigm, are violated” (7). Speaking about the change in religious identity, she cites B. Turner’s thesis that modern conversions “are more like a change of consumer brands than the result of deep spiritual searches” (9). Finally, Filippova argues that “the line linking the current growth of fundamentalism to the conservative protest against the cultural postmodern with its relativism and the absence of inviolable truths can be more productive” than searching for a causal relationship between religiousness and radicalism (13). The erosion of the core of religion (if it is understood in terms of modern history) and the misunderstanding of dogmatism is mentioned in several articles from the second part, and the change in the boundaries between the religious and secular in the first part. However,

the problem is that the authors of the articles themselves rarely appeal to these concepts (with a few exceptions), and all these (undoubtedly valuable) theoretical constructs are detached from the main part of the book.

In his brief review, Jean Radvanyi searches for similar moments in the French and Russian experience of interaction between the state and religious organizations. He was able to identify the areas that allow for the most productive comparison: first, the diversity of the Muslim population; second, the problem of the integration of Muslims; third, the problem of radicalization, or, in his words, the “increased deformation of political Islam and its consequences”; and finally, the fight against Islam-related extremism. In my opinion, the author has managed to define very precisely the main vectors of discussion on this issue — and not only within the framework of this book.

In the first part, Alain Christnacht presented a detailed and exhaustive overview of how the attitude of the French state toward different faiths has changed since the French Revolution. Roman Lunkin, based on an analysis of the legal framework and the practice of law enforcement in Russia, reveals the contradictions of “Orthodox statehood.” In his view, the

Law on Freedom of Conscience, adopted in 1997, as well as the set of amendments called the “Yarovaya Package,” which intensified the discussion of the dominance of “traditional” religions in Russia, became particular points of no return. The author calls this phenomenon a phenomenon of “mono-religion,” which emerged “as a result of the atheistic policy of the Soviet period, which led to the eradication of national religiosity and impoverishment of the religious diversity of Russia” (41).

Katie Rousselet echoes Lunkin’s arguments. Looking at the relationship between spirituality and religiosity in late Soviet society and then in Russian society in the 1990s, she draws an important conclusion: the term decoupling is applicable only in a limited way to Russian society (especially if, following B. Turner, one distinguishes between political and social secularization). In fact, atheism and “clericalization” are two sides of the same coin. “Religion is an integral element of a certain form of government, made possible by the reconstruction of the identity initiated by the elites and quickly taken up by the entire society (53) . . . religiosity participates in the construction of the post-Soviet state, just as state atheism participated in the construction of the Soviet state” (57). Therefore,

one should not contrast the Soviet experience to the post-Soviet one, but, on the contrary, look for continuity and similarities, which is what the author has managed to do, giving numerous historical and contemporary examples of interaction between the state and the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia.

The interaction between the Muslim community and the Russian state is covered only by the example of Tatarstan (obviously, this is due to the participation of Kazan [Volga] Federal University in the project), which, of course, does not reflect the entire palette of such interactions in different regions. It is much more worrying that authors of two of the articles devoted to Tatarstan take a clear state-centric position. In his text, Azat Akhunov describes in detail the history of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan (DUM RT) from 1998 to the present day. The collection of facts is impressive: the author examines in detail the events of the unification congress of the Muslims of Tatarstan in 1998, but there are no references to any historical research or documents. Among the sources there are separate speeches by Muslim leaders of Tatarstan and newspaper articles. The emphasis placed on the narrative reveals the author’s desire to idealize the pri-

macy of the state in state-confessional relations. Thus, Akhunov proceeds from the unsubstantiated notion that “power in the understanding of an ordinary Tatar is sacral; on this basis, perhaps, sometimes, there were proposals to appoint state officials to the highest religious posts” (70). Akhunov characterizes the situation of “powerlessness” in the Muslim community of Tatarstan as follows: “We had to act forcefully, otherwise we could have lost control over the situation.” However, this was avoided due to M. Shaimiev’s intervention in the course of preparation of the unification congress of Muslims of 1998, which was to decide who would head the DUM RT — the “candidate from the government” or a representative of the opposition wing. The author goes on speaking about destabilization or, on the contrary, stabilization through the intervention of Shaimiev’s firm hand. Akhunov comes to the following conclusion: “The relations that have developed between the authorities and Islam have so far yielded positive results and, as noted above, are positively assessed by the Muslim ummah of Tatarstan and are perceived as fair” (79). Although this position is quite popular, especially among Tatar researchers, it still requires justification. To speak about the features inherent in a nation means

to stand on extremely unstable ground; moreover, it is unreasonable to use such statements as an argument to justify the necessity and usefulness of state interference in the religious sphere. This requires stronger arguments based on sociological or other data that are not available in this study.

Reseda Safiullina also notes in her article “the positive nature of the State’s interference in the affairs of religion.” However, then she wonders whether this situation suits those Muslims “who tend to have an official religious structure.” What about the “mass of Muslims who disagree with many provisions” of the DUM? (84) The answer is self-evident — there is a need for more discussion, including on theological issues. However, Safiullina believes that this should be a real discussion, not a simulation. Otherwise, “the wide spreading idea about merging of the republican authorities, security forces and the official clergy will turn to impenetrable barriers between ordinary Muslims and state institutions. As a result, all dissenters will be driven into the underground” (87). It turns out that a productive discussion between representatives of the Muslim community loyal to the authorities is impossible, but it is also impossible between “traditionalists,” because there is a theo-

logical split among them, since “the Hanafi tradition is no longer presented as something unified, monolithic, but as a multifaceted tradition in which accents can be placed in different ways” (87). In public discussion there is criticism of the medieval scholastic approach. Initially, the problem of “recreating the Russian theological school” was put at the forefront. Therefore, speaking about the most adequate way out of the current situation, the author refers to D.-H. Mukhetdinov’s thesis about the change of hadithocentricity to Koranocentrism. Thus, it all comes down to unifying the religious field — this time by creating a unified theological school.

It is worth noting that both A. Akhunov and R. Safiullina appeal to the constitutional principle of separation of religion and state. But both also justify the violation of this principle, on the one hand, by referring to the “positive” consequences of state interference in the life of religious communities, and on the other hand, to M. Shaimiev’s assertion that “religion is separated from the state, but not separated from society” (82).

The second part of the book is designed to show the diversity of interfaith interaction in society. And the articles in this section use a great numbers of facts: almost every author cites data from

sociological surveys and relies on interviews and other field research. At the same time, it is disappointing that sometimes either the conclusions are trivial (“thus, moods of protest are an integral part of the religious life of the Muslim and Christian communities of Karachaevo-Cherkessia. . . . On the whole, the population demonstrates a fairly high resistance to the influence of destructive ideologies” — from the article by Yevgeny and Natalia Kratova, p. 188), or there are no conclusions at all, and the authors are limited to fairly flat statistics (for example, the works of Titova and Kozlov, as well as Olga Pavlova). The article by Guzelia Guzelbaeva abounds in quotations from interviews with informants, but the overall picture is not clear: first, the social status of informants is not specified (although both the general public and experts were interviewed), and secondly, interesting field materials are undoubtedly followed by almost no meaningful conclusions. Conceptual summaries or discussions of the identified problems are often absent.

Liliya Sagitova describes in detail the place of Islam in the modern public space of Tatarstan. It is one of the best examples of the description of the realities of Tatarstan in this edition. The author draws attention to the discussion within the elite about

the understanding of the modern role of Islam and the mechanisms of social integration of Muslims, as well as noting the problem of the stigmatization of Muslims (a very illustrative example is news about the so-called “Sharia patrol,” as well as the movement “Russian jogging for a healthy lifestyle”¹). However, Sagitova also fails to avoid some alarmism when it comes to “the risks of Islamic globalization,” which “may lead to the loss of the historically established Islamic theological tradition of the Tatars, divide the Muslim ummah of Tatarstan, and contribute to the formation of Muslim sects of extremist orientation” (97).

A rather interesting portrait of interfaith dialogue in Adygea is presented by Irina Babich. Alexander Martynenko uses the example of the village of Belozer’e to show the life of “the enclave of the Tatar-Muslim culture in the Volga region . . . the Muslim enclave in the Republic of Mor-dovia.” Against the general background, the work of Alena Guskova, who focused on the poorly studied area of interaction between Muslims and Christians of

the Moscow region, is particularly notable. Through numerous interviews, she shows how tolerant the two religious groups are of each other and also reveals an important issue on which their opinions are shared: the question of the transmission of traditions. “An incorrect understanding of the dogma of ‘ethnic’ Christians and Muslims, failure to observe the requirements of religion, lack of interest in the issues of faith among young people, mixed marriages in which unbelief is chosen over faith — these problems were common” (202).

The third part of the book seems to be the most successful, as the authors were able not only to consider the various aspects of radicalism in detail, but also to set the direction of further discussion and even enter into polemics among themselves.

Sylvia Serrano points out that the goals and methods of fighting radicalism are distorted by the wrong definition of the subject field of radicalization by the French authorities. Their main mistake, according to Serrano, is an attempt to unify this field and create a kind of average image of a radical based on supposedly similar sociological characteristics. “As a rule, the authorities tend to describe the process of radicalization as a certain path consisting of a series of events

1. In January 2014 in Tatarstan “Sharia patrols” appeared, which attacked people that “didn’t live according to Sharia” in their point of view. As an answer some days later the group “Russian jogging for a healthy lifestyle” appeared, which attacked participants of the “Sharia patrols.”

and crucial contacts, which can be modeled” (221). They prefer this way as it simplifies the formulation of tasks to counter radicalism, but it is not productive. As Serrano notes, ultimately, this approach leads to imagining that “a reluctance to eat baguette or go to the pool is a prerequisite for radicalization” (225). First and foremost, Islam is at risk, as “a radical person’ stigmatizes Islam as a religion incompatible with French society.” Is it possible to overcome this situation? To answer this question, Serrano presents a classic polemic by Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel. The first insists on the need to address the phenomenon of the “Islamization of radicalism” in its entirety, while the second considers political violence the result of the radicalization of Islam. As a result, she states that “the content of antiradicalization programs is rather in line with G. Kepel’s concept” (223).

The editors of the collection, apparently, following S. Serrano, support the position of Olivier Roy, as his text is in the collection, but Gilles Kepel’s is not. It is hardly necessary to dwell on this text, which contains information about hundreds of people who have participated in terrorist attacks in France. Once again, Roy defends the position he has expressed in many works: there is no single psychological,

political, or other portrait of a jihadist; at best, there are some similar sociological characteristics and nothing more. Each specific case is unique. “They [jihadists] do not share its [modern society’s] values, but share its sociological characteristics: the couple is the main cell. Therefore, a jihadist often goes the way of desocialization with his wife or girlfriend, in order to reconstruct a micro-society in the company of brothers and sisters in arms” (257). The myth of brainwashing for Muslim women is also breaking down, as it does not take into account such components of individual behavior as personal freedom and political choice.

However, the trend toward simplifications based on various classifications and typologies is attractive not only for civil servants engaged in the development of counter-radicalization programs, but also in the academic environment. Thus, the article by Samir Amgar and Samy Zenyani completely contradicts the theses set forth by O. Roy. In their article, they offer a seemingly exhaustive classification of modern Salafism: quietist (based on the principles of purification of religion from innovation and education of Muslims to give up bad customs), political (defending a “militant and political understanding of Islam in the spirit of

the Muslim Brotherhood”), and revolutionary (calling for jihad in the form of armed struggle). The main weakness of such theoretical constructions is their limited factual basis. Thus, it appears as if the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is no different from its “western branch” and the regional diversity of the movement’s activities is not taken into account. The authors also emphasize the “symbolic protest” of Salafists, which is allegedly expressed in their appearance: “It is typical to wear long traditional robes, hats on the head and beards” (272). The failure of this thesis is clearly illustrated by the texts of Serrano and Roy.

How do we find the balance between the dangerous simplifications that lead to the neglect of significant aspects of social reality and the analysis of each case in the spirit of Olivier Roy? It is probably necessary to investigate similarities in the activity of these or those movements or separate persons, but not to construct them as an absolute, pretending to an exhaustive explanation. In his article, Akhmet Yarlykapov focuses on this very issue. Long years of ethnographic work allow him to speak with full confidence about the mosaic of the Islamic field in Russia as the most important factor to be taken into account when building a dialogue between the state

and the Muslim community, especially in light of what is happening in the Middle East. In his article, he discusses in detail the new security challenges posed by the Islamic State and the possible ways in which the state can respond to these challenges. The author comes to the conclusion that this “mosaic” of the Muslim community in Russia should also give rise to a kind of “mosaic” of measures taken by the state: it is necessary not only to support the DUM, but also “to involve in cooperation another part of the Islamic field, growing more and more, which for a long time remained outside the partnership due to the lack of official status” (248); and, of course, it is necessary to consistently implement the principle of equidistance of the state from all Muslim organizations in order to assert the principle of secularism (some authors who have presented their research on Tatarstan in this collection argue otherwise).

Victor Shnirelman presents a picture of radicalism associated with Orthodox traditionalists and fundamentalists. Using several cases he analyzes various manifestations and dynamics of radical movements that use the rhetoric of traditional values and Orthodoxy. He examines in detail the activities of the Orthodox national teams that emerged after

the “punk prayer service,” the pogrom in the Manege on August 14, 2015, the program for the construction of 200 churches in Moscow and related activities of the organization “Sorok Sorokov.” Most of the article is devoted to discussion about the film *Mathilde*. The factual basis of this research, which allows the author to draw original and, undoubtedly, strongly supported conclusions about the new cultural boundaries in the Russian public space, is striking.

Finally, Anne-Sophie Lamine calls for an examination of the multifaceted nature of radicalism from the perspective of social

psychology. She shows how the attitudes of “faith-identity” and “faith-confidence” influence manifestations of radicalism.

The undoubted merit of the book’s editors is that they managed to gather such different points of view in one collection and literally “dissect” the problems of interaction between the state and religious communities. Updating the discussion on many painful issues of French and Russian society is, perhaps, the greatest success of the publication under consideration.

S. Ragozina

M. Iu. Smirnov, ed. 2017. *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar' sotsiologii religii* [Encyclopedic dictionary of the sociology of religion]. Saint Petersburg: Platonovskoe Filosofskoe Obshchestvo (in Russian). — 508 p.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.22394/2311-3448-2019-6-1-113-119>

There is no question that the editor-in-chief of this publication, Yuri Smirnov, and the circle of authors representing established, well-respected post-Soviet religious studies, proceeded from the best motives and spent a lot of effort to make a useful book. The result was ambiguous: sometimes impeccably solid, but in general not very clear and sometimes even strange. While some articles are thoughtfully and pro-

fessionally written, and some important sociological theories and names are adequately presented and have reference and educational value, it is still not quite clear how to use this book.

The original design itself is questionable. The very idea of arranging everything alphabetically — names, concepts, organizations — as is usually done in large universal encyclopedias, does not seem to be a very ap-

appropriate solution in the case of representing a specific academic discipline. *Handbooks* and *companions* of this kind are never structured in this way: they usually consist of thematic sections, partly reminiscent of classic textbooks, that can be supplemented with reference materials as an appendix. Here everything is mixed together, and different articles follow the same alphabetical order: “Agnosticism,” “Adept,” “Asad, Talal,” “Atheism,” and so on. The problem seems to begin with the criteria for determining the “weight” of names and concepts to be included. There is, for example, the article “Eschatology in Mass Consciousness.” Perhaps, the reader is familiar with the concept of “eschatology,” and the reference to the “masses” assumes its sociological relevance. But there are separate articles about atheism, hierophany, rituals, worship, prayer, ecumenism, pacifism, etc. In the article “Atheism” the author (E. Ufimtseva) has to explain what atheism is in general, and to present its entire history starting with Democritus (!); the article never arrives at the real *sociology* of this phenomenon. It is clear that all these phenomena — fasting, rituals, prayer, monasticism, etc. — have a sociological dimension, but the authors seldom manage to keep this particular, sociological emphasis, or to

avoid a common, even if sometimes quite good, but excessive description of certain phenomena with long historical essays and philosophical speculations.

There is also confusion in the initial idea of the dictionary: a whole series of articles begins with the word “religion,” on the model “religion and . . . something”; it is clear that religion can be connected with any other element of society and culture, but also it is obvious that using such a principle in writing a dictionary does not seem very helpful. All the more so because this model suddenly appears in the opposite order for unknown reasons, for example, “Terrorism and Religion.” Or the article “Civil Society and Religion” (whose author is well-known Italian sociologist S. Ferrari), where, for some reason, we read a long passage about what civil society as such is, and in the end we are offered some casuistry about the correlation between faith and truth, while the problem put forward in the title of the entry has a number of concrete sociological implications, which the author ignores. The same is true of the word “concept”: there are a number of articles starting with this word; it is not clear why the articles “Implicit Religion,” “Invisible Religion,” and “Public Religion” could not be named in this direct way, without the term

“concept” coming first. And there is an article titled “Postulate of ‘Conservative Churches’” (a separate aspect of Stark and Finke’s theory of religion), immediately following the article on fasting (*post* in Russian). It is not very clear which user would suddenly browse the book in search of the word “postulate,” and why.

In some formulations and styles, one can sense the worn-out, proven combination of sociology and religious studies that derives from the old Marxism: for example, the author of the article “The Phenomenon of Religion” (E. Arinin) presents a long and painful discussion of what a “phenomenon” is and what “phenomenology” is in general. In the same vein, articles such as, for example, “The Typology of Religion” or “Those Hesitant toward Religion” (sic! separate article!) are of little relevance — it is not very clear how they relate to each other. The concept of *fuzzy-religiosity* suddenly resurfaces as a separate article (not as a “concept”!) and for some reason in English (unlike all the others), although there are many other, more significant, related concepts that are omitted. And in general, why are all these notions singled out and not combined in the framework of the same typology within a complex, but semantically compact and transparent concept of “religiosity”? “Religiosity”

is undoubtedly a central term in the sociology of religion, and it seems correct that the book includes four authors’ articles about this concept (R. Lopatkin, E. Ostrovskaya, E. Rutkevich, I. Yablokov). But other entries seem unnecessary or excessive: for example, the entry called “The Religious and Mythological Complex in the Public Consciousness” (by M. Smirnov). It is not clear how this relates to “religiosity,” “religious consciousness,” and many other terms to which other entries are devoted and with which this text intersects; not to mention the fact that the very word “complex” (in the dreary combination “religious and mythological complex”) may not be understood by people who are not familiar with Soviet philosophical language.

I repeat: there is a thoroughness and strength in the efforts of the sociologists involved in the book. For example, the already mentioned decision to include several articles by different authors on the same topic is very correct and reasonable. Apart from “religiosity” the dictionary contains four articles on identity, which is certainly one of the most important sociological concepts. The same applies to a number of other important concepts, such as secularity. But in other cases, logical failures are too frequent. When, next to several articles on

the topic of “Globalization and Religion,” you suddenly stumble upon an article titled “Global Perspectives of Religion,” you begin to doubt whether the whole project had any central coordination. Or another example: along with a short article on the privatization of religion (K. Kolkunova), there is, for some reason, an equally short article on the privatization of *faith* (M. Smirnov), and at the same time — an article five times as long on the “deprivatization of religion” (E. Rutkevich). It is strange that three different authors talk about two aspects of the same sociological discourse; it is doubly strange that the concept of the “privatization of religion” — which has a much more elaborate, substantive core and remains at the center of the sociology of religion — is given much less space. Or further, there is a separate entry about the “profane,” a separate entry about the “sacred” (*sakral’noe* in Russian), and one more entry about another Russian word for the “sacred” — *sviashchenoe*, which does not add much to the previous articles.

Some texts are really solid and systematic, with references to the latest Western works, and these articles to some extent justify the project as a whole. In other cases, however, the wording does not stand up to criticism. For example, although it is use-

ful that the notion of “vernacular religions” is introduced into the vocabulary, this term is defined quite vaguely: “Vernacular religions are the interpretation of the dependence of perception of a religion to sth. by specific communities. . . , etc.” (E. Grishaeva); there is clearly confusion in the syntax (how can “religions” be “an interpretation?”) and the content. Or in the entry about Talal Asad, K. Medvedeva says that Asad considers Islam “not as a theoretical object, but as a specific historical totality”; although the further description of Asad’s approaches is adequate, the first formula is strange: why would “historical specificity” make it impossible to consider Islam as a “theoretical object”? Perhaps the author wanted to express some other thought?

Or let us take the definition of “religious movement,” which, as author M. Smirnov writes, is “in the broadest sense . . . any independent group of believers, different from others by their faith and religious actions.” It remains quite unclear how this definition of “movement” actually differs from non-movement — while in fact the concept of (religious) movement is sociologically quite clear and well-defined. Smirnov also equates the word “adept” with the concept of “religious virtuoso,” which does not seem to be correct. The entry on Max

Weber (by the same author) formulates “Weber’s so-called thesis” about the alleged dependence of society and culture on the “content of religious beliefs.” Such a “thesis,” in such a rigid formulation, of course, is a serious simplification, which neither Weber nor contemporary sociologists could allow. And if we call secularization “the process of the loss of religion’s social significance,” then the statement that follows seems to be, to put it mildly, a particular exaggeration, namely, that all of the Christian reformers, such as Wycliffe, Hus, and Luther, “called for secularization” (author E. Elbakyan): even if it may be only a clumsy formulation, still . . . let us try to imagine Luther calling for “the loss of the significance of religion”! Maybe I’m a little too picky. But there are a lot of clumsy instances like this.

The dictionary contains useful and important essays on personalities, especially some major Western sociologists, whose work is not very well known in Russia and who are therefore on the periphery of at least the Russian student community: Pierre Bourdieu, Robert Bell, James Beckford, Brian Wilson, Grace Davy, Robert Wuthnow, and others. However, some other names included in this series do not seem entirely appropriate, for example, someone named E. Ba-

bosov, especially after we read that his main contribution was that he “considered religion as a specific spiritual and social phenomenon in its interaction with other spheres,” as if one could see religion in a different way. It also seems inappropriate to honor, along with Bourdieu and others, a certain A. Lukashevsky, “an active member of the Union of Militant Godless.” Or, say, the Soviet academician and state official Georgy Frantsev, who once studied ancient Egyptian religion and had no relation to sociology.

The dictionary pays great attention to the academic institutional structures related to the sociology of religion; the relevant Russian, foreign, and international societies, organizations, and associations of different ranks and scales are described in detail. The professional life of a discipline is important and useful, but numerous dry pages devoted to it make the whole thing strongly resemble a reference book.

Speaking as a whole, the book, by virtue of a design that was not quite thought-out, leaves the impression of a sum of fragments of different orders and levels, from which the contour of a whole is not visible. Apparently, the alphabetical principle itself was in the first place unsuitable for such a project, especially if we

take into account how difficult it is for the reader to predict the quirks and whims of a haphazardly composed dictionary. As for the content, despite the solidity of some texts, in my opinion, the authors failed to reflect the *actual* status of the discipline — the sociology of religion — what it was formerly and at the time of publication. Sociological aspects are often dissolved in traditional, general religious studies issues. The history of the discipline and basic information about it prevails, and many relevant topics are entirely or mostly omitted.

There is almost no attempt to understand the status of the sociology of religion in the era of poststructuralist and postmodernist criticism. There is no description or theoretical assessment of post-colonial or feminist approaches. The concept of post-secularity is ignored. There is almost no coverage of the commodification of religion — the rethinking of religious objects and practices in the neoliberal economic and consumerist environment. There is nothing concerning studies of religion within the framework of the sociology of space (especially within urban studies). There is no in-depth theoretical analysis of the mediation of religiosity in the digital environment (although there is an article on religion on the In-

ternet). There are no separate articles on the national and ethnic dimension of religion, or on migration and diasporas (these central topics are only touched upon in the articles on globalization). There is no interpretation of religious violence as a sociological problem. There is no real, deep interpretation of the relationship between religiosity and spirituality; the relationship of popular (urban), folk, and “invented” religion, understood not within the framework of the old Marxist concept of “mass consciousness,” but in the context of a set of actual discourses and practices. The methods of the discipline are not sufficiently covered — although there is information about textbook approaches to “measuring religiosity” (to which two articles are devoted), there is nothing on the new challenges and problems of the research *consciousness* itself: dependence on academic background, open or implicit political and confessional engagement, disputes about reliability and representativeness, and so on. In addition, the book treats the sociology of religion like a separate locked office, or as a separate bookcase rigidly dedicated to a specific subject: the book seems blind to the general environment in which sociology actively interacts with other disciplines in the social sciences and humanities.

However, it is easy to criticize and list what the book does *not* contain. Yet, we have it, and it is good that we do, and what it contains is a collection of texts, albeit of different quality and caliber, which are important for students at all levels and for researchers;

these texts adequately reflect the professional view of the discipline (or subdiscipline) from the Russian perspective; the sociology of religion has a long history in Western academia, to which the Russian contributions belong as well.

A. Agadjanian



Reference Information

Authors

ALEXANDER AGADJANIAN — Professor of Religious Studies at the Center for the Study of Religion, Russian State University of the Humanities (Moscow, Russia). grandrecit@gmail.com

DIMITRI BRATKIN — Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy of Religion and Religious Studies, St. Petersburg State University (Saint Petersburg, Russia). bratkin@yandex.ru

WILL COHEN — Associate Professor of Theology, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Scranton; President of the Orthodox Theological Society in America (USA). will.cohen@scranton.edu

PAVEL KHONDZINSKII — Archpriest, Associated Professor at Saint Tikhon's Orthodox University of the Humanities (Moscow, Russia). paulum@mail.ru

VLADIMIR MIKHEEV — M.A. Student in Cognitive Science, Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia). Dezem@bk.ru

SOFYA RAGOZINA — Lecturer at the National Research University Higher School of Economics; Research Fellow at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) (Moscow, Russia). ragozina.grc@gmail.com

ANDREY SHISHKOV — Lecturer at the Chair of External Church Relations and Social Sciences, Ss. Cyril and Methodius Post-Graduate Institute; Director of the Center for Studies on Contemporary Ecclesiological Issues of Eastern Orthodoxy; Secretary, Synodal Biblical and Theological Commission of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow, Russia). andrey.v.shishkov@gmail.com